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With compliment to Japan Foundation and  
The International Chodiev Foundation.


The Russian Japanology Review is semiannual edition. This edition is published under the auspice of Association of Japanologists in cooperation with Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). The purpose of this project is broader international promotion of the results of Japanese Studies in Russia and the introduction of the academic activities of Russian Japanologists. It rubricates articles in two large sections — contemporary Japan (politics, economics, society) and traditional Japan (history, literature, and culture).

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ISSN: 2658-6789

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CONTENT

Greeting for the readers of the summer issue
of ‘Russian Japanology Review’.................................................................5

Streltsov D.V.   Maverick of Japanese politics in Cold War era
                      (commemorating the centenary of Yasuhiro Nakasone)........7

Kazakov O.I.   Some aspects of humanitarian cooperation
                      of Japan with the countries of East Asia..............................29

Zhilina L.V.   The challenges of political socialization
                      of the contemporary Japanese youth.................................57

Sakharova E.B.  Fujiwara House Biography: Continental Prototypes ........81

Rodin S.A.   Poetical collection Kaifuso:
                          history, politics and poetics........................................107

Shchepkin V.V.  Creating a minority: the views of Japanese
                      intellectuals and Japan’s policy towards Ainu
                      in the 18th and 19th centuries ........................................128
Greeting for the readers of the summer issue of ‘Russian Japanology Review’

Dear readers,

It is my great pleasure to present you the summer issue of our semiannual Russian Japanology Review. Three papers of the issue are concerned with modern Japanese politics. The article written by Dmitry Streltsov dwells upon the political biography of Yasuhiro Nakasone who marked his centenary in May 2018. This prominent Japanese politician, who is called in the paper a Maverick of Japanese policy in Cold War era, left a significant footprint on the political history of Japan. In the opinion of the author, Nakasone is an example of a successful reformer, whose undertakings set the tone to the national development in the field of administrative, tax, and social affairs and education for many years ahead. The author stresses that one of Nakasone’s messages was that Japan should stop following examples of other nations’ patterns others but become fully politically and spiritually independent. The paper by Oleg Kazakov presents the role of humanitarian exchanges in Japan’s relations with Russia and the countries of East Asia. A special emphasis is put on Japan’s policy of simulating the inflow of foreign tourism, which is illustrated by rich statistical material. The paper highlights humanitarian cooperation between Japan and Russia in the Cross-year Year of 2018, which was initiated by the country’s leaders to boost contacts in a broad range of areas. The author stresses that Japan’s experience of using soft power in constructing its relations with other countries could be extremely helpful for Russia. The paper of Larisa Zhilina is dedicated to challenges
of political socialization of the contemporary Japanese youth. The author stresses that Japanese young people do not exhibit much interest in politics, which is attributed to a lack of the sense of civic duty, compared to older generations. Zhilina insists that traditional mobilizing institutions of politics in Japan are basically not interested in reaching out to young people.

Three other papers deal with the problems of Japanese history. Stepan Rodin’s paper deals with Kaifuso, the first poetical collection of the verse by Japanese poets, which was composed prior to Man’yoshu, dating back to Nara period. Evgeniya Sakharova’s research focuses on the continental prototypes for Fujiwara-no Kamatari Biography (the main part of “Toshi Kaden”/“The Fujiwara House Biography”). Vasilii Schepkin concentrates his attention to the views of Japanese intellectuals and Japan’s policy towards Ainu in the 18th and 19th centuries.

I hope you will enjoy the reading.

Dmitry Streltsov,
Chairman of the Russian Association of Japanologists
MAVERICK\textsuperscript{1} OF JAPANESE POLITICS
IN COLD WAR ERA
(commemorating the centenary of Yasuhiro Nakasone)

D.V. STRELTSOV

Abstract: The centenary of a prominent post-war politician, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone was observed on May 27, 2018. The personality of Nakasone attracts attention due to his being a new type of politician who left a significant footprint on the political history of Japan. Many rightfully link the political success of Nakasone to his phenomenal capacity for political maneuvering, and the ability to gain support of stronger political opponents and to establish temporary unions, which resulted in his nickname, the “Weather Vane”.

In contrast to his predecessors, Prime Minister Nakasone was actively using mass media to create a favorable image in the eye of the public and to appeal to his voters directly. In fact, Nakasone was the first leader of the Liberal Democratic Party to transform his personal popularity with voters into a powerful internal political resource in the party.

Nakasone is the example of a successful reformer, whose undertakings set the tone to the national development in the field of administrative, tax, and social affairs and education for many years ahead. The Nakasone reforms are mentioned in many textbooks on public politics and governance as remarkably productive and effective against the backdrop of unsuccessful reforms held in a number of European countries in the same period.

\textsuperscript{1} The coined term comes from the name of Samuel Maverick (1803–1870). Unlike other farmers, the Texan entrepreneur and politician of the 19th century refused to brand his cattle, amongst other things. The term means “individualist”, “dissident”, and “neo-Orthodox”.
In fact, Nakasone’s neo-conservatism relied on economic nationalism: the establishment of Japan as a global economic leader that could dictate its terms on the world. A major idea of Nakasone’s neo-conservatism was that Japan should stop following examples of other nations’ patterns others but become fully politically and spiritually independent. He believed that, apart from stopping to borrow foreign practices, Japan should develop into an attractive role model to be followed by others. In that sense, Nakasone’s neo-conservatism was an impressive call for internationalizing Japanese cultural and spiritual values.

Nakasone’s institutional reforms faced fierce resistance from the government bureaucracy and, despite partial success, were not fully implemented. In the field of diplomacy, many initiatives of Nakasone aimed at increasing the political role of Japan on the world stage remained unfinished during his Premiership.

Keywords: Nakasone, Maverick, the “Weather Vane”, neo-conservatism, “autonomous defense”, privatization of public corporations, “unsinkable aircraft carrier”, populism.

The centenary of a prominent post-war politician, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, was observed on May 27, 2018. The Nakasone personality attracts attention not just because he had a longer premiership than many other Japanese politicians in the post-war history of the 20th century (his five-year tenure was shorter only than the eight-year term of Eisaku Sato) but also because he was a new type of politician who left a significant footprint on the political history of Japan.

This article will follow the political path of Nakasone and evaluate his political legacy in a great variety of spheres: the domestic and foreign policy, ideology, national security, public governance, education, etc.

Yasuhiro Nakasone was born in a big family of timber merchant in Takasaki, Gunma prefecture, on May 27, 1918. He had five brothers and sisters, two of whom died in their early years. The Nakasone family derived from an old Samurai clan and even claimed being direct descendants of the Minamoto clan via the famous Minamoto-no Yoshimitsu and his son Minamoto-no Yoshikiyo. According to the Tsunayoshi family chronicle, a tenth-generation descendant of Yoshikiyo,
a vassal of the Takeda clan, took the name of Juro Nakasone and died in the Battle of Sagamigawa [Nakasone 1999, pp. 1-2].

Nakasone’s father settled down in Takasaki in 1912 and started a timber business that was thriving on the construction boom of the post-WWI period. Yacchan (the child name of Yasuhiro) was in his own words a calm and balanced child. He was admitted to the Shizuoka secondary school in 1935, excelled in history and literature, and acquired a fluent knowledge of French. In the fall of 1938, Nakasone was admitted to the Department of Law of the Tokyo Imperial University, a forge of Japanese civil servants, graduated in 1941, and was employed with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Later that year he volunteered to join the Imperial Japanese Navy, where he served as officer and treasurer until the end of war. Notably, Nakasone was the only post-war prime minister of Japan with an experience of active military service.

In 1946, the young man with firm anti-Communist outlooks decided to retire from civil service and to start a political career. He established in his home district of Takasaki the Seiun Juku (Purple Cloud Society) which declared in its charter the goal of reinstating national pride and independence of Japan [Seiunjuku to wa 2018].

As early as in April 1947, he was elected to parliament for the first time on the ticket of the Democratic Party, which united many right-wing politicians of the pre-war generation.

Instead of concealing his nationalistic views, Nakasone made a point of them. In the beginning of his career, Nakasone rode his white bicycle throughout the third electoral district of the Gunma prefecture and presented anti-communist pamphlets to voters. He was always wearing a black tie in parliament to express his grief over the country’s occupation [Tsuzuki 2000, p. 438]. In his public speeches, Nakasone called for the immediate reinstatement of the Armed Forces, the abolition of Article 9 of the imposed ‘MacArthur Constitution’, and the raising of the younger generation in the spirit of patriotism and respect for the emperor. He also started calling for modifying Article 1 of the new constitution, which defined the emperor as “the symbol of state,” in order to give the sovereign the status of “the chief of state.” [Tsuzuki 2000, p. 439]. It was
only in the 1960s, when the period of “ideological policy” came to an end and more reserved sentiments became to prevail in the country, that Nakasone changed his tone and concluded that the constitution enjoyed public support and should be changed in a gradual and long-term manner.

Nakasone was a political newcomer in 1951 but did not hesitate to send a 28-page letter to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, head of the General Headquarters of the Occupation. The letter strongly criticized the occupation policy of the United States, and the angry general immediately tossed it into a waste basket [Fackler 2010]. In 1952 Nakasone became known for his criticism of the emperor for losing the war. He urged Emperor Showa to abdicate his throne in favor of the crown prince as an effort to console families of fallen soldiers, to strengthen the moral foundation of the imperial system, and to give a fresh impetus to its development. [Tsuzuki 2000, p. 439].

In 1955, Nakasone and his supporters from the Democratic Party joined the newly established Liberal Democratic Party. As early as in 1959, being a young politician of 41, he was appointed to his first cabinet member position as the minister of science and education in the Kishi Cabinet. In 1968, Nakasone headed his own faction in the Liberal Democratic Party that was of the anti-mainstream origin (the faction was led by Ichiro Kono until 1965). Later on, he occupied many significant positions in the government: he was the Minister of Transportation in 1967-1968, the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency in 1970-1971 (in the cabinet of Eisaku Sato), the Minister of Foreign Trade and Industry in 1972-1974 (in the cabinet of Kakuei Tanaka), and the Director General of the Administrative Management Agency in 1980-1981 (in the cabinet of Zenko Suzuki). October 1982 was Nakasone’s finest hour. After the resignation of Suzuki, he ran for the Liberal Democratic Party presidential election and won with 58% of the vote. The support from Tanaka faction, the most powerful one in the Liberal Democratic Party, played the decisive role. In November 1982 he was elected prime minister by the parliament’s lower house.

The tenure of Nakasone could have ended soon enough: a year later the opposition pushed through the motion of no-confidence to his
cabinet, and the Liberal Democratic Party lost the absolute majority in the parliament’s lower house as a result of the early election of December 18, 1983.

Nonetheless, Nakasone retained his premiership, and lured eight independent MPs from amongst former members of the New Liberal Club to join the ruling party. Nakasone took revenge in July 1986 by winning a landslide victory in the “double election” to the upper and lower houses of the parliament. In recognition of Nakasone’s achievements, a party congress extended his presidency for another year (the party charter limited presidency to two two-year terms), which enabled him to remain prime minister until November 1987.

Upon resignation from the prime minister’s position, which was extended to Noboru Takeshita, the new party president, whom Nakasone designated his successor (it was the only case in history when the successor was named by an outgoing party leader), Nakasone, like most leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, appeared to be involved in the Recruit corruption scandal and had to leave the party in May 1989, handing over the leadership of his party faction to Michio Watanabe. Still, Nakasone returned to the party in April 1991 and retained the MP mandate for more than a decade. It was only in 2003 when Nakasone, then 81, was not on the ticket of the Liberal Democratic Party and his parliamentary career came to an end.

Having resigned as prime minister, Nakasone established the Nakasone Yasuhiro Peace Institute (NPI) in June 1988 with the goal of “research, international exchange, and other measures promoting studies of major problems faced by the world and Japan.” [About NPI]. The institute’s research programs embrace international politics, economy, security, energy, and environment.

Nakasone founded a political dynasty: his son, Hirofumi (born in 1945), became a member of the parliament’s upper chamber and occupied various ministerial positions, including the posts of the Minister of Education and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and also served as the Chairman of the General Assembly of LDP Members in the House of Councilors. Nakasone’s grandson, Yasutaka (born in 1982) was for the
first time elected to the parliament’s lower chamber from the Liberal Democratic Party in the proportionate representation constituency in 2017.

The noticeable footprint left by Nakasone on the history of Japanese politics was primarily the result of his personal abilities. An article published by The New York Times in September 1970 described the new head of the Japan Defense Agency as a Maverick, a man of remarkable style whose appearance was completely unexpected in the country where individuality was not a fashion and convenient mediocrity was expected of politicians [Oka 1970].

Many justly linked Nakasone’s success on the political stage with his phenomenal knack on political maneuvering. Nakasone repeatedly demonstrated his ability to gain support of stronger political opponents and forge temporary alliances, which gave him a chance to win in a losing situation with much worse position than his rivals had initially. This is why he was nicknamed “Weather Vane” (kazamidori). Nakasone often said, “A weather vane stands upright but rotates its body. This is the essence of politics.” [Encyclopedia of World Biography 2004].

In the late 1960s, when Nakasone had a deficit of funds and lost the support of his own faction and, he joined a coalition with his rival Eisaku Sato, representing the Liberal Democratic Party’s “mainstream” faction. As a result, he became a member of the Sato cabinet.

In the election of the Liberal Democratic Party president, which followed Sato’s resignation in 1972, he shifted his focus on Kakuei Tanaka. This move brought victory to the latter and provided Nakasone with a ministerial position in the new cabinet. A decade later, Tanaka supported Nakasone who was running for party presidency against Takeo Fukuda. As a result, the Nakasone Cabinet was highly dependent on the opinion of Tanaka and was dubbed as the “Tanakasone Cabinet.” [Hrebenar 1992, p. 253]. At the same time, fair relations with the party faction leaders Tanaka and Suzuki, who could actually veto any party decisions, made Nakasone feel confident in his position as prime minister for the whole five years period of his tenure.
Another important element of Nakasone’s success was his unusual for Japanese politicians ability to appeal directly to people and a remarkable personal charisma. Nakasone was actually the first LDP leader to transform his personal popularity with voters into a powerful intra-party political resource. Many voters and party colleagues especially liked Nakasone’s ability to assume personal responsibility and to be accountable for his own actions. As the prime minister, he drew many new members to his faction, both new MPs who took part in the election campaign under the banners of the Nakasone faction, and independent MPs and members of other party factions and groups.

In 1981, a year before Nakasone was appointed the Prime minister; his faction was the fourth largest in the party (after the factions of Tanaka, Suzuki, and Fukuda) and comprised 52 members. Given the moderate faction size, Nakasone could not aspire for independence in managing the party and government affairs. But as soon as he gained substantial ground in the dual election of 1986, his policy towards rival factions became much more independent than before. After the election, his faction in the party grew to 87 members, which put it on the third position amongst LDP factions in the parliament and on the second position after the Tanaka faction in the House of Representatives [Curtis 1988, p. 105]. The reliance on the might of his faction and the ability to maintain the intra-party balance enabled Nakasone not to look back at his party opponents but to initiate a series of risky and controversial reforms, such as the administrative reform or the introduction of consumer tax.

Later developments demonstrated that the phenomenon of charismatic Nakasone was short-lived. The epoch of populism was still a long way off in the Japanese politics; the popularity of Nakasone was based on his “presidential style” management and the ability to assume personal responsibility as the leader, which was still a unique case [Curtis 1988, p. 106]. Maverick Nakasone was succeeded by a series of traditional type politicians. The first LDP leader after Nakasone who dared to challenge the tradition and to rely on the rank-and-file party members and the public opinion was Junichiro Koizumi, who took the position of the party president in 2001.
Political innovations of Nakasone which deserve a special mention include his broad use of mass media for directly addressing the public. For instance, in early 1984, when the party’s approval rating fell after the unpopular “hawkish” statements of the prime minister, Nakasone loudly declared the launch of “three reforms” — administrative, financial, and educational — and took a lot of effort to promote his undertakings. At the same time, newspapers and national television broadly advertised the cabinet’s welfare policy, “the course of flowers and greens” (protection of city environment), measures against cancer, the fight against juvenile delinquency, etc. As a result, the approval rating of the Nakasone Cabinet stabilized at 40% level, which was quite high for Japan [Masumi 1995, p. 423]. This enabled him to win the LDP presidential election held in the same year.

Nakasone was even more efficient in using media resources for promoting his foreign policy undertakings. For instance, in January 1983, right after the formation of a new cabinet, he paid a visit to South Korea, which drastically improved the atmosphere of bilateral relations and made a good publicity for the prime minister. Right after that, he went to the United States and made a series of flamboyant statements, which caused a mixed public response but markedly increased his rating.

The innovations introduced by Nakasone in various spheres drew attention at every stage of his political career. An illustrative example is the defense policy where Nakasone was campaigning for a proactive course. He believed that Japan should be capable of autonomous defense, so it should renounce the pacifist self-restrictions assumed after the WWII. In the middle of the 1950s, he called for Japan’s acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. Later on, he abandoned the idea of nuclear choice as he realized that the possession of nuclear weapons per se would not solve the problem of national security.

From the very beginning of his political career, Nakasone earned a reputation of an opponent to the Security Treaty, which, in his opinion, infringed the Japanese sovereignty. Nonetheless, he was appointed Director General of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in 1970. Being true to his beliefs, Nakasone proposed in his new capacity the course of “autonomous
defense” (jishu boei). Notably, the “autonomous defense” line basically corresponded to Japan’s foreign political conditions after the release of the “Nixon Doctrine,” which implied a reduction in the US military presence in Asia and required much more self-defense efforts from the US Asian allies.

The ideas of “autonomous defense” was reproduced in the conceptual documents of Japan’s military policy, which were adopted in the period of Nakasone’s tenure as the JDA Director General. He attained a revision of “Japan’s National Defense Basic Policy” (October 1970) and succeeded in the adoption of a new five-year national defense plan (1972-1977). The publication of the White Book on Defense had a special significance for Nakasone, as all previous White Books, due to the Constitutional restrictions, had been for official use only. The publication of the White Book put an end to the taboo on public discussion of defense issues. Another important innovation introduced by Nakasone was the inclusion to the White Book on Defense of the proposition that the Self-Defense Forces would be resisting to a foreign aggression along with the U.S. troops stationed in Japan (according to the 1957 provisions, the Self-Defense Forces had been viewed only as a “supplement” to the U.S. forces performing auxiliary functions) [Hoey 2012, p. 48].

In fact, the “autonomous defense” course did not gain much support from the government and caused resistance on the part of the party colleagues and from inside the Japan Defense Agency. Prime Minister Sato generally backed the ideas of his minister but worried that the “autonomous defense” concept might weaken the Security Treaty and might erode the zone of responsibility of the U.S. forces. [Hoey 2012, p. 74]. It was one of the reasons for Nakasone’s resignation as the head of the Japan Defense Agency in 1971.

Nakasone also gave much attention to national defense issues while serving as the prime minister (1982-1987). For example, he took personal efforts to adopt an increase in defense expenditures, which disagreed with the general line of reducing the national budget deficit. Despite the silent rule that defense expenditures should not exceed 1% of the country’s GDP, Nakasone believed they must be raised to the level of 3% of GDP.
and called for an annual increase by 5-7%. A commission designated by him to address the issue recommended in 1986 that the 1% limit be lifted, but leaders of party factions and the Finance Ministry raised objections, and all he achieved in the 1987 budget was the 1.004% of GDP level of defense expenses [Pyle 2007 p. 273]. An effective adjustment of budget priorities required the overriding of the tradition of incrementalist budget planning (when all changes to the budget policy are smooth and proportionate for all appropriations). Even the political heavyweight Nakasone did not have enough might to redistribute appropriations: any attempts of the sort encountered resistance of agencies and “rooted interests” of the corporate sector dependent on budgetary investment.

The most significant economic achievements of Nakasone were accomplished in the period of his premiership. He tried to reform the Japanese model of capitalism, whose primary features were a high level of state regulation of the economy, especially in the field of foreign trade and taxation, limiting of free competition, a secluded and non-transparent system of public procurement, the mandatory placement of the state debt, the encouragement of saving as an incentive for exports, etc. It became obvious by the early 1980s, that the model used to promote the industrial growth of Japan lost its efficiency and slowed down the economy, which could not rid of ineffective and noncompetitive industries.

In 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone set up an advisory council under his aegis. The council, headed by the former governor of the Bank of Japan, Haruo Maekawa, was entrusted with elaborating practical recommendations on reducing the trade surplus of Japan which had reached by that moment its historical maximum. The council delivered the Maekawa Report in April 1986 to raise the subject of economic internationalization for the first time in Japan’s history. The report recommended that the economy be restructured, protectionist trade barriers be removed, imports be enlarged, the preferential tax regime be changed, and the system of distribution, which led to high consumer prices, be reformed.

Ideas proposed by the report became the cornerstone of the country’s economic development for a long period of time. However, they looked
practically unachievable at the time the report was released, considering the scope of “rooted interests” they concerned. The growing economic nationalism based on economic successes also played a role: then Japan was “dizzy with success” and had faith in the correctness of the earlier closed-economy course. Eventually, Nakasone had to admit that economic restructuring was a long-term goal for the next generation of politicians to cope with.

Nakasone’s premiership coincided with a peak of economic disputes with the United States, which was actively urging Japan to abandon its protectionist policy and to reduce the huge trade surplus. In September 1985, the Japanese government concluded the Plaza Accord, which considerably strengthened the yen to the dollar. The yen was relatively weak in the first half of the 1980s, and the exchange rate averaged at 260 yens to the dollar, which gave Japan a significant competitive edge in foreign trade. The Plaza Accord signed by the finance ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan, resulted in a rocketing growth of the yen, and the exchange rate reached 120 yens to the dollar by the end of 1987. This dealt a strong blow to the interests of Japanese exporters, but Nakasone signed the accord on purpose: for him, it “liberated the weak yen from the yoke of the strong dollar,” and became an additional argument in favor of the theory of Japan’s economic leadership based on strong national currency.

While advocating the internationalization of Japanese economy, Nakasone also called for lifting protectionist trade barriers and actively consuming imported goods. During a shopping tour covered by the media, the Japanese prime minister bought a U.S. tennis racket, a French shirt, and an Italian tie [Harvey 1994, p. 369]. In 1986, Nakasone called for reforming the tax system and proposed a value added tax, which would not apply to imported goods. He viewed the proposal as a way to increase the consumer demand for imported goods and to reduce the trade imbalance. The idea proved extremely unpopular, and the prime minister had to drop it.

On the other hand, Nakasone was pragmatic and careful and always avoided reckless radicalism. For instance, during talks in America in
January 1983, he successfully resisted the pressure of the administration of the U.S. President Ronald Reagan, which insisted that Tokyo should lift all limits on the imports of U.S. beef and oranges. One of his motivations had a domestic orientation: Nakasone feared criticism from his opponents before elections of the parliament’s upper chamber.

As a result, Nakasone’s premiership was one of the most successful for the economic development of Japan. The Japanese economy continued to demonstrate sustainable growth in the first half of his tenure, and in 1986, by the end of Nakasone’s second term, Japan became the world’s biggest creditor and competed with the United States for global economic leadership.

An important element of Nakasone’s political heritage is the drastic reforms of public governance, finance, and education he implemented as the prime minister.

The most noticeable reform of Nakasone in the field of public governance was privatization of Japanese railroads. It was the most favored reform of Nakasone, who was serving as the head of the Administrative Management Agency before taking the prime minister’s position and was well aware of the state of affairs in public business. It was at his initiative that the 2nd Provisional Council on Administrative Reform was established on March 16, 1981. The Council gained enormous political weight after Nakasone was appointed prime minister in November 1982 and practically became an informal supervisor of administrative reforms.

The Council was broadly representing various population groups, including big business, trade unions, the media, and the academic community, and had a large auxiliary staff. The Council was headed by Japan Business Federation President and former Toshiba CEO, Toshio Doko, whose career demonstrated his remarkable abilities as an outstanding businessman, who knew a lot about the economic and political realities, a distinguished manager, and an influential public leader with broad connections in the political circles. As a result, the Council was supported by the business community and the public, and that was an important factor preventing open sabotage by agencies. Importantly, members of the Council, including numerous personal
friends and sympathizers, had no close connection to the government, which made the Council decisions objective and immune to bureaucratic influence [Streltsov 2002, p. 88]. The establishment of an advisory body, which formally operated outside the party-and-government structure but had real powers and employed skilled experts, appeared to be highly effective in the prime minister’s top-to-bottom model of management. The Council enabled the implementation of an effective program aimed at reducing public expenditures, promoting de-regulation and rationalizing the system of licenses and permits, etc.

Public corporations were privatized on the basis of recommendations of the Council’s report. In 1986, the government decided to dismantle the network of state-owned railroads JR, whose inefficiency was a cause of the chronic budget deficit. The corporation was divided into six regional passenger companies and one national cargo company, and new companies were corporatized. Another object of the Nakasone Cabinet’s privatization plan was the National Telecommunications Corporation, NTT. The decision to privatize NTT was rooted in the conceptual strategy of telecommunication business, for which the status of public corporation was a disadvantage preventing the necessary flexibility of management, the attraction of private investment in the sphere directly controlled by the parliament, etc.

A keystone to the success of reforms was the personal involvement of the prime minister in their preparation and implementation. For instance, as the decision to privatize the railroad corporation JR met resistance at every stage, Nakasone had to personally “persuade” top-ranking bureaucrats of the Transport Ministry and to reshuffle the JR management for removing privatization opponents from their positions.

Education was also an important sphere of Nakasone’s reforms. The centralized, rigid system of school education, which aimed at mechanical memorization and high test scores, was focused not on educating a creative person, but on meeting the corporate sector’s demand for obedient and disciplined workforce in mass production. Standardization and centralized regulation of education were slowing down national development.
In 1987 the Advisory Council on Education was established at the initiative of Nakasone. The Council recommended that the school curriculum be based on new, broader criteria of knowledge evaluation rather than mere test results. The Council called for fostering creativity and creative individuality to provide Japan with proper cadres of an international leader. Nakasone wanted educational establishments to head the process of internationalization, and that required opening of international schools and universities, liquidation of hindrances to the recruitment of foreign teachers and the admission of foreign students, intensified studies of foreign languages, and the improvement of Japanese people’s understanding of other people’s cultures. The Council said in its recommendations that a “good Japanese” should be brought up so as to develop into a “tough international man.” [Tsuzuki 2000, p. 440].

Emphasis was also put on patriotic upbringing: in the opinion of Nakasone, Japan must rid of negative recollections of its humiliation in order to be a global “political giant.” Despite the resistance of the left-wing teachers trade union, the Education Ministry decided that students must learn the imperial anthem and honor the national flag. At the same time, the course of social sciences, which was added to the school curriculum under the influence of reformist ideas of the first days of occupation, was practically abolished [Tsuzuki 2000, p. 440].

The education reform was inseparable from the task of implementing new ideological values so that society stopped perceiving its past in the “masochist” manner. An important message sent by Nakasone was the idea of historical rehabilitation of Japan and the elimination of the “hostile state” label. He wanted Japan to stop feeling awkward for its historical past. Nakasone presented his vision of the difference between defensive and offensive wars at a meeting of the House of Representatives’ Budget Committee in September 1983. In his words, the Russian-Japanese war of 1905 was defensive for Japan. As for the Pacific war, many soldiers and officers viewed it as a war for liberating Asia. Many fought and died believing that the war was sacred [Tsuzuki 2000, p. 441]. Masayuki Fujio, the Education Minister in the Nakasone Cabinet, went further and wrote in an article published by the magazine *Bungei shunju*
that Korea was partially responsible for its annexation by Japan in 1910. (Nakasone had to fire Fujio because of the scandal) [Tsuzuki 2000, p. 442].

The political views characteristic of Nakasone in that period were vividly demonstrated by his attitude to the Yasukuni Temple bill. The Yasukuni Shinto temple, which was built in 1869 to honor the Japanese fallen in the war, lost the status of a state sanctuary. Since the middle of the 1950s, Japanese prime ministers visited the temple only on the autumnal Shinto holiday as private persons and never went there on August 15 (the day of the end of WWII observed by Japan). Nakasone was the first prime minister to participate in New Year celebrations in 1984 and to pay a formal visit to the Yasukuni Temple as the head of government on August 15, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of war, for the first time in the entire post-war history. Protests triggered by the visit in China and Korea were so fierce that Nakasone never dared to go on pilgrimage again. Nakasone concluded in the end of his premiership, when he was thinking on the mistrust other countries had towards Japan, that “a century must pass before the suspicion and mistrust of our neighbors will dissipate.” [cit. ex.: Pyle 2007, p. 276].

The foreign policy of Nakasone is known no less, or even better. The course taken in relations with the United States won attention for several reasons. First of all, the strategic partnership was raised to the level of philosophical values. Nakasone said at the talks with President Ronald Reagan during his first visit to the United States in January 1983 that Japan and the United States formed “a partnership of fate” (ummei kyodotai), which extended across the Pacific Ocean. In his interview with the Washington Post, Nakasone compared Japan to an aircraft carrier (okina koku bokan). The translator used the phrase “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” (fuchin kubo) to emphasize the hyperbole [Pyle 2007, p. 272]. The phrase, which symbolized Nakasone’s approach to the alliance with the United States, was mentioned in the context of Japan being an outpost of the military standoff between the West and the Soviet Union. Reagan gladly welcomed the bravado speech by Nakasone, which started their cordial personal relationship. In fact, Nakasone was the one who launched the tradition of personal diplomacy – President Reagan and he
were on the first-name terms (known as Ron-Yasu relations), which was a practice unthinkable in diplomatic etiquette.

Nakasone called for Japan’s active participation in the consolidated strategy of the West towards the Soviet Union. Against the backdrop of a new outbreak of the Cold War in the early 1980s, the strategy was based on the escalation of military confrontation. Nakasone underlined in his speeches that Japan would seek full control over straits to prevent Soviet submarines from entering the Pacific Ocean and carrying out naval operations in case of emergency [Murata 2011, p. 151]. Japan and the U.S. Pacific Fleet started the joint planning of ways to block the La Perouse, Tsugaru and Korean Straits, so that Soviet warships were trapped in the Sea of Japan should a Soviet-U.S. conflict break out.

At the G7 meeting in Williamsburg in May 1983 Nakasone actively backed Reagan’s intention to prevent redeployment of Soviet intermediate-range missiles, codenamed by the West as SS-20, from the European part of the Soviet Union to its Asian part. The main thesis of the Japanese prime minister was that security is “indivisible” and that military security of Europe must not be achieved to the detriment of security of Asian allies of the U.S.

Later on, when the United States took the course towards gaining a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union in outer space through the Strategic Defense Initiative, Nakasone violated Tokyo’s three principles of arms exports and initiated sharing with the United States of its advanced military technologies in which Japanese leadership was most tangible at the moment: semiconductors, microcircuits, laser hardware components, optical fibers, and some other communication and control means. In 1985, the Japanese government approved the engagement of private companies in military research held for the Strategic Defense Initiative, and in September 1986 it was decided to formally join the “Star Wars” program. The Nakasone Cabinet also made some decisions to enlarge Japan’s input in the nuclear strategy of the United States with military cooperation, including the provision of navigation and reconnaissance information by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, the planning of joint combat operations involving nuclear weapons, etc.
Nakasone’s diplomacy had both “hawk-style” and “dove-style” angles. For instance, Nakasone and Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe initiated the process of normalization of political relations with the Soviet Union. He was the only Japanese prime minister in the 1980s who, in the words of a major Japanese expert in Japanese-Soviet relations Nobuo Shimotomai, “had at least some understanding and experience of contacts with the Soviet Union.” [Shimotomai 2008, p. 19]. Prime Minister Nakasone attended the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko and was received by new Secretary General Michael Gorbachev in March 1985. The first positive changes in bilateral relations on the long road to normalization occurred during Nakasone’s premiership. These include the visit of new Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Tokyo in January 1986 and the reciprocal visit of his Japanese counterpart, Shintaro Abe, to Moscow in January 1987.

Prime Minister Nakasone gave much attention to Asian affairs in his diplomatic work. As soon as he took the office, he visited Seoul and approved a long-term loan to South Korea. In 1984, Nakasone visited China on the occasion of the 12th anniversary of Japan’s diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic. In turn, the Chinese government invited 3,000 young Japanese to visit China. Nakasone was trying to use his amicable relations with the then Secretary General of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, Hu Yaobang, to begin cooperation with China in search for peace on the Korean Peninsula. While visiting China in November 1986, Nakasone told the Chinese leader about the wish of South Korea to establish official relations with Beijing. While trying to broker relations between Beijing and Seoul, Nakasone proposed a simultaneous improvement of relations between Japan and North Korea [Nakasone pitched trade... 2017].

Personal views and convictions of Nakasone left a tangible footprint on Japanese politics. He became known as the founder of neo-conservatism in Japanese ideology. In contrast to the majority of political heavyweights, Nakasone presented his views in fundamental monographs written in a completely clear and precise language (which was completely uncharacteristic of Japanese authors from among national politicians) [Nakasone, 2002].
It is true that other politicians, who had occupied top political positions before Nakasone, also initiated new guidelines in the national development. For example, several think tanks were operating in the late 1970s under the aegis of Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira to develop ideas of weaker state control, de-regulation, and abolition of the total bureaucratic control system. Yet Nakasone is believed to be the politician who laid the ideological groundwork for the country’s transition to a brand-new development model of the post-industrial epoch.

The ideological heritage of Nakasone is usually opposed to the conservative tradition of the Liberal Democratic Party’s mainstream, which was established by Shigeru Yoshida. The meaning of “old conservatism” was the commitment to the pacifist tradition and Article 9 of the Constitution, and the renouncement of an active defense policy and of an equal relationship within the alliance with the United States. In the economic sphere, “old conservatism” declared by the Yoshida doctrine gave an ideological explanation of the catch-up modernization strategy, which was guiding Japan’s policy for several post-war decades.

Instead, Nakasone believed that the Constitution of 1947 was pushed on Japan by foreign troops and should be modified, that the Security Treaty with the United States should be revisited to ensure full equally of mutual obligations, that the San Francisco system of international relations based on the Peace Treaty of 1951 was an anachronism, and that Japan should have the ability and the capacity for independently defending itself.

The neo-conservatism of Nakasone was centered on social matters topical for many countries of the West, primarily the United States and the United Kingdom. It is not accidental that Reaganomics and Thatcherism are usually attributed to the same neo-conservative trend of the active withdrawal of the government from the economy, the reduction of taxes, the shift to a small government, de-regulation, and the stake on market principles. In the foreign policy, the neo-conservatism of the West manifested itself in fierce confrontation with the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc.
Yet Nakasone’s neo-conservatism had a number of substantial distinctions from its U.S. and British analogues. First of all, it derived from understanding of the need to end the epoch of Japan’s catch-up development which lasted for over a century and resulted in Japan’s leading position in the global economy. In fact, Nakasone’s neo-conservatism relied on economic nationalism, namely, Japan’s self-establishment as a global economic leader capable of dictating its rules of conduct to the whole world.

A key premise of Nakasone’s neo-conservatism was that Japan must stop following others’ example but become completely independent in the political and moral respects. Besides, Japan should not just borrow foreign practices but also set an attractive role model. In that sense, “Nakasoneism” was an impressive call for internationalizing Japanese cultural and spiritual values.

In his works Nakasone insisted that “healthy” nationalism, which promoted Japan’s self-identification, was fully justified. “We should be fostering it through education,” he wrote. [Nakasone 1987, p. 13-14] In the opinion of the Japanese politician, a high level of homogeneity is an advantage of the Japanese nation. For instance, Nakasone said in his address to young members of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1986 that an average American was less smart than an average Japanese because of the large number of national minorities in the U.S. — black people, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans — lowering the average level of the nation. [Page 1986]. Nakasone had to publicly apologize for his statement after the protests made in the U.S. Congress.

Nakasone is the example of a successful reformer, whose undertakings set the tone to the national development in the field of administrative, tax, and social affairs and education for many years. The Nakasone reforms are mentioned in many textbooks on public politics and governance as remarkably productive and effective against the backdrop of unsuccessful and even failed reforms in a number of European countries in the same period.

Nakasone had a strong influence on the Japanese political tradition. The country’s political scene was always dominated by unimpressive and
low-profile apparatchik type politicians whose power was based on techniques of internal intra-party political manipulation. Nakasone added an element of vibrant personality in politics and revealed the potential of populist resource, which primarily relied on the force of media. The new generation of politicians learned from Maverick Nakasone the art of political image-making and his ability to appeal to voters and to receive his mandate from society instead of mighty party bosses from amongst the heads of the LDP party factions.

Far from all undertakings of Nakasone were successful. His institutional reforms bumped into fierce resistance of government bureaucracy and, despite their partial success, were not brought to the end. In the sphere of diplomacy, the undertakings of Nakasone, which were unfinished during his premiership, required the collapse of the Cold War system to be fully accomplished. When leaving his post in 1987, Nakasone said ironically that the result of his effort to transform the international role of Japan was “yet to be seen.” [Pyle 2007, p. 276]).

References


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Russian edition of the article:
DOI: 10.24411/0235-8182-2018-10001
SOME ASPECTS OF HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION OF JAPAN WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EAST ASIA

O.I. KAZAKOV

Abstract. The article presents a non-traditional approach to evaluation of Japan’s soft power in the context of its humanitarian cooperation with East Asian states (primarily, China and South Korea) and also Russia. The characteristic features of current Japan’s soft power and the historic prerequisites for the development the Japanese foreign policy of this sphere are analyzed. In the author’s opinion, there is no alternative of Japan’s soft power to hard power currently employed by other countries of East Asia. The article stresses the successes of Japanese policy of simulating the inflow of foreign tourism and analyzes the reasons for the steady growth in the number of tourists arriving in Japan. Recent statistics shows the predominance of Chinese and South Koreans among foreign guests, both tourists and expats, with the mostly negative attitude to China and South Korea among the Japanese citizens. The deterioration of the demographic situation in Japan is also marked: the percentage of foreigners is growing, which prompts the Japanese to adjust.

The article highlights humanitarian cooperation between Japan and Russia in the Cross-year Year of 2018, which was initiated by the country’s leaders to boost contacts in a broad range of areas. It indicates a decline in the bilateral trade in the past five years and points a low level of mutual tourism. There are different reasons for Russia and Japan for insignificant number of tourists travelling to the partner country. The antipathy of most Japanese toward Russia is a negative factor for bilateral relations. In conclusion, the author elaborates on the possible ways of enhancing the Russo-Japanese relations in the context of the highlighted issues.

The article’s objective is to inform experts working in relevant areas about successful Japanese projects with the aim of borrowing some useful Japanese
practices of soft power and outbound tourism in relations with other countries. This experience could be beneficial for Russia.

*Keywords:* East Asia, Japan, “soft power,” Russo-Japanese relations, outbound tourism, inbound tourism, mutual tourism, public opinion, friendly sentiment, antipathy.

**Foreword**

Humanitarian cooperation between Japan and other countries, including East Asian nations (the article uses an notion of Expanded East Asia), can be evaluated not just by statistical methods, i.e. by the number and type of events related to Japan held in other countries or by the number and type of events associated with other countries held in Japan, but also from the viewpoint of the effectiveness of Japan’s “soft power”, the latter being manifested through such objective though non-traditional data as the structure and dynamics of inbound tourism, the number of permanent foreign residents in Japan, and the results of opinion polls held among the Japanese on their attitude to different countries and regions of the globe.

Apparently, these factors fairly reflect complicated relationships between the nations of East Asia, predominantly deriving from their tragic common history. Meanwhile, a specific layer of political, economic, and humanitarian interrelationship is being shaped among the Asian countries (China, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan). Multilevel processes are brewing in this Asian melting pot, presenting a criteria for assessment of the regional stability and security.

Apart from these processes, there exist the Russian-Japanese relations, locating themselves on the periphery of the region. They are characterized by a low level of trade and economic collaboration and by the often-conflicting diplomatic agenda.

**Japan’s soft power is a key factor of external influence**

As its economy was growing, post-war Japan focused on promoting its national traditions and achievements abroad with the aim of creating
favorable business climate and building relationships comfortable for cooperation. Such outer world activity has recently been dubbed worldwide as “soft power”, in contrast to “hard power”, which appeals to the military force as an instrument of influence by one country to another.

Given that following the political outcome of WWII Japan does not possess full-fledged armed forces as the Constitution of the 1947 actually prohibits its Self-Defense Forces to conduct military operations abroad, Japan’s soft power has become Tokyo’s a pivotal operational instrument for achieving specific diplomatic goals [Kazakov 2014].

Evidently, today’s Japan is also deprived of the military force alternative to soft power. Being sensitive to threats from DPRK (which launched missiles toward Japan and conducted nuclear tests) and from the growing military might of China (which uses military pressure in addition to other pressure methods in its territorial claims to Japan), Japan has stepped up military and political interaction with its strategic partner, the United States, including the procurement and deployment of new U.S. weapons on its territory. Yet, for Japan diplomacy still remains the key tool for achieving foreign policy objectives.

Meanwhile, Russia has never been Japan’s major foreign political or trade partner, though bilateral cooperation in the humanitarian field was sustained over years, including in the Soviet ‘golden age’ period. Cooperation intensified in 2018 thanks to the Cross-year of Russia in Japan and of Japan in Russia.

As an example of the traditional soft power toolkit, one can mention the Japan Foundation, which is positioned by the Japanese side as a sole Japanese organization engaged in comprehensive cultural exchanges with foreign countries. The Foundation aims to contribute to building a base of harmonious co-existence between Japan and other countries. Japan Foundation was established in 1972 as a special legal entity operating under the aegis of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to promote Japan’s international cultural exchanges. On October 1, 2003, it acquired the status of an independent administrative body. Public funds lay the financial basis of the Japan Foundation; operational costs are financed by capital management income, government subsidies, and private
donations. The Foundation is headquartered in Tokyo and has a branch in Kyoto and two affiliations in Japan (the Japanese Language Institute in Urawa and the Japanese Language Institute in Kansai), as well as 24 missions in 23 countries, among them Russia, China, South Korea, Vietnam, and other ASEAN nations.

The Japan Foundation is focused on three areas:

1. Art and culture (文化芸術交流[文化]),
2. Japanese language (日本語教育[言語]),
3. Japanese studies (日本研究・知的交流[対話]). [Three Fields...]

Its budget almost tripled in 2012-2016, from 2 billion yens in 2012 to 5.7 billion in 2016 (roughly from $18 million to $52 million; based on the technical exchange rate of $1 to 110 yens) (table 1). Yet, a lean-budget trend seems to be emerging when the growing number of events are funded by a more economical expenditure scheme (the effectiveness of the Japan Foundation activity requires a separate and more thorough analysis).

Table 1.

Key performance indicators of Japan Foundation in 2012-2017

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget, thousand yen</td>
<td>1 977 181</td>
<td>1 908 097</td>
<td>4 664 476</td>
<td>4 138 000</td>
<td>5 708 733</td>
<td>3 536 628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of events</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>1144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on: [Gyomu jissekito hokokusho 2017]

The Japan Foundation spreads information about its activity in the popular social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

It should be noted, that Russia, for example, lacks a similar institution: neither Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International
Humanitarian Cooperation) nor the Russkiy Mir Foundation handle any goals and budgets comparable to the Japan Foundation. The latter’s experience could be useful for the construction of Russia’s soft power. Many experts deem Japan’s soft power to be quite effective and worthy borrowing in some aspects [Dobrinskaya 2015; Giang Thi Thom, Muratshina 2018].

Soft power helps Japan to successfully accomplish various missions, from attraction of foreign tourists to promotion of business done by the Japanese companies in other countries and regions. The rapidly developing China and South Korea have lately also given much attention to soft power, creating a specific competition environment in the struggle for peoples’ minds in East Asia. China which surpassed Japan by the GDP level in 2010 has been particularly effective in this respect [Lomanov A.V., Kobelev E.V. (ed.) 2015]. Under these circumstances, Japan was compelled to pay much more attention to its soft power, to improve it and to optimize its cost. Eventually, if soft power becomes the only dominating factor in East Asia’s international relations while interstate tourism flows are maintained at high levels, it would stimulate the improvement of relations between nations on the grassroots\(^1\) level and the reduction of risk of resorting to hard power. Such development could only be welcome.

As for the attitude of the Japanese to the use of military force in the future, the debate on modifying the pacifist clause of the Constitution (Article 9), which was going on for years, has not brought Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party any palpable success in this direction. According to the opinion poll conducted in Japan on the eve of the 71\(^{st}\) anniversary of the entry into force of the Constitution on May 3, 1947, constitutional amendments gained support of 61% respondents and were rejected by 38%. The poll has also shown that 58% respondents deem eventual constitutional amendments to be “necessary”\(^1\)

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\(^1\) The Japanese term *kusa-no ne* is literary translated as “grass roots” and has a meaning close to the U.S. *grassroot* term (which describes spontaneous movement originating from below), contacts and interaction between average people, rather than officials, citizen diplomacy.
or “rather necessary,” while 39% disagree [60% opposed to amendment... 2018]. The poll outcome indicates that, on the one hand, many people in Japan realize that the Constitution should be changed in compliance to the currents of the time, but, on the other hand, they see no need to hurry. The latter factor might also indicate popular mistrust to the Abe administration amid a number of political scandals with his participation. Besides, the poll showed that the Japanese public appreciates the renouncement of war, and 69% believe it was the reason why Japan never used military force abroad after WWII (This fact repeatedly caused irritation of the United States, which criticized Japan for “buying itself out” of military operations and letting its partners bear the risks and suffer casualties of war). Still, ahead of the Liberal Democratic Party president’s election in September 2018, Abe kept trying to modify the “pacifist article” of the Constitution and expressed the wish to “step up the debate” [Yamaguchi 2018a].

Yet, at present the Japanese public is split over the issue of the revision of the pacifist clause [Yamaguchi 2018b]. This topic serves a “litmus test” for people’s attitude to shifting from soft power to hard power. Nonetheless, the demonstration of military force and the “muscle flexing” , the practice widely used on the international arena by, say, the United States and Russia, would seemingly remain unacceptable for Japan in the coming years².

Some features of Japan’s inbound tourism

Having enough economy and image-related reasons to be interested in a higher level of inbound tourism, Japan takes relevant organizational and economic measures to reach this goal [Kazakov 2016]. One can note two substantial factors, which gave a boost to inbound tourism in Japan in recent years.

² Still, certain Russian commentators regularly mention Japan’s militarization in the light of its strengthening military-political alliance with the United States and the reinforcement of the Self-Defense Forces amid the threats posed by China and North Korea.
First, on March 11, 2011, Japan encountered a powerful earthquake, the so-called Great East Japan Earthquake, which involved a devastating tsunami, large human casualties and the man-made disaster at the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant. The latter was a shock not only for the Japanese people but for the entire humanity. There emerged a threat of radioactive contamination, Japanese residents were evacuated from the risk zone, and many foreigners left Japan. The threat resulted in a 27.8% year-on-year plummet in foreign tourist arrivals in 2011 compared to the previous year. The Japanese government set the task of restoring the national economy, including the tourist industry, severely wounded by the natural and man-made disaster. Since 2012, Japan has been demonstrating a stable growth of foreign tourist arrivals and has even registered a number of records of this indicator.

To date, the efforts taken by the Japanese government resulted in almost a complete recovery of the national economy from the 2011 disaster, though the problems of relaunching nuclear power plants and of the future of the atomic industry in Japan remain unsolved. Japan has enhanced, although not fully, its image undermined by the radioactive contamination of a part of its territory. Despite earthquakes, typhoons and tsunami which are inseparable from Japan’s natural conditions, for foreign tourists Japan remains to be one of the safest places in the world.

Secondly, the 125th session of the International Olympic Committee held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on September 7, 2013, named Tokyo the host city of the 2020 Summer Olympic Games. Japan started energetic preparations for the Olympic and Paralympic events, and the Japanese government set the goal of doubling the number of incoming foreign visitors, from 20 million in 2015 to 40 million by 2020.

The dynamics of growth in foreign tourist arrivals indicates that Japan is likely to achieve this objective provided that there are no natural or military emergencies. The Japanese government is currently making a lot of efforts, as a part of systemic and comprehensive work, to promote foreign tourism. Using its soft power, Japan creates an attractive image of the country by accentuating, on the one side, its traditions (samurai,
geisha, ninja, karate, tea ceremony, ikebana, bonsai, Shinto and Buddhist temples, Noh and Kabuki theaters, traditional Japanese cuisine, etc.), and, on the other side, modernity (music, fashion, architecture, theater, anime, sport, etc.), and technological leadership (robotics, artificial intelligence, clean energy, automatic transport, drones, etc.), which in turn simulates foreigners to see Japan with their own eyes (Cool Japan)³. As relatively high prices in Japan remain a major factor preventing tourism from countries with low incomes, the bulwalk of tourists arrive from countries with growing economies and solvent population, such as China, South Korea, the United States, and others. Russia does not belong to this category.

The Japanese government has been constantly liberalizing visa procedures, tightening control over visitors for security purposes, promoting the expansion of air and marine transport corridors, supporting the creation of new tourist routes, and developing popular tourist destinations. The work aimed at developing various economic sectors (tourist services, catering, entertainment, shopping, etc.) is done not only by the central government, but by prefectures and municipalities. A special attention is paid to improving the conditions of the stay of foreign tourists in Japan (quality of interpreting services, development of tourist information systems, including mobile services, systems of road signs and alerts, duplication of names and announcements in English and other languages, rapid support in case of emergencies and security measures, like the interaction with police, emergency measures in case of natural disasters etc.).

It should be noted that the government relies on traditional hospitality and politeness of the Japanese people, *omotenashi*, which create a very comfortable environment for foreign guests, and on the special treatment of foreigners by the Japanese, which is viewed by foreigners as tolerance. (Japanese term *omotenashi* actually means hospitality, courtesy, service, etc.). Judging by statistics, since 2012 Japan has achieved a great success in attracting foreign tourists.

³ Cool Japan — translated into Russian as “Amazing Japan” — is the Japanese government initiative aimed to boost relations with foreign countries in the economy, culture, and diplomacy. URL: http://www.cao.go.jp/cool_japan/english/index-e.html
Foreigners in Japan and the predominance of the Chinese

According to the Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO), foreign tourist arrivals in Japan grew by 34.4% (over 1.4 million) in 2012. In 2017 the number of foreign visitors exceeded 28 million (table 2), including over 7 million from China, which ranks the first among Japan’s inbound tourism partners and amounts to over 25% of all foreign tourists in Japan. However, the year of 2017 witnessed a 40% surge in arrivals from South Korea. Their number has also exceeded 7 million, nearing 25% of all tourist arrivals.

Table 2.
Number of foreign tourists in Japan, information in brackets indicates year-on-year growth/decline, %

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(36.6 %)</td>
<td>(–7.8 %)</td>
<td>(83.3 %)</td>
<td>(107.3 %)</td>
<td>(27.6 %)</td>
<td>(15.4 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1 425 100</td>
<td>1 314 437</td>
<td>2 409 158</td>
<td>4 993 689</td>
<td>6 372 948</td>
<td>7 355 818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2 042 775</td>
<td>2 456 165</td>
<td>2 755 313</td>
<td>4 002 095</td>
<td>5 090 302</td>
<td>7 140 165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 465 753</td>
<td>2 210 821</td>
<td>2 829 821</td>
<td>3 677 075</td>
<td>4 167 504</td>
<td>4 564 053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(47.5 %)</td>
<td>(50.8 %)</td>
<td>(28.0 %)</td>
<td>(29.9 %)</td>
<td>(13.3 %)</td>
<td>(9.5 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(32.0 %)</td>
<td>(54.9 %)</td>
<td>(24.1 %)</td>
<td>(64.6 %)</td>
<td>(20.7 %)</td>
<td>(21.3 %)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>716 709</td>
<td>799 280</td>
<td>891 668</td>
<td>1 033 258</td>
<td>1 242 702</td>
<td>1 374 964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26.7 %)</td>
<td>(11.5 %)</td>
<td>(11.6 %)</td>
<td>(17.8 %)</td>
<td>(20.3 %)</td>
<td>(10.6 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>8 358 105</td>
<td>10 363 904</td>
<td>13 413 467</td>
<td>19 737 409</td>
<td>24 039 053</td>
<td>28 691 073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(34.4 %)</td>
<td>(24.0 %)</td>
<td>(29.4 %)</td>
<td>(47.1 %)</td>
<td>(21.8 %)</td>
<td>(19.3 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table indicates countries whose tourist arrivals in Japan exceeds 1 mln. Tourists from these countries amount to approximately 80% of all tourist arrivals in Japan.

Based on: [Kokuseki/mokuteki betsu honichi gaikyaku 2004-2017].
Table 3.
Number of expats in Japan in 2012-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country*</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017 (share, %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>652 595</td>
<td>649 078</td>
<td>654 777</td>
<td>665 847</td>
<td>695 522</td>
<td>730 890 (28.5 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>489 431</td>
<td>481 249</td>
<td>465 477</td>
<td>457 772</td>
<td>453 096</td>
<td>450 663 (17.6 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>52 367</td>
<td>72 256</td>
<td>99 865</td>
<td>146 956</td>
<td>199 990</td>
<td>262 405 (10.2 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>202 985</td>
<td>209 183</td>
<td>217 585</td>
<td>229 595</td>
<td>243 662</td>
<td>260 553 (10.2 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>190 609</td>
<td>181 317</td>
<td>175 410</td>
<td>173 437</td>
<td>180 923</td>
<td>191 362 (7.5 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>24 071</td>
<td>31 537</td>
<td>42 346</td>
<td>54 775</td>
<td>67 470</td>
<td>80 038 (3.1 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>22 775</td>
<td>33 324</td>
<td>40 197</td>
<td>48 723</td>
<td>52 768</td>
<td>56 724 (2.2 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>48 361</td>
<td>49 981</td>
<td>51 256</td>
<td>52 271</td>
<td>53 705</td>
<td>55 713 (2.2 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>40 133</td>
<td>41 208</td>
<td>43 081</td>
<td>45 379</td>
<td>47 647</td>
<td>50 179 (2.0 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>25 532</td>
<td>27 214</td>
<td>30 210</td>
<td>35 910</td>
<td>42 850</td>
<td>49 982 (2.0 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>284 797</td>
<td>290 098</td>
<td>301 627</td>
<td>321 524</td>
<td>345 189</td>
<td>373 339 (14.6 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 033 656</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 066 445</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 121 831</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 232 189</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 382 822</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 561 848 (100 %)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Russia in not reviewed, probably because of the insignificant number of Russian nationals residing in Japan.

*Source: [Kokuseki chiiki betsu zairyu... 2017]*

The majority expats permanently residing in Japan also come from China. According to the Japanese Justice Ministry, more than 730,000 Chinese nationals were residing in Japan in the end of 2017 (which is
a record figure), or 28.5% of all expats. South Koreans, over 450,000 persons, ranked the second, with the share of 17.6% (table 3).

According to the records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the total population of Japan as of January 1, 2018 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number, persons</th>
<th>All registered persons</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Foreign residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth (persons, %)</td>
<td>−99 827 (−0.16 %)</td>
<td>−374 055 (−0.30 %)</td>
<td>+174 228 (+7.50 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on: [Jumin kihondaichyo ni motodzuku... 2018]

Hence, the Japanese population reduced by 374,000 since 2016. The decline was an all-time high since the start of monitoring in 1968. At the same time, the number of permanent foreign residents in Japan has been constantly growing, reaching 2.5 million.

Japan is demonstrating the following demographic trends. On the one hand, the number of Japanese citizens is on the decline and, on the other hand, the number of expats and foreign tourists is growing. Thus, the share of foreigners permanently staying in Japan is steadily rising. In view of that, the Japanese people with their “insular mentality” and the traditionally cautious attitude to foreigners are forced to adopt to this new reality.

The attitude of the Japanese toward other nations

Statistics show that most foreign tourists (about 50%) come to Japan from China and South Korea, and the diasporas from these countries are also the biggest (approximately 46% of all foreigners living in Japan). Still the Japanese exhibit a high degree of antipathy toward South Korea and China, especially toward China. The said antipathy is rooted in the recently aggravated historical dispute on the behaviour of the Japanese in the period of occupation and Japan’s territorial disputes over the
Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands with China and the Takeshima (Tokto) islands with the Republic of Korea.

Since 1978, the PR department of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Prime minister and the Central Research Services have been carrying out a nationwide poll to learn the attitude of the Japanese to other countries and regions. Respondents were mostly asked about their sympathy and antipathy towards other countries and regions. Some of the poll results for the past six years are presented in Table 4. Other questions regarding the attitude to foreign countries were asked, too (tables 5 and 6).

Table 4.
Attitude of the Japanese to the United States, Russia, China, South Korea in 2012-2017, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country*</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antipathy</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antipathy</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antipathy</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antipathy</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Hereinafter the countries are listed in the survey order.

*Based on: [Gaiko ni kansuru Seronchosa 2012-2017]*

40
Results of the survey demonstrate a high degree of antipathy among the Japanese toward China and Russia, which stands at around 80%, and toward South Korea, about 60% (Table 4). Over 80% of the Japanese believe that their country has “good” relations with the United States, while relations with Russia, China, and South Korea are estimated as “not good” by, respectively, 60-70%, 80-90%, and about 70% respondents (Table 5). Notably, the biggest number of Japanese with “undecided” attitude is seen in regard to Russia (4% or more). At the same time, the Japanese demonstrate a desire to develop relations with all their neighbors: over 90% with the United States, over 75% with Russia, and
over 70% with China and South Korea (Table 6). The Japanese exhibit an inclination to cooperate, which could evidence an aspiration for peaceful and harmonious co-existence with other countries of the region.

Table 6.
Is it important to develop relations between Japan with the indicated country?* (%) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I can't say for sure</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I can't say for sure</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I can't say for sure</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I can't say for sure</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) The question is asked since 2015.

*Based on:* [Gaiko ni kansuru Seronchosa 2012-2017]
Despite a high level of antipathy toward China, a 2017 survey held by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in China revealed that Japan ranked first amongst countries and territories which Chinese citizens wished to visit (40.2%). The United States ranked second (39.9%), and Italy ranked third (37.4%) (table 7). Answering the additional question, whether they would like to visit Japan in future, some 88.9% of the interviewed Chinese opted for “yes” and 11.1% — for “no”.

Table 7.
The response of Chinese citizens to the task to choose three countries which they would like to visit in future (three options were permitted), %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015.01</th>
<th>2015.07</th>
<th>2016.01</th>
<th>2016.10</th>
<th>2017.08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Domestic tourism

Source: [Anata ga kongo ikitai kuni wo... 2017]
JETRO polls residents of six big Chinese cities with relatively high incomes every year. Since the start of such surveys in 2013 Japan was for the first time ranked 1st in 2017. In the same survey, the Chinese gave Japan a higher ranking compared to other countries by such parameters as (1) clean environment, (2) service quality, and (3) politeness. Apparently, in Japan Chinese visitors do not feel antipathy toward their own country, which creates them a comfortable environment for relishing all possible pleasures they are ready to pay for during their journey.

It is noteworthy that over the past three years, the level of the Japanese antipathy toward China reduced from 83.2% in 2015 to 78.5% in 2017, while the level of sympathy grew from 14.8% in 2015 to 18.7% in 2017 (Table 4). However, from the point of view of de-facto deep historical, cultural, trade and economic ties rooted between Japan and China, negative attitude of the Japanese to China demonstrated by the survey cannot be described as normal.

Importantly, the level of sympathy toward the United States decreased from 84.1% in 2016 to 78.4% in 2017, while the level of antipathy grew from 13.2% in 2016 to 19.1% in 2017 (Table 4). Presumably, this is a result of the increasingly negative attitude of the Japanese to the U.S. President Donald Trump. The attitude of the Japanese toward the leader of a foreign country seems to serve a substantial factor for projecting such attitude on this country.

As for DPRK is concerned, Japan in 2017 still viewed it as a rogue country. The top three concerns of the Japanese about North Korea are missile launches (83.0%), abductions of Japanese citizens (78.3%), and the nuclear problem (75.3%). DPRK is perceived by the Japanese citizens as a country posing military threat associated with regular missile launches toward Japan and the nuclear tests which should appeal Pyongyang’s ability to build nuclear weapons. Besides, the Japanese believe that North Korea is reluctant to resolve the sensitive abductions problem. According to a Nikkei poll, 52% of the Japanese deem that the international community should continue the policy of sanctions against DPRK, while 11% favor a military resolution of the problem of Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear programs [Opros: Bolee 50% yapontsev... 2018].
Russian-Japanese humanitarian relations

Even in the cold war period the level of humanitarian cooperation between the USSR and Japan surpassed the level of their official political contacts or trade and economic cooperation. To date the situation has not changed remarkably, and in the recent years, especially after the Crimean events of 2014 when the bilateral trade between Russia and Japan more than halved (from $33.2 billion in 2013 to $16 billion in 2016 and $18 billion in 2017), the humanitarian dimension acquired the role of an even bigger driving factor role for the bilateral relations.

In the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, Moscow has been holding since 2006 the annual Festivals of Russian Culture in Japan. The 13\textsuperscript{th} Festival of Russian Culture in Japan opened at the Santori Hall in Tokyo on June 12, 2018 [V Tokio proshlo torzhhestvennoye otkrytiye... 2018].

Meanwhile, in 2017 the Russian Ministry of Culture launched a new project, Russian Seasons, which, according to the plan of the Ministry, among other things should involve the mentioned Festival of Russian Culture in Japan [Ob organizatsii ezhegodnogo... 2017]. Yet, the responsibility for promoting Russia abroad is blurred, which affects the quality of its soft power.

The year of 2018 had a special meaning due to a boost of humanitarian cooperation inspired by the Cross year of Japan in Russia and of Russia in Japan. Japanese Ambassador to Russia Toyohisa Kozuki made the following comment on this event: “Prime Minister Abe and President Putin have decided to declare 2018 the Cross-year of Japan and Russia to encourage bilateral exchanges in all spheres. Such Cross-year is also my old dream. After all, it will involve not only culture and art, but also business, science, education, youth, sports and inter-regional exchanges, which in turn would help to maximally use the potential of Japanese-Russian relations. More than 300 events are planned within the framework of the Year of Japan in Russia” [Toyohisa Kodzuki: Abe pervym ... 2018].

In 2018 the number of various events grew significantly, although, according to various sources, the budgets of the two countries for...
humanitarian cooperation did not expand much. Some of the events were funded by national budgets, and some - by the Japan Foundation and other entities. Certain events in Russia and Japan are sponsored by the International Chodiev Foundation (URL: http://www.international-chodievfoundation.org).

The Year of Japan in Russia is held under the aegis of the Japanese Embassy and is partially sponsored by the Japan Foundation. The projects of the Year involved numerous Russian organizations promoting relations with Japan and Japanese culture. Many of the events of the Year are carried out by the regional branches of the Russia-Japan Society. The list of events of the Year of Japan in Russia was posted on the Japanese Embassy’s website [Informatsiya o meropriyatiyakh... 2018].

A similar list of events of the Russian Year in Japan was posted on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website on January 25, 2018. In view of the intensification of humanitarian contacts between Russia and Japan caused by the Cross year, the attitude of Russians to Japan deserves a special interest.

In contrast to Japan, where only 20% of citizens are sympathetic to Russia (Table 4), the Russians are generally favorably disposed to Japan, except for their negative attitude to the Japanese territorial claims to Russia. The negative sentiment is displayed, for instance, in the opinion polls on Russia’s “friends” and “foes”.

According to a poll of the Levada Analytical Center [“Druz’ya” I “vragi”... 2018], Japan is listed in neither the top ten “friends” of Russia (Table 8), nor in the top ten of its “foes” (Table 9). Nevertheless, even such polls exhibit the inclination of Russians to rather see in Japan a friend, than a foe, although such situation cannot be called satisfactory. Other polls occasionally demonstrate a bigger shift of the Russian sentiment toward Japan as a “friendly” country (for instance, [O Rossii I stranakh mira... 2017.]).

The territorial problem in Russian-Japanese relations has a definitely negative impact on Russian’s sentiment toward Japan. The attitude of the overwhelming majority of Russians to Japan’s territorial claims for the South Kuril Islands (the “Northern territories”) is known very well
The REGNUM news agency conducted a survey in 2017 using the STIRVOX crowd-sourcing platform to study the attitude of the Russians to the Kuril Islands and the associated problems in relations with Japan [Kuril’skiye ostrova Rossii... 2017] Respondents gave the traditional answer to the question: “Imagine that the future of the Kuril Islands depends solely on your decision. Weigh all cons and pros and say what you decide.” As many as 85% of the respondents opted for the Kuril Islands to be left with Russia forever, 8% were undecided, and only 7% deem the Kuril Islands should be transferred to Japan either at once or in the future [Problema russkikh Kuril...].

Table 8.
Answers to the question “Name five countries that you can call the closest friends and allies of Russia” (Respondents could choose several options from the list of countries; answers were listed in descending order, 2018) %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No*</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The country’s ranking number on the “friend” list. China, which is one of the top ten “friends,” and some other East Asian countries ranking below Japan are given as example.

Source: [“Druz’ya” I “vragi”... 2018]
Table 9.
Answers to the question “Name five countries that you can call the most unfriendly and hostile towards Russia”
(Respondents could choose several options from the list of countries; answers were listed in descending order, 2018) %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No*</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The country’s number on the “foe” list. The United States, which tops the list of “foes” and some other East Asian countries ranking below Japan are given as example.

Source: [“Druz’ya” I “vragi”... 2018]

Another factor slowing down the Russian-Japanese relations is the low income of most Russian citizens, who have to choose relatively cheap countries as travel destinations. According to Levada Center [Poezdi za granitsu (2018)], over the 12 months before April 2018 Russians had traveled mostly to Turkey, Thailand, Greece, Italy, and Spain (in case of Muscovites – to Turkey, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, and Thailand). It is not surprising that only a handful of Russian tourists visited Japan in recent years, less than 1/3% or even 1/4% of all tourist arrivals (table 10).
Table 10.
Number of Russian tourists in Japan, persons; year-on-year growth/decline indicted in brackets, %

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>50 176 (48.5 %)</td>
<td>60 502 (20.6 %)</td>
<td>64 077 (5.9 %)</td>
<td>54 365 (–15.2 %)</td>
<td>54 838 (0.87 %)</td>
<td>77 251 (40.9 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s share</td>
<td>0.60 %</td>
<td>0.58 %</td>
<td>0.48 %</td>
<td>0.28 %</td>
<td>0.23 %</td>
<td>0.27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of foreign visitors:</td>
<td>8 358 105 (34.4 %)</td>
<td>10 363 904 (24.0 %)</td>
<td>13 413 467 (29.4 %)</td>
<td>19 737 409 (47.1 %)</td>
<td>24 039 053 (21.8 %)</td>
<td>28 691 073 (19.3 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on: [Kokuseki/mokuteki betsu honichi gaikyakusu 2004-2017]

At the same time, according to the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), Japan is one of the top five countries Russians would like to visit (table 11).

Table 11.
Which five countries would you choose from the list if you had a chance to travel for free? (A card, no more than five answers), %

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [O Rossii I stranakh mira... 2017].
Japanese tourists amounted to less than 0.5% of all foreigners visiting Russia in 2017. According to Rosstat (the quality of Rosstat’s data on foreign tourists is incomparably low vis-a-vis the detailed Japanese statistics) [Chislo v’yezdnikh turistskikh poezdok... 2014-2019], about 24.5 million foreign citizens visited Russia in 2017, while the number of Japanese tourists was 14.5 times smaller than of Chinese tourists (table 12). Notably, in 2016 an almost equal number of tourists (around 24 million) visited Russia and Japan, but in 2017 Japan surpassed Russian by the number of coming foreign tourists (28.7 million) (table 2).

Table 12.
Number of foreign tourists in Russia, thousand persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (share, %)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>All countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1 478 (6 %)</td>
<td>282 (1,2 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1 289</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1 122</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Chislo v’yezdnikh turistskikh poezdok... 2014-2019]

According to Table 10, as many as 77,251 Russians visited Japan in 2017, which was equal to 0.27% of all foreign tourist arrivals. Therefore the share of Russian tourists visiting Japan (0.27% in 2017) and Japanese tourists visiting Russia (0.42% in 2017) do not match the potential of the two neighboring countries, whose leaders publicly declare the course of comprehensive development of bilateral relations.
The dynamics of Japanese tourist arrivals in Russia is largely determined by Russia’s attractiveness in Japan’s eyes (according to Table 4, only 20% of the Japanese feel sympathy to Russia), which in turn roots in the effectiveness of Russia’s soft power in Japan. For its part, a growth in Russian tourists’ arrivals in Japan is limited not so much by the lack of Russians’ interest to Japan, but by their financial capacity for such travels.

One can notice another trend. Given a drop in trade turnover and low investment activity, the eight-point cooperation plan proposed by Abe [Abe predstavil Putinu plan... 2016] is positioned not as a project of an “economic breakthrough” in bilateral relations but as a framework agreement on Japan’s localized assistance to Russian regions in improving healthcare services, creating comfortable and clean living environment, promoting cooperation and exchange between Japanese and Russian small and medium business and the energy sector, renewable energy included, diversifying Russian industries for the purpose of higher productivity, developing industries in the Russian Far East, etc.

Notwithstanding the implementation of these intentions, which comprise a modernized type of Japan’s soft power applied to Russia, and the “small business policy” (the Russian term was coined from the “theory of small deeds”, which was developed by populist intelligentsia in the 1880s, and correlates to the English-language notion of Small Business Policy in case of entrepreneurship), bring certain positive results, the mentioned plan does not help to solve serious problems which drastically impede bilateral trade and economic relations.

Hence, enthusiastic speeches of certain politicians and diplomats in both countries lauding “the high level of relations” between Russia and Japan, including over 20 meetings held between Russian President Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Abe on various venues, far from always conform with the reality expressed in facts and numbers. They actually mislead the public about the actual condition of Russian-Japanese relations and conceal the existence of complicated problems hindering multifaceted political and economic interaction.
Conclusion

1. Due to the absence of the hard power alternative, Japan’s soft power, ensuring its fruitful humanitarian cooperation with other states, primarily with other East Asian nations, to a large extent, is a key element of the country’s foreign policy. Japan’s “soft power” is quite effective and in many areas it can be an example to follow.

2. Inbound tourism in Japan has been demonstrating a steady growth since 2012 (primarily from China and South Korea) due to Japan’s attractive appeal in the eyes of foreigners and the effective measures taken by the Japanese government to develop inbound tourism. Other countries could benefit from studying and borrowing Japan’s tourism practices.

3. The high level of Russian-Japanese humanitarian cooperation in 2018 resulted from the Cross-year of Russia and Japan. But this was a temporary factor related to the intensive talks between the state leaders.

4. The existence of the territorial problem, which is addressed at various formats, including Putin-Abe regular summit meetings, has a negative effect on the opinion of Russians about Japan. However, the main factor hindering Russian tourist arrivals in Japan lies in Japan’s relatively expensiveness for Russians, compared to the rapidly developing economies of China and South Korea providing increasingly high living standards for their citizens, who comprise the bulk of tourist flow to Japan.

5. The number of Japanese travelers in Russia cannot be assessed as satisfactory. However, the resolution of this problem is in Russia’s hands: Russia should develop its soft power on the Japanese track and create more comfortable conditions for foreign tourists, including visitors from Japan.

6. Apparently, positive development of Russian-Japanese humanitarian relations should rest upon a substantial institutional and financial foundation and be immune from momentary considerations. To pursue that goal, Russian government should create political and economic conditions for boosting Japanese sympathy toward Russia, intensifying bilateral tourist exchanges, expanding contacts on various levels and in a broad range of areas.
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Russian edition of the article:
DOI: 10.24411/0235-8182-2018-10004
THE CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF THE CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE YOUTH

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Abstract: The main problems of political socialization of Japanese youth are studied in the paper. According to the author’s point of view, participation in the election process, youth movements, and a growing interest in international issues are the principal trends and the main indicators of Japanese youth’s political activity and political socialization of young people in contemporary Japanese society.

Political socialization is the transmission of political culture to new generations of citizens in a given society and it includes such activities as voting campaigns, attending meetings, joining political parties, taking part in political discussions, etc. Whether young people have ability to quickly adapt to the changing circumstances of the world around them depends on the process of political socialization. The difficulties that characterize the Japanese youth’s political socialization process during the last decade and its outcomes have become especially evident now - young people exhibit a less developed sense of civic duty, and take the obligations of citizenship more lightly than older generations. One of the factors influencing young people’s tendency to be engaged in civic and political activities may be the fact that the traditional mobilizing institutions of politics in Japan are not especially interested in reaching out to young people. In the article the main problems of political socialization of Japanese youth are examined. Using the data from large-scale surveys of Pew Research Center and some data of Mainichi Shimbun surveys carried out in 2017, the author analyzes whether young Japanese people are active participants of political process or play the role of unconcerned spectators.

Keywords: political socialization, Japanese youth, problems, principal trends
Political activity of the youth [Sourtayev 1999, p.152], the social group of young persons aged 15 to 29, who are mostly developed as personalities but have flexible values responsive to various influences, is an indicator of processes evolving in modern society. As a rule, development outlooks of any country ascribe a key role to the young, who are the main mobilization resource of society and the generation determining the future of the state [Zagrebin 2014]. In recent years, the understanding of the role and significance of the young in the development of society and the country has grown a lot, so the place and role of the younger generation in the political process and its involvement in politics are deemed to be some of the most debated issues in the modern world.

Political socialization is particularly intensive in the young age: a person who has been passively watching the political process becomes its participant as a result of developed views, beliefs, perceptions, and development of political culture. How are the modern young Japanese involved in this process? Are the young Japanese active participants, or do they play the role of engaged bystanders?

Democratic relations

Whenever political culture of the young is mentioned nowadays, people tend to describe it as underdeveloped, if not totally non-existent. The preservation and development of democratic foundations in any society are impossible without political engagement of the young, who are responsible for the country’s democratic potential. The process of political socialization of young people is significant because it forges a person into a citizen and incorporates the latter into the political system. For the purpose of establishing and defining the attitude of Japanese citizens to democratic values and democratic processes (as well as the level of realization of their civil rights and freedoms), the Pew Research Center carried out a massive sociological survey in 2017 [Japanese Divided on Democracy’s Success... 2017].

Democracy is vividly demonstrating its capacity to adjust to various national and cultural conditions. The question of individual rights and
freedoms is more topical for the West, while most countries of the East prioritize group rights and interests. The debate on whether democracy has grown roots in Japan and whether the political system that has become institutionalized there could be called a democracy in the traditional sense of this word is still ongoing. To a large extent, this is explained by national specifics of Japanese democracy, which makes it different from Western democratic models. Specialists affirm its historical specifics and speak about “Japanese-style democracy,” a certain hybrid that might surpass the original, i.e. the Western model, in terms of its resilience and effectiveness [Gadzhiyev 2010].

Indeed, the future of Japanese politics belongs to the young, but it is also largely determined by the reaction of older generations of the Japanese to the ongoing transformations. This circumstance has prompted us to focus on age groups in our study.

According to the survey, modern Japanese are generally satisfied with the level of democracy in their society (57%). The level is much lower than those in the Netherlands (71%), Germany (69%), or Sweden (67%), but higher than the ones in the United States (51%), the United Kingdom (49%), and Australia (48%).

Meanwhile, 47% of Japanese citizens expressed certain pessimism about democracy in their country. The respondents were not divided by political or social considerations: the biggest differences in the attitude to democracy appeared between various age groups: 32% of the respondents aged 18 to 29 were “discontent”, which is fewer than in other age groups (50% in the group aged 30 to 49, and 48% in the group older than 50). The young Japanese are more satisfied with the level of democracy in society than their older compatriots, and are inclined to support the technocratic approach and the opinion of experts in the governmental decision-making process: 63% of the Japanese aged 18 to 29 believe that decisions must be made exclusively by experts (vs. 45% in the 50+ age group).

The opinion of Keio University Professor Tomohiko Taniguchi (special advisor of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet) is of interest in this respect. He analyzed the implications of Brexit for the United Kingdom, extrapolated them on Japan, and concluded that representative
democracy required substantive debates on any issues that might have
global consequences for society. Obviously, Shinzo Abe realized that a
referendum on such important matters as Brexit could trigger demagogy
and xenophobic sentiments in society or even split a nation. This
realization leads to the conclusion that even the adoption of amendments
to the Japanese Constitution would require not only a vote in both Diet
chambers, but also a nationwide referendum which, in the epoch of
digital democracy, when predilections prevail over sense and arguments,
could be an extremely difficult thing to accomplish [Taniguchi 2016].

In addition, Brexit has shown the Japanese the potential danger
created by different views of generations. For instance, British voters with
life expectancy fewer than 20 years voted for leaving the EU, while those
with life expectancy of over 50 years (i.e. the young Brits) voted for
staying. This suggests a comparison with the situation in modern Japan,
where “division” over matters that are crucial to society (e.g., the problem
of women’s employment, or the regulatory reform) and have a strong
effect on sentiments of the young Japanese could be even more
catastrophic to society in general.

In an increasingly interconnected world, which the young Japanese
understand and accept as a source of huge opportunities, the older
generation of politicians should listen to the opinion of the young on
issues with long-term prospects and far-reaching consequences more
frequently and closely than to the opinion of their current target audience,
which rejects everything new or strange in their futile hopes to go back
to their young days. This is the reason for realizing the need to be more
active in persuading the young Japanese to vote: the more young voters
there are, the stronger the chance that their voices will not be muffled by
the older voters, whose number has become disproportionately large.

Old problems — new voters?

Elections are turning into an indicator of political socialization of
modern young people [Denisova 2010]. Considering Japan’s aging
population (over a quarter of the population is older than 60), the
political landscape has turned into one in which political candidates focus solely on the elderly demographic. As the population aged 60 and over reaches 42% of the country’s total by 2050, this trend will become increasingly pronounced. Political passivity and absenteeism are more characteristic of the young people than of any other population group. So as this demographic shift happens, the young voices of Japan’s future may become drowned out and they would never be heard.

Indeed, political apathy among young people is not a phenomenon unique to Japan, and it is a common trend in many developed countries today. In Canada’s 2011 national election, 38.8% of registered voters aged 18 to 24 cast their ballots, while in the U.S., 41.2% of young people voted in the 2012 presidential election. In many developed countries, it seems that the elderly, rather than the young, are more interested in political issues [Ostaszewski 2015]. Japan is no exception. Only 38% of 20-year-old Japanese took part in the national elections in 2012 (compared to 75% of voters aged 60). However, the political apathy apparent in the recent decades has not always been typical of the young Japanese: 57.76% of young Japanese voters came to polls in 1990, but their turnout drastically dropped to 36.5% six years later.

A poll regarding “participation of the young in the country’s political life,” which was carried out by one of the Japanese research institutes studying the issues of the young generation, showed that only 30% of 20-year-old Japanese and 6.5% of Japanese college students believed that they could make a difference in politics and that their involvement or contribution to politics would matter. Some were disappointed with their personal participation in the political process and have no wish to participate in it, and others were not participating because of their passivity.

From apathy to sympathy

Experts say, however, that the future becomes brighter for politically savvy young voters [Ostaszewski 2015]. As Japanese Diet approved the lowering of voting age in Japan from 20 to 18, 2.4 million more voters were added to the electorate of 104 million.
As the voting age was lowered, teenagers demonstrated their political activity. Shortly before the October 22, 2017 election to the House of Representatives, in September 2017, Mainichi Shimbun held two national public opinion polls [Do the young lean right?... 2017], which showed that the approval rating of the Abe Cabinet and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is higher among teenage voters and those in their 20s and 30s than among voters over 40, indicating a conservative tack in young people’s views.

In the first poll by Mainichi Shimbun, roughly 40% of those over 70 and in their 40s said they supported the Cabinet. Notably, almost a half (!) of teenage voters and the Japanese in their 20s expressed their support for the Abe government. In the second poll, 40% of the young Japanese expressed their support for the government (and less than 40% of those in their 40s).

The approval rate of LDP policies was also highest among the young, standing at nearly 40% in the first survey and around 30% in the second. This stood out from the less than 30% in the first and roughly 30% in the second survey among those aged 30 to 69.

Some of the younger respondents highlighted a lack of political knowledge among many members of their age group, saying that “If I don’t know anything, I just pick the most famous candidate.” Young respondents criticized their generation, pointing out that “Those who aren’t interested in politics just vote for the people whose names they know” and “They don’t have their own political beliefs, so they just go with the candidate with the most support.” This indicates a deficit of knowledge and experience of various generations of voters.

According to Prof. Masao Matsumoto, head of the Social Research Center of the Saitama University and an expert in political awareness and voter behavior, “other polls also demonstrated a high approval rating of the government and the Liberal Democratic Party, especially amongst teenage voters.” Of course, these numbers do not evidence intensive political activity and a high voter turnout but, to some extent, they characterize a new group of voters which might potentially be involved in political processes in the country.
From apathy to antipathy

Informal groups and civil associations are acquiring a strong influence on the political socialization process. Involvement of the young in the political process depends on many factors, including their confidence that this activity would have at least some positive influence on the solution of problems and the improvement of the general situation in the country. In the opinion of V. Ostaszewski, an analyst and researcher of Canada’s Asia Pacific Foundation, the young Japanese, who were deemed to be political indifferent, acquired their new political voice since the beginning of the debate on the security bills\(^1\) [Ostaszewski 2015]. What is more, the previous political apathy of the young Japanese might be replaced with totally different feelings [Martin 2015].

No serious student protests have happened since the 1960s, but in the past few years, such groups as Zengakuren\(^2\) and SEALDs\(^3\) have become active and started to discuss contentious issues of Japanese society. For instance, SEALDs [Slater, O’Day, Uno, Kindstrand, Takano 2015] and TDC have been active since the anti-nuclear demonstrations [Manabe 2014] that followed the earthquake and tsunami disaster in Japan in 2011, and they protested against the inability of the Japanese government to deal with this catastrophe and its consequences. SEALDs members and other young activists also protested against “the State Secrecy Act”\(^4\) and the Legislation for Peace and Security (aka Collective

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1. The package of security bills approved by the Diet and signed by Prime Minister Abe enables the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to give logistic support to and assist in rescue operations of foreign forces.

2. Zengakuren, established in 1948, is an abbreviation for the All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Governing Associations which united about a half of the nation’s students (See: [Shimbori 1971] ).

3. SEALD — Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy — is the largest civic movement organized by students at the end of 2013. It holds rallies and demonstrations in various parts of Japan to fight for democracy, and to address economic equality and poor labor conditions, as well as forms research groups to study Japan’s problems.

4. “The State Secrecy Act” endorsed in 2014 punishes officials with up to ten years in prison for divulging information about defense, foreign policy, anti-espionage, and anti-terrorism activity. People were discontent with the hasty approval of the bill by the ruling coalition and its application to broad spheres of public life — any interview with an official pertaining to defense and foreign policy could be seen as a divulgence of state secrets.
Self-Defense law) [Katharine, Moon, Park, Whelan-Wuest 2016]. Later on, the group focused on broader matters, such as democracy, the Constitution, and national security. Interacting with other activists and using social media to reach out to broader groups of the young, SEALDs managed to unite tens of thousands of people across the country, including a crowd of 120 000 (on August 30, 2015), when mass protests against laws broadening the powers of the Self-Defense Forces [Massoviye antivoenniye mitingi... 2015] were held near the Diet building in Tokyo and in 300 other cities.

The above said is a vivid proof of the growing involvement of the young Japanese in organized political activity, i.e. youth organizations of various levels and civic movements the goal of which is to exert tangible influence on the government decision-making process.

*Satisfied with economy but have some doubts...*

Japan remains one of the most economically developed countries of the world; it is also one of the most successful countries in terms of distributing economic development benefits between its citizens. This is evidenced by the opinion polls which the Prime Minister’s Office has been holding since the 1960s. For almost five decades, about 90% of the Japanese have been describing themselves as middle class [Lebedeva 2017, p. 34]. No doubt, stability is a great political value; and the attitude to stability and the assessment of the situation as stable or unstable largely determines the population’s readiness to accept government policies. This is particularly important for the young who are inclined to exhibit a fierce reaction whenever they disagree with the government and are ready to take action and to protest. Therefore, the psychological perception of economic and political stability depends not only on the objective situation and its subjective interpretation but also on the subject’s attitude to the state (the guarantor and principal subject of stability), individual psychological features, situation, and mood [Deineka, Vartanova 2012]. Obviously, the situation of the national economy has a tangible effect on the process of political socialization of the young Japanese.
In general, the Japanese believe that their life “has greatly improved” — about two-thirds say that life in modern Japan is much better than it was 50 years ago and feel more optimistic than the Americans (37%) who have also been asked to compare their life today and half a century ago. The Japanese feel better in the present-day economic situation and have a more positive view of its condition than they had in 2016. Although the general satisfaction with the economic situation in Japan has been growing, fears about the future remain, and 51% of the Japanese believe that the condition of the global economy poses a serious threat to Japan. While such concerns are much less pronounced than concerns about cyber-attacks and other threats, these are young people aged from 18 to 29 who more often worry about the external economic turbulence (65% vs. 43% in the 50+ age group).

As for the global “economic balance”, surprisingly, only 7% of the Japanese described Japan as “a leading global economic power.” Post-war Japan demonstrated exceptionally high growth rates in a certain historical period, since the 1960s till the early 1970s. In the opinion of Naoki Tanaka, president of the Center for International Public Policy Studies, “other countries have had periods of rapid growth as well, and looking back, we can see that while a given country may experience rapid growth at a given time, no country can lay claim to the kind of enduring strengths that guarantee sustained growth from one era to the next. In fact, no nation in history has sustained high-paced economic growth as the norm. We must begin by realizing that Japan’s ‘economic miracle’ was a passing phenomenon of the 1960s and early 1970s, and nothing more” [Tanaka 2012]. It is likely due to this that the lack of faith in the country’s economic superiority has been characteristic of the Japanese society for years, while now there is a heated discussion about the methods that could give a boost to the national economic development in the 21st century.

Speaking of the economic prospects of the next generation, only 19% of the Japanese said that today’s children will be living in a better financial and economic reality than their parents (72% feel pessimistic). Pessimism is most pronounced among the Japanese aged 30 to 49 and
older than 50: in this group, only 18% and 16% respectively believe that the next generation will prosper financially. Against this backdrop, this is inspiring news that about a third (32%) of the young Japanese believe in a better economic future for their children. These feelings are the best proof of the opinion of Japan Foundation head Yohei Sasakawa: “Japan is prosperous and stable, and more than anything else, the number of young people who view the future optimistically is increasing” [Sasakawa 2017].

**Between the world and oneself**

It is generally believed that the younger generation is disinterested in politics, politically passive, and indifferent to international affairs. Regretfully, these conclusions are supported by numerous surveys and polls. The recent crises in international relations have created tensions in communication and hindered the achievement of understanding between societies. Under these complicated circumstances, young people are not just objects of public influence but also agenda-setting actors capable of learning and acting on the basis of knowledge about the international situation. The young perceive political reality through the lens of their “world view” and develop their attitude to international political events through their system of values, so the interest in global developments is a major form of manifestation of the political behavior of the younger generation. Understandably, the interest in political information, which is realized through the search for and consumption of necessary information, should come first. Globalization and modern technologies are of great value in this respect, as they make young citizens more experienced in collecting and using received information [Rosenau 1997]. Apparently, an important role in the process of political socialization of the youth is played by the media (both printed and electronic), which is a primary source of information and a shaper of opinions and political preferences of the young.

Conscious political, social, economic, and cultural orientation and guidelines of the younger generation largely depend on the media, which
provides information about ongoing events to the public, helps people quench their thirst for information, reflects and structures the reality as a value-based public “view of the world,” performs the role of an indisputable leader in the formation of outlook and political culture of the younger generation, and has a targeted influence on political consciousness and behavior of the young.

Judging by recent surveys, the young Japanese prefer television to the Internet, magazines, etc as their select “source of information about international events” [Zhilina 2015, p. 7]. Other studies [Kiselev, Samarkina 2007] indicate that Internet users (and young people in particular) frequently choose communication activities (contacts with experts, media, and organizations), which are maximally effective on the Internet. And only a small portion of users prefers more active forms of political participation.

Online political activity of the young also depends on whether political information is necessary for their daily life. In this respect, the Internet does not differ much from traditional media outlets, such as printed publications and television. There is an important observation to be made: most young Japanese spend less than 30 minutes per week (!) on reading, listening to, or watching international news. One in five young Japanese reports that they “absolutely have no time to spare on it.” Newspapers are not so helpful in learning about the world, either, considering their weak focus on foreign news and events [Zhilina 2016]. Yet the only way to develop a habit for political evaluation of events, the need for political knowledge, and a wish to understand the essence of global political processes is to find and comprehend necessary information. In other words, political socialization starts with the active involvement of the younger generation in the world of political attitudes, rather than with the passive learning of information.

In John Berry’s opinion, only the people who felt safe in their country could be tolerant to representatives of other countries and cultures. Whenever people feel a threat coming from other ethno-cultural communities, they do not accept cultural differences, demonstrate
intolerance, and resort to self-defense methods [Berry, Poortinga, Segall, Dasen 2002]. The latest studies conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2017 [Japanese Divided on Democracy’s Success... 2017] mentioned four external “irritants” with the biggest significance for the Japanese, which make them leave, to a varying degree, their zone of comfort – Korea, both North and South, China, the United States, and Russia. They were asked to evaluate relations and to determine the level of threat from each of these.

**Is Korea (which of them?) the problem?**

Japan’s relations with both states of the Korean Peninsula are a national security priority. However, for a number of historical reasons and factors of the international situation in Northeast Asia, Japan’s relations with South and North Koreas have not been easy. This factor has a serious impact on the entire foreign policy of Japan [Kistanov 2016b, p. 72]; besides, there are growing fears in Japan about the nuclear and missile threat coming from North Korea [Kistanov 2017, p. 14]. North Korea, which is rapidly enlarging its nuclear potential, is seen as an existential threat by many Japanese. Two-thirds (66%) are concerned about the nuclear weapons of Pyongyang. Notably, the question was asked before North Korea tested long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. At the same time, 41% of the young Japanese speak in favor of stronger relations with Korea (vs. 21% of people older than 50).

In 2017, only 26% of the Japanese had a positive opinion about South Korea. The indicator halved since 2008, when 57% of respondents declared their favorable disposition towards their Far Eastern neighbor. Generations are divided over South Korea: 40% of the young Japanese have a positive opinion, in contrast to 18% of older citizens.

**And no any love for China?**

Possessing powerful economies and substantial political weight, China and Japan turned into influential global actors in the early 21st century.
Foreign political aspirations of both countries and the nature of their relationship have a significant influence on the situation in Northeast Asia and military, political, and economic climate in the region. There are numerous disagreements between China and Japan at the current stage [Zabrovskaya 2013, p. 67].

Although Japan ranks third among global economies, has the seventh largest army on the planet, and plays an important role on the world stage, almost two-thirds of the Japanese (64%) highlight “China’s power” and describe its international influence as a serious threat (although this number has declined by 10 percentage points since 2013). Differences between the young and the older generations in their evaluation of China could be rooted in differences of their opinions on China from the perspective of national security: the Japanese older than 50 (68%) are more concerned about the influence of China than young people (55%).

In general, eight in ten Japanese (83%) speak negatively of China (only 13% speak positively) and few have trust in President Xi Jinping: only 11% approve of his actions on the global political stage, and 81% “have no trust” or “feel undecided.” Importantly, the Japanese aged 30 to 49 and older than 50 express their mistrust in the Chinese leader more often (82%) than the young Japanese (68%).

**Problems in relations: the U.S.?**

Despite the long-term military alliance and profound economic relations with the United States, Trump’s victory in the presidential election made the Japanese government worry about the future of the bilateral security alliance. During his election campaign, Trump kept expressing his wish to reconsider the alliance formalized by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. An equally important problem, which will arise during Trump’s tenure, will be the focus of Japan’s nuclear energy program. The 1988 U.S. – Japan Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy expired in July 2018. Negotiations on its resumption will unavoidably
mention the possibility of Japan’s military uses of nuclear energy, especially in the light of contradictory statements of Trump concerning the possible possession of nuclear weapons by Japan [Kistanov 2016a]. Nevertheless, over half of the Japanese (57%) are favorably disposed towards the United States (despite a 15% decline in positive sentiments since 2016). A reason for the positive attitude to America is respondents’ belief that “this country respects personal rights of its citizens” (69%) and that this “is the leading economy of the world” (62%). The older Japanese also have more trust in the long-standing ally than young people. The latter are prone to see Washington as a serious threat, rather than a good ally, more often (68%) than the older generation of the Japanese (58%).

An analysis of the survey by age groups indicates a big difference between the attitude of the young and the older Japanese to the United States and the U.S. president: about two-thirds (67%) of the young Japanese like this country, and half (51%) of older citizens have become disappointed in it. Just a year before, 69% of the Japanese felt rather optimistic about America. The worsening attitude to America could derive from their mistrust in the new president: more people in Japan fear that the bilateral alliance might experience problems during Trump’s presidency.

About 41% of the Japanese predict “deterioration of relations.” However, twice as many young Japanese (25% vs. 13% in the age group older than 50) are expecting relations to improve.

Back in 2016, the overwhelming majority (78%) expressed confidence in U.S. President Barack Obama, and in 2017 only 24% said that they trusted Trump, his policy, and approved of his actions. There was a difference in the attitude of age groups to the White House’s occupant as well.

In fact, Japan has mixed feelings about Trump. The young give a more positive description of the U.S. leader than the older generation (see Table 1).

Over half of the young Japanese (60% vs. 46% from the group older than 50) described the incumbent U.S. president as “charismatic.”
Approximately the same number (64% vs. 41% in the age group older than 50) called him a strong leader and indicated almost three times more often (36% vs. 10% in the age group older than 50) that “Trump cared about ordinary people.”

Table 1
President Trump’s characteristic (young Japanese are less critical of Trump) %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>18–29 %</th>
<th>30-49 %</th>
<th>50+ %</th>
<th>Difference between answers of the youngest and the oldest age group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A strong leader</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>+23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-qualified to be president</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring about ordinary people</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charismatic</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>−4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerant</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>−12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrogant</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>−16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Japanese Divided on Democracy’s Success... 2017].

However, many young respondents called the American president “arrogant” (68% vs. 83% in the age group older than 50), “intolerant” (53% vs. 65% from the age group older than 50) and even “dangerous” (55% vs. 59% in the group older than 50). This explains, to an extent, why only 28% of the young Japanese believe that Trump is “well-qualified to be the U.S. president” (vs. 10% in the age group older than 50). Many disagreed with certain political initiatives of the U.S. president.
Various generations differed in their opinion on the U.S. leader: 31% of the young Japanese said that they trusted Trump and his policies, and only 20% of older citizens felt the same way.

Devil is not as black as he is painted: Russia

Despite the cooling of Russia’s relations with the United States and other leading Western nations, which imposed sanctions on Moscow over Crimea and Ukraine, 2016 and the beginning of 2017 witnessed a marked rapprochement between Russia and Japan in the political and economic fields [Kistanov 2017, p. 22]. Japan’s relations with Russia are sensitive to political circumstances. Hence, a key task of a Japanese leader traditionally lies in the field of domestic policy: he must demonstrate the public his ability to defend national interests by using a broad range of propaganda tools [Streltsov 2017]. According to Professor Streltsov, an expert in international relations, at the level of collective consciousness Japan “still has illusions about Russia, which are largely created by public opinion leaders. According to a prevalent view, President Putin is grateful to Abe for the ‘new approach’ proposed by the Japanese leader and after the election in March 2018 he will agree to make a decision on the islands that would be politically favorable for Japan” [Streltsov 2017].

According to the October 2017 poll [Japanese Divided on Democracy’s Success... 2017], the older Japanese are less worried about the “threat” coming from Russia than about the threat posed by China or the United States. At the same time, 43% believe that Russia poses a serious threat to Japan, and nearly two-thirds (64%) express negative feelings toward Russia. Only 26% spoke favorably of Moscow. However, the poll titled Publics Worldwide Unfavorable Toward Putin, Russia exhibited a substantial difference between the ways various generations think about Russia: 53% of the Japanese aged from 18 to 29 have a favorable opinion on their “distant neighbor” (compared to 16% in the 50+ age group; the gap is 37%) (Table 2).
Table 2
Positive view on Russia (Russia is taken more positively by the young)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total %</th>
<th>18–29 %</th>
<th>30-49 %</th>
<th>50+ %</th>
<th>Difference between answers of the youngest and the oldest age group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>+22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>+21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>+17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Publics Worldwide Unfavorable Toward Putin, Russia 2017]

For comparison, in 2013 [Global opinion of Russia Mixed... 2013] a positive attitude towards Russia was expressed by 46% of the young Japanese and 21% of senior respondents (50+), and the gap stood at 25%. Obviously, the number of the young Japanese favorably disposed towards their neighbor in the Asia Pacific region has been on the rise (+7%). A trend of 2013 is “different attitudes towards Russia depending on the respondents’ age.” Indeed, young people aged 18 to 29 in other countries were also inclined to speak more positively of Russia than their compatriots older than 50. In more than eight countries, including G20 member states such as Japan, Canada, Brazil, Germany, the United States, and South Korea, the gap between opinions of the youngest and
oldest age groups amounted to 20%. Experts said that different opinions about Russia could result from perception of “Russia’s changing role in the world.” This trend could also be part of a more universal phenomenon: both the United States and China were often more positively taken by respondents younger than 30.

In 2017, Pew Research Center Director Bruce Stokes explained the different opinions of the young and the senior respondents by difference in evaluation of Russia’s “observance of civil freedoms.” Only 26% of the Japanese believe that Russia “respects personal freedoms of its citizens.” The share of such opinions is 60% among the youth and only 11% in the older group.

The contradictory situation around Russia is also manifested by answers given by different age groups to the question about their attitude towards the Russian leader: most people in Japan (64%) said that they had “no trust in Russian President Vladimir Putin” (vs. 28% of sympathizers). In 2017 about 49% of the young Japanese said that they “trusted the Russian president” (vs. 17% in the 50+ age group).

We should add the following: although international relations have not been easy and simple in recent years, there is a trend that deserves attention: the young Japanese are more open to the world than their older compatriots:

– The young Japanese support stronger relations with North Korea and have a rather positive attitude towards South Korea, in contrast to the older generation;

– The young Japanese are more favorably disposed to relations with China and have more trust in its leader in contrast to the older generation;

– Nearly twice as many Japanese aged 18 to 29 expect relations with the United States to improve and are more amicably disposed towards the U.S. president; they appear to be less subjective than the older Japanese;

– Russia is more favored among Japanese youth and, importantly, the number of the young Japanese who feel optimistic about their “distant neighbor” and bilateral relations has substantially grown. Besides, nearly half of them “trust the Russian president,” while the older generation is
more cautious about him. These factors inspire optimism: the young are leaving the cocoon of domestic isolation and reach out to the big world [Zhilina 2016, p. 69], which provides an optimistic perspective on the future of Japanese society. And since the future of society will be realized precisely through the activities of those who are the youth today, political leaders, understanding this fact, increasingly talk about the need for supporting political and other activity of the young.

* * *

As we can see, the young Japanese are gradually shifting from the group of passive observers of others’ victories and “audience” of the political game to the ranks of political process participants. Once the younger generation of the Japanese starts to implement its voting rights, there will be a chance to strengthen its political status with a real, rather than formal opportunity to influence the correlation of political forces in society through a vote. For now, most voters who come to polls in Japan are older than 60, rather than the ones in their 20s, and it is not ruled out that politicians will center their campaigns on older groups. However, just like SEALDs pooled efforts with other groups of activists to draw thousands of protesters, Japanese society should unite at every level and clearly demonstrate to the young that their voice could change the situation in politics and the daily life of Japan. The future of the country depends on this balance. In other words, the Japanese political community has a chance to engage the young in its political interests and thus gain support in the election. Even a slight change in electoral preferences in Japan, which has a complex electoral system, might have a strong impact on the division of Diet seats, which is why every vote matters.

An analysis of young people’s attitude to economic stability and levels of democracy in the country leads to the following conclusion. Despite strong (compared with those of the older generation) fears about external economic turbulence, the young Japanese are more optimistic about the economic future of their country, which means that the government’s
strategy and economic policy have their trust. Besides, the younger Japanese are more satisfied with democratic processes in society than the older generation, but voice a stronger support for the technocratic approach to the decision-making process in the government.

Japanese Prime Minister Abe said in his New Year greetings [New Year’s Reflection... 2018] that the year 2018 “would be a period of action” for his country and emphasized that “Everything depends on the aspirations and eagerness of the Japanese people. It all depends on whether or not the Japanese people believe that they can change the future and are able to take action”. He expressed confidence in Japan’s capacity for significant development if it builds society where everyone is able to realize one’s potential. In this context, the young Japanese are viewed not only and not so much as an age group but as a special social and psychological category of people whose importance for political processes evolving in Japan must not be underestimated. Being a subject of political and social relations, the young Japanese will become an active part of society and will be able to influence political decisions.

References


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Russian edition of the article:
DOI: 10.24411/0235-8182-2018-10003
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to research the continental prototypes for Fujiwara-no Kamatari Biography (the main part of “Toshi Kaden”/“The Fujiwara House Biography”). Kamatari was the key political figure of his time and one of the Japanese statehood fathers. Whereas the Chinese prototypes are well investigated, we could not say so about the Korean ones. However, Kamatari is compared with both Chinese and Korean statesmen. It is for this reason, that the paper focuses on the analysis of the possible Korean prototypes.

Keywords: Toshi Kaden, Fujiwara-no Kamatari, Kim Yusin, Asuka and Nara periods, Silla.

The Fujiwara House Biography (Toshi Kaden, 藤氏家伝) is a text remarkable in many ways. First of all, it is the only surviving example of the ancient genre of “family biographies” (Kaden, 家伝) in Japan\(^1\), which is why Kaden usually implies the Fujiwara House Biography. Toshi Kaden was composed in the early 760th by Fujiwara-no Nakamaro (706–764) and monk Enkei (?–?).

Secondly, this is the story of the powerful Fujiwara clan (or, to be more exact, its southern branch), which played a key role in the history of Japan for several centuries. Thirdly, much of the first Kaden scroll is devoted to Fujiwara-no Kamatari (614–669), the founder of the Fujiwara

\(^1\)It was fully translated into German [Hermann 1941; Hermann 1942] and partially (the first scroll) into English [Bauer 2017; Bauer 2018]. For Russian translation see: [Sakharova 2006].
clan and a founding father of the reforms of the second half of the 7th century. Fourthly, Kamatari’s great-grandson, Nakamaro, a major 8th century statesman, who made a breathtaking career, took a spectacular fall, and was executed as a rebel on the shore of Lake Biwa, was one of the Toshi Kaden authors. Nakamaro’s head was cut off and brought to the capital in an act of unprecedented reprisal on a noble family’s offspring.

Two scrolls have survived: the first one contains a detailed narrative of the life of Kamatari and briefly tells the life of his son Joe (–665), and the second presents the biography of Fujiwara-no Muchimaro (680–737), the father of Fujiwara-no Kamatari. Several copies of Toshi Kaden have been preserved, the oldest of which are dating back to the end of the 12th century. Most documents copy the first scroll with the Kamatari biography (some are missing the Joe biography). There is no doubt that the text was known to aristocrats, primarily, members of the Fujiwara clan. Mentions of and quotes from Kaden can be found in sources dating back to 11th–12th centuries [Sakharova 2006, p.196].

The popularity of Kaden, especially the Kamatari biography, is rooted in its glorification of the Fujiwara clan and the high erudition of authors. Japanese researchers indicate that the authors had a profound knowledge of the Japanese official chronicles Nihon Shoki (the Chronicles of Japan, 720), and Chinese sources, primarily Han Shu (the History of the Former Han) by Ban Gu (32–92), Hou Han Shu (the History of the Later Han), which covers a period from the 1st century to the early 3rd century, and is ascribed to Fan Ye (398–446), and Shi Ji (Records of the Grand Historian) by Sima Qian (circa 145–86), which covers the period from the mythical emperors to the reign of Wu-di (141–87). Researchers have found direct and indirect quotations from 20 Chinese canonical, historical, literary, and philosophical works in the Kamatari’s son Joe epitaph alone (comprising 220 characters) [Ma Jun 2007].

This article studies the central part of the document, the Kamatari biography, whose authorship is attributed to Fujiwara-no Nakamaro. Basically, the Kamatari biography does not contradict Nihon Shoki, and
even copy it precisely in many cases. Yet many paragraphs demonstrate a higher degree of originality, and some are missing in *Nihon Shoki.*

The primary objective of the article is to attempt to identify continental prototypes of Kamatari’s image and to trace the components from which the image of one of the “founding father” of the ancient Japanese state was composed.

One has to note that borrowings from the Chinese chronicles, above all *Han Shu,* are rather well studied by Japanese researchers [Okimori 1999; Yajima 1999]. According to the researchers, the author of the Kamatari biography actively referred to the biography of Zhang Liang (?–168 BC), associate of the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC – 8 AD) founder, Emperor Gao-zu (206–195 BC) of *Han Shu,* as well *Basic Annals* of the emperor Gao-zu period from *Han Shu* and *Shi Ji.*

The biography compares Kamatari to a number of acclaimed Chinese statesmen, in all cases referring to the founders of new dynasties (Zhou, Han, Tang) and their close associates. That is, it proceeds from the Confucian concept, according to which a “exemplary person” (*junzi*君子) helps a sacred sovereign to govern the country. In this biography, the ideal pair is emperor Tenji (668–671) and Kamatari. In the opinion of Nakamaro, the ideal reign of Tenji-Kamatari corresponds to the political tandem of Junnin (758–764)-Nakamaro [Sato Makoto 1999].

Emperor Tenji said in his decree on the occasion of Kamatari’s death: “King Wen [founder of Zhou dynasty – E.S.] appointed Shang Fu² and the founder of the Han had Chang Liang [or Zhang Liang in pinyin romanization system³ – E.S.] as his minister. Isn’t this just like the two of us?”⁴ [Bauer 2017, p. 493].

² Shang Fu is another name of Lu Shang (Tai Gong Wang), the father of Wen Wang and the teacher of his successor, Wu Wang.
³ Here and below is used pinyin romanization system for the Chinese names and toponyms. In cases when in cited translations of the sources is used another system, pinyin spelling is given in parentheses.
Kamatari is compared to both Chinese and Korean statesmen. Yet most of ideal Chinese sovereigns and exemplary persons, lived in the ancient era, and every Korean statement referred to in the biography were Kamatari’s contemporaries. First of all, the remarkable Korean politician and military commander of Silla and a key figure of the epoch of unification of Korean, Kim Yusin\(^5\) (595–673). Just like Zhang Liang, Kim Yusin was twice mentioned in the biography.

The future emperor, Tenji, said: “I have heard that ‘The Great Tang had Wei Zheng\(^6\), Koguryō had Kae Kim\(^7\), Paekche had Song Chung\(^8\), and Silla had Su Sun [i.e. Kim Yusin – E.S.].’” Each one protected their state and their fame reached ten thousand li. These were all great men in their country, and their wisdom and strategy surpassed ordinary men. Compared to our Minister of the Interior, these people would reach below his middle. How could they compete with him?” \[Bauer 2017, p. 490\]

One more reference: “In the 9th month of autumn of the 7th year, Silla sent tribute. The Great Minister thereupon offered the high official of Silla [Yusin – E.S.] a ship as gift through the official Kim Tong Won” \[Bauer 2017, p. 491\].

The reference to the gift to Kim Yusin is also mentioned in Nihon Shoki (Tenji 7-9-26, 668): “26th day. Nakatomi no Naijin sent the Buddhist priests Hōben and Shimpitsu to present a ship to the Tē-kak-u Yu-sin, Prime Minister of Silla. It was delivered to Tong-wön and his companions”

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\(^5\) Here and below McCune–Reischauer romanization system for the Korean language is used. There are several romanization systems for the Korean language in use, so the unification is impossible. In cases when in cited translations of the sources is used another system, spelling in McCune–Reischauer romanization system is given in parentheses.

\(^6\) Wei Zheng (580–643) is a renowned high official of the early Tang epoch, who served in the court of Gao-zu (618–627) and Tai-zong (627–650).

\(^7\) Yŏn Kaesomun (?–666) is a statesman and military commander of Koguryō. In 642, Kaesomun killed the Koguryō sovereign and practically started to govern Koguryō. His biography was included in Kim Busik’s Samguk sagi, but Korea traditionally views Kaesomun as a rebel \[Kim Busik 2002, vol. 3, p.191-192\].

\(^8\) Japanese commentators tentatively presume it could be Kwisil Pok-sin (?–663), repeatedly mentioned in Nihon Shoki, but Russian expert on Korea V.M. Tikhonov believes Song Chung means Song Chung (?–656), a loyal subject of the last Paekche sovereign, Uija (642-660). Song Chung was slandered and died in prison (oral information).
[Nihongi: Chronicles of Japan... 1972, p. 289] (In Russian see: [Nihon Shoki 1997, vol. 2, p. 202]. Japanese commenters note similarity between several fragments of the Kamatari biography and *Samguk sagi* (History of the Three Kingdoms, 1145): the Kim Yusin biography and a fragment of the *Silla Annals* of the *Samguk Sagi*. The author of *Samguk sagi*, Kim Busik (1075–1151), noted that the biography of Kim Yusin was composed by his great-grandchild and comprised of ten juans (chapters). Kim Busik abridged the document to ten chapters. The dates of life of Kim Yusin’s great-grandchild are unknown\(^9\). Presumably, the biography was written in the second half or the end of the 8th century\(^10\). In 630–40s, Silla saw the establishment of a group led by Ch’unch’u (later known as T’aejong-Muryŏl (654–661)) and Kim Yusin, which pursued an active expansionist policy. The activity of Ch’unch’u and Kim Yusin dated back to the period of two female sovereigns Sŏndŏk (632–647) and Jindŏk (647–654), and Ch’unch’u ascended the throne in 654. In 647 Ch’unch’u arrived to the Yamato court as a hostage [Nihon Shoki 2005] (Taika, 3–12–last day, 647; Jito, 3–5–22, 689). Apparently, amid the military and political instability on the Korean Peninsula (in 642, Kaesomun came to power in Koguryŏ, and in 644 Tang forces invaded Koguryŏ), Ch’unch’u was seeking diplomatic and military support of Yamato. As early as in 648, Ch’unch’u and his son headed for the Tang Chang’an capital to meet with Emperor Tai-zong (627–650) and to ask for assistance of the mighty neighbor.

It is highly probable that Kamatari was personally acquainted with Ch’unch’u, who became the sovereign of Silla in 654.

The table in the appendix indicates similarities between *Toshi Kaden*, Japanese sources *Nihon Shoki* and *Shoku Nihongi*, Chinese *Shi Ji, Han Shu*, and *Hou Han Shu*, and Korea’s *Samguk Sagi* (Table 1. Similarities in the Kamatari Biography and Japanese, Chinese, and Korean sources). For the purpose of convenience, we used the modern division of the Kamatari biography. One also has to note that Japanese

\(^9\) For the research of the Kim Yusin’s biography see: [McBride II 2013, pp. 497-535]

\(^10\) Kim Yusin’s biography was translated into Russian by V.M. Tikhonov [Tikhonov 1998; Kim Busik 2002, vol. 3].
commentators have found similarity with the Kim Yusin’s biography and information about Yusin given in the *Silla Annals* of the *Samguk sagi* (Part 6, King Munmu) [Kim Pusik 2012, pp.181-183] only in three fragments — 1, 6, 9, while we believe the actual number of similarities is larger. Eight fragments (1, 2, 6, 9, 29, 33, 34, 41) have similarities with the Kim Yusin’s biography. We will analyze them in detail in the light of similarities with *Shi Ji* and *Han Shu* (Appendix. Table 2. Similarities between the biographies of Kamatari, Kim Yusin, and Zhang Liang).

The biographies of Kim Yusin and Kamatari have the following similarities (Table 2).

1. The miraculous birth: Kim Yusin was born 20 months after conception, Kamatari — 12 months after conception (fragment 1).

2. The knowledge of secret martial art: Kim Yusin received instructions from an old Taoist, and Kamatari learned by heart the “Six Secret Teachings” military treatise allegedly written on the orders from Tai Gong, an associate of Zhou’s King Wen and King Wu (fragment 2).

3. The alliances made between Kim Yusin and prince Ch’unch’u (later known as King T’aejong-Muryŏl (654–661) — E.S.), and between Kamatari and Prince Naka-no Oe (the future Emperor Tenji, 668-671) while playing a game of kemari\(^{11}\) (fragment 5).

4. The elder sister of Kim Yusin missed her chance to marry Ch’unch’u (future King T’aejong-Muryŏl), the younger sister of Kim Yusin becomes Ch’unch’u’s wife and mother of King Munmu (661–681). The elder daughter of Yamada-no Omi, an ally of Kamatari and Naka-no Oe, missed her chance to marry Naka-no Oe (the future Emperor Tenji), and the younger daughter of Yamada-no Omi becomes the mother of future Empress Jito (690–697) (fragment 9).

5. In 668, the Tang Emperor Gao-zu “sent to Yusin a decree, in which paid tribute to his [merits] and invited him to the [Tang] court”.

\(^{11}\) Mari or Kemari is a game of ball, in which players must keep the ball in mid-air as long as they can by kicking it with their legs.
The king of Koguryŏ (whose name is not mentioned!) sent a message to Kamatari to laud his virtues (fragment 29).

6. The house of terminally ill Kim Yusin is visited by King Munmu; Kim Yusin gives him instructions on governing the country, and the crying king accepts them. The house of terminally ill Kamatari is visited by Emperor Tenji; Kamatari asks for a modest funeral, and Tenji chokes back tears (fragment 33).

7. In 660, King T’aejong-Muryŏl appointed Yusin to the supreme position and grants him the highest rank, and in 668 King Munmu grants Yusin an exclusive rank (*taedae seobalhan*), established specially for him. Emperor Tenji awarded the supreme rank and position of the Chief Minister to Kamatari shortly before his death (*daijo daijin*; in fact, the position was established two years after Kamatari’s death, in 671) (fragment 34).

8. The king ordered his officers “to erect a stele recording Kim Yusin’s meritorious works”. Paekche monk Sat’aek Somyŏng made the inscription on the stele to keep Kamatari’s glory alive (fragment 41).

Thus, the intricate Chinese figurativeness and phraseology conceals the profound similarity with the Korean prototype at the level of narrative and key moments of Kamatari’s biography. Considering that crucial moments of Kamatari’s biography coincide with *Nihon Shoki*, one could also presume that the biography of Kamatari based on the Korean prototype was written by the time *Nihon Shoki* was composed. As for the Chinese prototype (Zhang Liang), it looks like the biography of Zhang Liang and information about Gao-zu from *Shi Ji* and *Han Shu* was used extensively in composing Kim Yusin’s biography.

This is proven by the story of initiation into the art of war miraculously given by an old Taoist (Table 2, fragment 2). Yusin’s biography has a moment coinciding with the early days of Gao-zu. “At this time, Yusin was the military governor of Amnyang-ju and often spent months drinking wine and playing music as if he had no interest in military matters” [Na, You, Shin 2018, p. 220].
Shi Ji says the following about Gao-zu: “He treated all the other officials in the office with familiarity and disdain. He was fond of wine and women and often used to go to Dame Wang’s or old lady Wu’s and drink on credit” [Sima Qian 1993, p. 78; in Russian see: Sima Qian 2003, vol. 2, p. 157]. The use of Zhang Liang’s image in writing the biography of Kim Yusin looks quite logical. Kim Yusin was mostly known as a military commander, and a standard phrase in his biography is “10,000 heads of [enemies] were chopped off.” In contrast to Yusin, Zhang Liang never took part in battles due to his poor health, but was a remarkable tactician and strategist, and Gao-zu won many victories thanks to his recommendations and advice.

As known, Kamatari scored no military victories. Moreover, during his time Yamato joined a military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula on the side of Paekche and against the coalition forces of Silla and Tang. In 661–668, three expedition corps were sent to Korea (5,000 men in 661, and 27,000 men in 663), to help Paekche, an ally of Yamato. As a result of several defeats, the worst of which was the sea battle of Paekkang chŏnt’u in 663, the corps ingloriously returned to the home country. It is known that Kim Yusin personally led Silla’s main forces in numerous military operations. Toshi Kaden makes no mention of the defeat of the Yamato forces.

So, the chain of ideal Confucian pairs of “sovereign-subject” looks as follows: Gao Zu – Zhang Liang, Ch’unch’u – Kim Yusin, Tenji–Fujiwara-no Kamatari.

The question is what is behind this strong “Korean trace”, hidden by multiple Chinese quotations. An answer to this question would require a separate research, but the preliminary ideas are as follows.

In Kamatari’s times, Yamato was actively engaged in the affairs evolving on the Korean Peninsula, which was manifested, among other things, at the level of personal relations. It seems that Kamatari personally knew well Ch’unch’u, the future king of Silla. Meanwhile, Kim Yusin was a descendant of Karakkuk, a clan in the small proto-state Kaya (Mimana), which traditionally maintained close contacts with Yamato.
People with origins on the Korean Peninsula (including re-settlers) played a huge role at the early stage of the formation of the Japanese statehood. It seems that the first systematized information about Kamatari used by the authors of *Nihon Shoki* and *Toshi Kaden*, was recorded by a person who comes from the Korean Peninsula. It could be a Koguryō monk named Doken. He is the author of *Nihon Seiki* [The Records of Japanese Generations (Sovereigns)], which did not survive but which was frequently quoted by *Nihon Shoki*. This is what *Nihon Shoki* says about Kamatari’s death:

“The "Nihon Seiki" says: — "The Naidaijin died at the age of fifty in his private residence. He was removed for temporary burial to the south of the mountain. Oh! cruel Heaven! that could not bring itself to leave this aged man! Alas! what sorrow!" The inscription on his tomb says that he died at the age of fifty-six” [Nihongi: Chronicles of Japan... 1972, p. 292].

The authorship of the Joe epitaph is also ascribed to Doken. Despite Japan’s close and intensive contacts with the states of the Korean Peninsula, and after their unification by Silla – with the Unified Silla, Japanese-Korean relations were never problem-free. The only exception was the reign of Tenmu (673–686), when Silla, unrecognized by the Tang, needed an ally and pledged to be Yamato’s vassal. There was a period of thaw in Silla-Yamato relations. Yamato sent an embassy to the Tang in 669; no other embassies were sent to China until 701. Meanwhile, Silla sent embassies to Yamato almost every year during the Tenmu reign; there were eight embassies from Yamato to Silla between 670 and the end of the century (in 670, 675, 676, 681, 684, 687, 692, and 696).

To my knowledge, Japan historians tend to disregard the following statement made by *Samguk Sagi* about the embassy sent from Yamato in 670: “The state We (Chinese “Wa”, Japanese “Yamato” — E.S.) had been renamed Nihon. They [the Japanese] said it was named so because of the state’s location close to the place where the Sun rises.” (The Silla Annals, 12th month, 670) [Kim Busik 2001, vol. 1, pp. 179, 109].
information given by *Samguk sagi* is confirmed by *Nihon Shoki*’s records of an embassy sent to Silla in 670 [Nihon Shoki. Tenji, 9–10–1, 670]. Meanwhile, Japanese historians believe that the first mentioned of the new name of the country (Nihon) was the record made in the Chinese chronicles *Jiu Tang Shu* (945), which said it was the name of the country given by Ambassador Awata-no Mahito in 702. It is generally assumed, that the country started naming itself Nihon during the reign of Tenmu. The opinion of South Korean historians, according to which the new name was reported by an ambassador who came from Yamato to Silla in 670, is disregarded<sup>12</sup>.

Later on, Japan-Silla relations were mostly deteriorating: Japan insisted on the subjugated position of Silla as a vassal, and Silla wanted the two states to have an equal status, which caused numerous diplomatic scandals [Sakharova 2012, pp. 20–24]. An aggravation of Japan-Silla relations was also characteristic of the period of political dominance of Fujiwara-no Nakamaro, who is believed to be the author of the Kamatari biography. In 759, he ordered to start preparations for a military invasion of Silla (*Shoku Nihongi, Tempyo Hoji*, 3–6–18, 759) [Shoku Nihongi 2005, vol. 3, p. 321]. His plans did not come to fruition: Nakamaro was deposed in 764. However, due to anti-Silla sentiments intensified in the later period, Japan severed official contacts with Silla (the last Japanese embassy was sent to Silla in 779) and terminated trade relations in the end of the 9<sup>th</sup> century. Since then, exchanges with the mainland were brokered by Chinese merchants.

Compared with the corresponding fragments of *Nihon Shoki*, *Toshi Kaden* gave a more Chinese-style description of the Kamatari biography. Given the increasing anti-Silla feelings of the Japanese ruling elite, the vagueness of the Korean prototype is understandable: after all, the Japanese leadership viewed Silla as a state hostile to Japan.

<sup>12</sup> Using the occasion, I’d like to thank V.M. Tikhonov for kindly advising me on this and other matters.
Table 1.
Congruence of Kamatari Biography with Japanese,
Chinese, and Korean sources

Legend:
- x — no match (only for Nihon Shoki);
- (+) — borrowing of some phrases or paraphrases from Shi Ji, Han Shu, and Hou Han Shu;
- + — matches with a significant degree of Kaden’s originality;
- ++ — significant semblance;
- +++ — practically complete match.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Kamatari Biography fragment</th>
<th>Nihon Shoki</th>
<th>Shoku Nihongi</th>
<th>Shih Ji</th>
<th>Han Shu</th>
<th>Hou Han shu</th>
<th>Samguk sagi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Birth at the Fujiwara mansion</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Kamatari’s character</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Man of outstanding moral qualities and knowledge</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Decline of Imperial House</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Prince Karu</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Naka-no Oe</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Elimination of Yamashiro-no Oe</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>+++</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>[Yamada-no Omi] offers marriage with his younger daughter</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Elaboration of joint plan</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>(+)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Plot to kill Iruka</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Iruka invited [to the empress]</td>
<td>++</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Message from 3 Korean states</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>End of message reading</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Killing the Iruka</td>
<td>++</td>
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<tr>
<td>№</td>
<td>Kamatari Biography fragment</td>
<td>Nihon Shoki</td>
<td>Shoku Nihongi</td>
<td>Shih Ji</td>
<td>Han Shu</td>
<td>Hou Han shu</td>
<td>Samguk sagi</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Treacherous rebels yet to be subdued</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Escape of rebels</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Eradiation of rebellion and vice</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Naka-no Oe gives up his throne</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Noble man loyal to his word</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Daikin rank awarded</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Extraordinary rank awarded</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Daishiki rank awarded</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>External affairs</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Response from deities</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>[Heir] puts on white clothes and starts to rule</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Remarkable wise men</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Heir starts to rule</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Message from Koguryō king</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Blessed reign</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Omi admonishes sovereign</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Modification and endorsement of laws</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>[Sovereign] enquires about illness</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Fujiwara-no Asomi</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Death at the Afumi mansion (Tenji’s order)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.  
Congruence between the Kamatari biography and biographies of Kim Yusin and Zhang Liang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Kamatari Biography fragment</th>
<th>Nihon Shoki</th>
<th>Shoku Nihongi</th>
<th>Shih Ji</th>
<th>Han Shu</th>
<th>Hou Han shu</th>
<th>Samguk sagi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Ship and oars sink (Tenji’s order continuation)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Tushita kingdom (Tenji’s order, end)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Burial</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>(+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Cremation in the Yamashina-dera temple</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Honoring three treasures</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>Reason why they built the tomb stone</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kamatari Biography Fragment</th>
<th>Kamatari Biography(^{13})</th>
<th>Samguk sagi(^{14})</th>
<th>Han Shu, Shih Ji(^{15})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Birth at the Fujiwara mansion</td>
<td>“His forebears descended from Ame no Koyane no Mikoto...” “While still inside Lady Ōtomo’s womb, his crying voice was heard from the outside and he was born after twelve months”</td>
<td>“…Yusin’s stele reads, “[He was] Xuanyuan’s (A legendary Chinese ruler, the Yellow Emperor 黄帝) descendant” Kim Yusin’s mother “dreamt that a boy clad in golden armor floated into her room on a cloud. Soon afterwards, she was pregnant, and after twenty months gave birth to Yusin” (Samguk sagi, Chapter 41)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^{13}\) [Bauer 2017].  
\(^{14}\) Kim Yusin Biography (volumes 41–43) [Na, You, Shin 2018; in Russian see: [Kim Busik 2002] and the Silla annals of the Samguk sagi (book 6) [Kim Pusik, 2012]  
\(^{15}\) Shi Ji quoted by [Sima Qian 1993], Russian translation [Sima Qian 2003]. Han Shu quoted by [Han Shu 2004; Han Shu. Le chuan 1991].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kamatari biography Fragment</th>
<th>Kamatari Biography</th>
<th>Samguk sagi</th>
<th>Han Shu, Shih Ji</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Kamatari’s character</td>
<td>“He often read Tai Gong’s Six Secret Teachings, and there wasn’t a single verse he could not repeat and recite”</td>
<td>Kim Yusin met with an old Taoist who taught him his art. “He remained there for four days until suddenly an old man, clad in hemp garments, came [up to him] and said, “This is a frightful place with lots of poisonous insects and ferocious beasts. Why did you come and stay here by yourself, my noble youth?” [Kim Yusin] said, “Sir, where do you come from? May I hear your venerable name?” The old man said, “I do not stay anywhere. I move or stay as conditions allow. My name is Nanseung.” Upon hearing this, Lord Yusin realized that he was no ordinary man. He prostrated himself twice and approached the old man saying, “I am a man of Silla. Seeing my country’s enemies has caused my heart to ache and my head to hurt. That is the reason I came here. I only hoped to come across something. I beseech you, Sir, show compassion for my earnest sincerity and give me a prescription [for the ills of my country]” The old man was quiet and uttered not a word. Lord Yusin wept and implored him tirelessly, six or seven times. Finally, the old man spoke and said, “You are but a youth, yet determined to annex the three kingdoms.”</td>
<td>Zhang Liang met an old man, from whom he received Tai Gong’s Six Secret Teachings (Han Shu, the biography of Zhang Liang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamatari biography Fragment</td>
<td>Kamatari Biography</td>
<td>Samguk sagi</td>
<td>Han Shu, Shih Ji</td>
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<tr>
<td>How brave!” Then, as he gave him a secret method, he continued, “You mustn’t pass this on. Having thus spoken, the old man took leave and walked for about two ri. Yusin pursued him, but he was nowhere in sight. There was only a light on the mountain top. It was radiant and shone in five colors” (Samguk sagi, Chapter 41).</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Man of outstanding moral qualities and knowledge</td>
<td>[Master of the Dharma Min told]: “Among those who entered my hall, there is none like Soga no Tairō. However, your spiritual and knowledgeable appearance in reality supersedes this man. I beg you, be careful.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Since my youth,&quot; said Master Lü, &quot;I have been fond of reading faces. I have read many faces, but none with signs like yours. You must take good care of yourself, I beg you...&quot; (Shi ji 8: The Basic Annals of Emperor Kao-tsu [Kao-tsu= Gao-zu in pinyin romanization system – E.S.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamatari biography Fragment</td>
<td>Kamatari Biography</td>
<td>Samguk sagi</td>
<td>Han Shu, Shih Ji</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Prince Karu</td>
<td>“...Prince Karu knew his ingenuity was grand and his knowledge surpassed the others. He specially had his favorite consort serve and feed him morning and evening, and his lodging, drink and food were quite different from what normal people received”</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Master Lü was very surprised and got up and came to the gate to greet him. Master Lü was very good at reading people's faces and when he saw Kao-tsu's features he treated him with great honor and respect and led him in to a seat” (Shi ji 8: The Basic Annals of Emperor Kao-tsu)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| 6. Naka-no Oe | A union made between Kamatari and prince Naka-no Oe (later known as emperor Tenji) during a game of kemari. “If the Great Minister wanted to select someone, going through the entire royal family, then only Naka no Ōe | A union made between Kim Yusin and Prince Ch’unch’u (later known as King T’aejong-Muryŏl) during a game of kemari. “...Yusin was playing kick-ball (kemari – E.S.) with Lord Ch’unch’u and stepped on sash on Ch’unch’u’s garment pulling it off. Yusin said, “Fortunately, my house is nearby, please come over and we will mend the sash” (The Silla annals of the Samguk Zhang Liang brings a shoe to an old Taoist who intentionally tossed it from the bridge (Han Shu, the biography of Zhang Liang). The daughter of Lü Kung |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kamatari biography Fragment</th>
<th>Kamatari Biography</th>
<th>Samguk sagi</th>
<th>Han Shu, Shih Ji</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>was ingenious and heroic and able to rise in rebellion. However, there was no occasion for the Great Minister to meet him. By chance, he encountered him at the kemari court, when Naka no Ōe’s shoe fell off through contact with the ball. The Great minister took it up and presented it to him respectfully. Likewise, Naka no Ōe received it with respect. From that moment, they were each other’s friend and together they were like fish and water”</td>
<td></td>
<td>“The Great King sobbed and said, “I need you as much as a fish needs water. If something unavoidable happens, what should I do with these people and this country?” (Samguk sagi, Chapter 43)</td>
<td>married Kao-tsu and became Empress Lü (Shi ji 8: The Basic Annals of Emperor Kao-tsu).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Elimination of Yamashiro-no Oe

“When Okamoto ascended the throne as sovereign, all ministers said there was strife between nephew and uncle” “It gradually became apparent at the court that the tranquil Han had fallen into disarray

“There are disagreements between Bu-wang from Jiuqiang (Qing Bu, an associate of Liu Bang), a courageous military commander from
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<td>and the savagery and arrogance of Dong Zhuo had already appeared in the country”</td>
<td>The elder sister of Kim Yusin refused to mend clothes of Prince Ch’unch’u, but the younger sister did. She married Prince Ch’unch’u (later known as king T’aejong-Muryŏl) and gave birth to Munmu. “...older sister dreamt that she climbed and sat on the top of Mount Sŏhyŏng where she urinated and it flowed to all corners of the country. The younger sister playfully said, “I would like to buy your dream”. And so she gave her brocade skirt as the price of the dream. Several days later, Yusin was playing kick-ball (kemari – E.S.) with Lord Ch’unch’u and stepped on sash on Ch’unch’u’s garment pulling it off. Yusin said, “Fortunately, my house is nearby, please come over and we will mend the sash”. And so they went together to his house. As wine was served he [Yusin] casually called his sister Pohŭi to bring a needle and thread to sew. For some reason the older sister did not appear, but younger sister came forward to sew it on. Lightly made up</td>
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<td>9. [Yamada-no Omi] offers marriage with his younger daughter</td>
<td>“In the third month of spring, when a hundred carriages went out to meet them, his younger brother Muzashi abducted the bride and took off. Yamada no Omi was distressed and afraid, not knowing what had to be done. His younger daughter was at his side, saw her father’s grieving complexion and asked: “Why are you so sad?” Her father explained his reasons. His younger daughter said: “I might not possess Xi Shi’s complexion but I do have the spirit of Mo Mu. Please, choose me and give me to him.” Her father was delighted and eventually presented his younger daughter”</td>
<td>Chu, and Hsi-ang-wang”. (Han Shu, the biography of Zhang Liang)</td>
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The daughter of Lü Kung married Gao-zu and became Empress Lü.
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<td>and neatly dressed, her beauty dazzled those around her. Ch'unch'u on seeing her was delighted, requested marriage, and completed the ceremony (The Silla annals of the Samguk sagi, book 6) [Kim Pusik 2012].</td>
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25. Response from deities

“When the seventh month of autumn arrived, the condition of the sovereign deteriorated. The Great Minister harbored fear in his heart, prayed to the gods and relying on the Three Regalia he passionately sought the longevity of her life. He was blessed by the statue of the Buddha, who reached out his arm and as in a dream Kannon herself appeared floating in the air; the manifestation of holiness was apparent.”

“Suddenly a large shooting star fell on the enemy’s camp along with heavy rains, thunder, and lightning. The enemy soldiers, perplexed and frightened, lifted the siege and ran away. Before this, when Yusin heard that the enemy had encircled the fortress, he said, “Now that our men’s strength is exhausted, we must rely on divine intervention.” He went to a monastery, where he built an altar and prayed. Just then the heavens shook and all the people said that his complete sincerity moved Heaven” (Samguk sagi, Chapter 42).

27. Remarkable wise men

“At that time he spoke to his personal attendants: “I have heard that ‘The Great Tang had Wei Zheng, Koguryō had Kae Kim, Paekche had |

There is a similar passage in Shi Ji, 92 (Huaiyin Biography) (Shi Ji 92)
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<td>Song Chung, and Silla had Su Sun.” Each one protected their state and their fame reached ten thousand li. These were all great men in their country, and their wisdom and strategy surpassed ordinary men. Compared to our Minister of the Interior, these people would reach below his middle. How could they compete with him?”</td>
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<td>28. Heir starts to rule</td>
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<td>29. Message from Koguryō king</td>
<td>“Therefore, the king of Koguryō sent a letter to the Minister of the Interior: “I believe that the Great Minister’s wind of benevolecence blows from afar, and his immense virtue stretches widely. You declare the sovereign will instruct the people for a thousand years, and his fragrant scent will spread ten thousand li. You became the pillar of the state and constructed floating bridges among its</td>
<td>In 668 Tang emperor Gao-zu “sent a decree to Yusin, praising and rewarding him. Furthermore, he instructed Yusin to come to the imperial court. However, in the end, this did not happen. The decree was preserved in Yusin’s household but was lost by the fifth generation” (Samguk sagi, Chapter 43).</td>
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<td>people. You are looked upon by the entire country and you are wanted by the common people. People hear you from afar and clap their hands out of joy. Their happiness spreads and truly deepens.”</td>
<td>“...the Great Minister weakened, became ill and finally his illness turned very serious. The sovereign proceeded to his private residence and inquired about his illness. ... Thereupon the sovereign stated: “If you are thinking about something, then I should hear it.” The Great Minister replied: “Your servant cannot be prompt now, what should I actually say? However, regarding my funeral, I request simplicity to be used. In life, I did not have merit for the country in war, why should my death result in labor for the people?” ... The sovereign’s throat choked and distressed he could not control himself”</td>
<td>“About ten days after that event, Yusin became bedridden with an illness and the Great King personally paid a visit”. (Samguk sagi, Chapter 43) “The king wept and took the words to heart”. (Samguk sagi, Chapter 43)</td>
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<td>34. Fujiwara-no Asomi</td>
<td>The sovereign sent his younger brother, the crown prince of the eastern palace, to his house to state: “When one reflects upon previous ages from a distance, then through time and generations there were not just one or two servants of a sovereign who conducted the policy. However, if one considers the accomplishments of their efforts, they did not do as well as you did. It is not merely we who have affection for you. Sovereigns of later generations will truly bless your descendants. Not forgetting and not dismissing, answering your good deeds widely and deeply. Having heard your sickness has become heavier, our hearts hurt more and more. We confer upon you the rank you should hold.” Then, he received the Brocade Cap, was promoted to the position of Dajōdaijin and his line became the “Fujiwara Asomi.”</td>
<td>In 668, sovereign Munmu gathered together dignitaries, and called merits of Yusin unprecedented. With their consent he grants Yusin the exclusive highest rank (taedae seobalhan), 500 homesteads, a palanquin, a staff, and the right not to bow to the sovereign. (Samguk sagi, Chapter 43).</td>
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<td>35. Death at the Afumi mansion (Tenji’s order)</td>
<td>“The sovereign wept and was very distressed. Court was suspended for nine days”</td>
<td>“The Great King learned of his [Yusin’s], death and was shaken with grief” (Samguk sagi, Chapter 43).</td>
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<td>41. Reason why they built the tombstone</td>
<td>“There was a man from Paekche named Sataku Seimei (=Sat’aek Somyong in McCune–Reischauer romanization system – E.S.) with the rank of Lesser Purple Cap who was unrivalled in talent and thinking, and during his life the foremost in composition. He was pained that the Great Minister’s reputation was not passed on, that his wisdom and virtue would hollow out and perish. Therefore he composed an epithet”</td>
<td>“There, the officer in charge was ordered to erect a stele recording Kim Yusin’s meritorious works” (Samguk sagi, Chapter 43).</td>
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References


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Russian edition of the article:
POETICAL COLLECTION KAIFUSO: HISTORY, POLITICS AND POETICS

S.A. RODIN

Abstract: Kaifuso, the very first poetical collection of the verse by Japanese poets, dates back to the year 751 (Nara period) and had been composed prior to Man’yoshu. However, this collection of early kanshi isn’t often analyzed as an important source for historical or poetical studies. The article attempts to demonstrate Kaifuso’s potential for academic studies in these fields and analyze not only poetical value of certain poems, but also political agenda of its compiler by taking a closer look at the traditional biographies of four princes, which are included in the collection.

Keywords: Kaifuso, kanshi, Nara period, traditional biography, poetical collection.

Kaifuso: opinions, judgments, and points of view

The Kaifuso poetical collection (懐風藻, 751) seems to be one of the least objectified written monuments of the Nara period (710-784), although there is no doubt about its significance for reconstructing the history of ancient Japan. Japanese researchers mostly consider Kaifuso from the literary point of view and describe the collection as “the first monument of literary thought in Japan” [Kaifuso... 1985, p. 3] or “the first literary work created in Japan” [Kaifuso 2000, p. 3], which is, of course, fair, considering that this collection of kanshi (漢詩) Chinese poetry appeared several years before the huge Anthology of Japanese poetry Man’yoshu (万葉集, 759). Japanese scholars view Kaifuso poetry
as “discipular” [Kaifuso 2000, p. 389–391], since Japanese poets were not writing in their native tongue but borrowed both the poetic form and the system of images characteristic of the Chinese tradition. A Japanese official living in the last quarter of the 7th century — the 8th century could hardly avoid writing poetry: this skill, same as the knowledge of the classic Chinese written language (wenyan), was a requirement in their position. Obviously, they were relying on Wen Xuan (Selected Works of Literature, first half of the 6th century 文選) comprising works of 129 poets and covering the period from the 4th–3rd centuries BC to the 6th century AD [Duhovnaya kultura Kitaya. 2008, pp. 255-262].

While furthering the idea of Kaifuso as “discipular” poetry, researchers unavoidably deny the personal touch of poets (their personal “poetic voice”). Presumably, as of the Kaifuso creation date, one can still hardly speak of influence of individual Chinese poets on the work of Japanese authors, as there was influence of the Wen Xuan collection as a whole, which comprised poetry of various genres and epochs but was perceived as a homogenous teaching text. The modern academic view of Japanese kanshi as a derivative from Chinese poetry as well as Japanese waka can be traced back to much earlier traditional interpretations and has not formed overnight. The authoritative Nihon Shishi (History of Japanese Kanshi Poetry 日本詩史,) written by Emura Hokkai (1713–1788) in 1771 as probably the first end-to-end history of the genre contains the same idea. According to Hokkai, Japanese poets who composed their poems in the Chinese language were always about 200 years behind poetic trends of the Middle Kingdom [Nihon Shishi... 1991, p. 600]. For instance, Japanese poets of the Nara period were mostly inspired not by poems of the Tang period (618-907), but preferred works written in the periods of the Three Kingdoms, and Southern and Northern dynasties (the 3rd – 6th centuries), and even the influence of the early Tang poetry is deemed to be insignificant. In the first half of the Heian period (794–1185), kanshi poets were mostly guided by Tang’s Li Bo (701-762/63) and Bo Juyi (772–846); poetry of the Song dynasty was the guideline in the Muromachi period (1333–1568), and so on and so forth [Nihon Shishi... 1991, p. 31].
While *Nihon Shishi* is both a historical and poetological work, Hokkai is very cautious in his assessments: “It is very hard to judge *kanshi* and to choose the best. The ones confident in their rightness make biased conjectures. The ones trying to avoid harsh judgements become weak and pampered and try to please everyone. Besides, the awe of authority and might, and the state of being blinded by one’s interests, passions, and dislikes mislead both oneself and others. It is not possible to make a true judgment while choosing between [poems] of a younger brother of the Chu wang and the head of a remote county.” [Nihon Shishi... 1991, p. 154]. Giving the *Nihon Shishi* author his due, we should say that he deals with these problems by grouping authors by their social position (sovereigns, princes, aristocrats, Buddhist monks, etc.) and naming the best in each group. Modern students of *kanshi* are somewhat more categorical in their judgements. For example, the comments by Eguchi Takao, who translated *Kaifuso* into the modern Japanese language, often include statements like: “The poem is good <…> perhaps, the author lacked linguistic means of expression” [Kaifuso 2000, p. 255], or “The poem is well composed but the description is a bit too simple.” [Kaifuso 2000, p. 13], etc.

This article does not aim to assess the quality of poetry presented in this collection or the Chinese language skills of the Japanese officials; we would like to shift the emphasis from the formal aspect of research to its substance. A literary analysis of *Kaifuso* appeared to be extremely fruitful from the angle of finding quotations hidden in poems and fragments of prose included in the collection¹, but it slightly deviates from the goal of revealing the Japanese element. In Russian Japanese studies, the importance of interdisciplinary approach in studying *Kaifuso* was demonstrated by the works of A.N. Meshcheryakov² and M.V. Toropygina³. In Japanese studies, a recent landmark event in the history of studying this monument

¹ See more about the *Kaifuso* structure below.
² For example, such works by A.N. Meshcheryakov as [Meshcheryakov 2010], [Meshcheryakov 2010a], [Meshcheryakov 2010b]. A.N. Meshcheryakov partially translated the collection foreword and some poems.
³[Toropygina 2006] also presents a translation of 16 out of 116 *Kaifuso* poems and comments.
was the publication of the collection “Kaifuso. How Ideas about Nature Developed in Japan” [Kaifuso. Nihontekina shizen wa... 2008], which addressed various aspects of real functioning of the text in the historical context of Nara and subsequent periods. We think this is the most productive approach. To our mind, the language of the narrative and the poetic form of the collection were not an end in itself, but an instrument used by the Japanese political elite of the time to achieve various objectives, including as an element of political struggle. The main part of this article will try to analyze possible political motivations behind the monument, which become clearer when seen through the lens of the specific concept of the past (history) presented by Kaifuso and the key notions of the poetry.

**Kaifuso poetic collection**

The *Kaifuso* poetic collection was composed in 751, which is known from its anonymous foreword. The *Shoku Nihongi* chronicle (Continuation of the Chronicles of Japan 続日本紀) [Shoku Nihongi 2005], which is the main source of information about the history of the Nara period, does not mention this event, as well as the creation of *Man'yoshu* — the chronicle recorded the appearance of texts sanctioned by the government. Neither *Kaifuso* nor *Man'yoshu* belonged to the *chokusenshu*, collections created on the emperor’s orders. The first “imperial” *kanshi* collection, *Ryounshu* (The Cloud-Borne Collection, 凌雲集) was commissioned in the Heian period, in 814. A specific feature of “imperially commissioned” texts, be it a poetic collection or a historical chronicle, is their succession to one another, which becomes clear from their titles⁴, they develop one another in terms of chronology and composition. The fact of “succession” is frequently indicated by their authors in forewords, and the “imperial commissioning” is demonstrated by formal features of the introduction to a collection, which is presented as a report of the official tasked with compiling the collection to the

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⁴This is true of historical chronicles called *rikkokushi* (六国史), “six state stories” and “imperial” waka collections.
sovereign. This is how the second state *kanshi* collection *Bunka Shureishu* (Collection of Literary Masterpieces 文華秀麗集, 818) begins: “Your subject, [Prince] Nakao says. *Ryonshu* was composed by the Mutsu governor, your subject Ono-no Minemori. It comprised 92 poems, from the first year of Enryaku [782] to the fifth year of Konin [814]. Less than four years have passed, but more poems were written, and their number exceeded one hundred” [Kaifuso... 1985, p. 192]. The *Ryonshu* foreword says nothing about the *Kaifuso* collection, but this does not mean that the latter was excluded from information exchange. Rather, this is evidence of specific features of the *chokusenshu* in general and the foreword genre in particular.

The *Kaifuso* foreword is anonymous, and the name of its author is yet to be established. The most probable candidates are Omi-no Mifune (722-785), a prominent politician and scholarly writer of the Nara period; official Fuji-no Hironari, whose poems finalize the collection; and statesman Isonokami-no Yakatsugu (729–781), who made a remarkable career (in 780 he was appointed senior state advisor, *dainagon*).

The possible authorship by Yakatsugu could be evidenced by the collection’s title. According to Kojima Noriyuki, the morpheme “so” (藻), which means a poetic collection, is never found in titles of Chinese collections, while *Kaifuso* mentions in the biography of his father, Isonokami-no Otomaro, the *kanshi* collection by Otomaro himself called *Kampiso* (揷悲藻) [Kaifuso... 1985, p. 6]. Ironically, the biography says that the collection “has survived until today.” [Kaifuso... 1985, p. 176]. Regretfully, this is not so, but the similarity of titles is obvious. Both texts contain the morpheme “so”; besides, the characters 鍵 and 懐 have a similar meaning of “intimate, secret thoughts.” According to the biography of Yakatsugu given by *Shoku Nihongi*, he was a follower of Buddhism. *Kaifuso* contains as many as four (out of 9) biographies of Buddhist monks, which could be an additional argument in favor of his authorship.

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5 *Shoku Nihongi*: [781] Ten’o 1-6-24. Hereinafter references to the historical chronicle *Shoku Nihongi* are given through dates of a particular event. Ten’o 1-6-24 means 24th day of the 6th moon of the first Ten’o year.
Despite the existence of arguments for and against the authorship by each of the three persons, we think that the most probable author of Kaifuso, judging by the analysis of text of the foreword and biographies, was Omi-no Mifune, a grandson of Prince Otomo (648–672 гг.), a key author of the collection. We will say more about this later.

The collection comprised 120 poems by 64 authors, but only 116 of them survived. All kanshi have formal elements of the Chinese shi poems: the equal number of feet in a line (penta- or hepta-syllabic), semantic parallelism, and observance of rhyming rules (only even lines are rhymed). There are 109 penta-syllabic poems, and seven hepta-syllabic ones. The kanshi have different number of lines, yet the Chinese tradition did not set limits on the poem length, either [Kravtsova 2001; Lisevitch 1979]. Penta-syllabic kanshi in Kaifuso include: 18 4-liners, 72 8-liners, six 10-liners, ten 12-liners, two 16-liners and one 18-liner. All poems are authored and are arranged in chronological order. Unlike the text of Wen Xuan, there are no thematic rubrics. The poets include medium- and high-ranked officials (the lowest rank is the junior sixth rank, upper grade, three persons; the highest rank is the posthumous senior first rank, two persons: Fujiwara-no Fuhito and Fujiwara-no Fusasaki), Buddhist monks, princes. Also, the collection includes three kanshi by Emperor Mommu. Most poems come from the imperial family and the Fujiwara clan. The age of 40 authors was given as of the date of their death. The ‘youngest’ author in Kaifuso was Prince Otsu (24), and the ‘oldest’ is a professor of the higher imperial school Tori-no Yasutsugu (81). Apart from poems, the collection includes prosaic pieces (the foreword and nine biographies) and several forewords to poems written as rhymed prose. All poems have titles, but they cannot be considered names of works, but rather indicate the theme, the cause, or the circumstances of the creation of the kanshi. Eighteen poems out of 116 have a sub-title which says “by the highest commission” (osho, 応詔). Shoku Nihongi contains information about...

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6 Kaifuso published in the Nihon Koten Bungaku Taikei series [Kaifuso... 1985] comprises 120 poems, while the 1706 woodcut (Edition of the 2nd year of Hoei) on which this and subsequent publications of the collection were based, comprise 116. Four poems are missing in the earlier collection scroll (by Koremune-no Takatoki 1041).
sovereigns’ feasts at which officials were ordered to write poems on given subjects.

It is hard to describe the feasts as poetic tournaments because all participating poets were rewarded according to their court rank and there is no record of choosing the best poem. Perhaps, there was an element of game (which does not rule out competition) in composing *kanshi* during feasts, judging by forewords to some of the *Kaifuso* poems. For instance, the foreword to poem No. 65 (A feast on an autumn day in the mansion of Prince Nagaya honoring guests from Silla) written by Simotsukeno-no Asomi Mushimaro, praises qualities of the host and the beauty of his estate and invites to write poems with a given rhyme. Simotsukeno chose the character (before, previously; Jp. 前): “Dip your brushes in the ink, take the paper, and describe things with words. Express the sorrow of the westward movement in your flowery lines. Preserve the fragrance of the Northern Liang. Let each of you select one character, prepare, and speak up.” [Kaifuso... 1985, pp. 128-131].

May the sacred time be seven hundred!
May the blessed reign last a millennium!
Guests from afar are here with us,
Long hair falling over their shoulders!

Autumnal cicadas buzzing in the foliage,
Wild geese returning, winding between the clouds;
Phoenix’s is the only lonely song
Sung as the strings make the sound of parting

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7 See, for e.g. Shoku Nihongi: [728] Jingi 5-3-3: the sovereign made a feast on the bank of a winding river. Court officials of the rank five and above and writers were invited. They were ordered to compose laudatory songs. All participants were rewarded in accordance with their rank; Shoku Nihongi: [734] Tempyo 6-7-7: writers were ordered to compose poems on the occasion of the 7th day of the 7th moon (Tanabata), etc.

8 Westward movement — return of the envoys to Silla, also a reference to autumn.

9 The Wen Xuan was written in the period of the Chinese dynasty Liang (502–557); here the wish to write poems as beautiful as the ones written in the Liang principality.
聖時逢七百
祚運啓一千
況乃梯山客
垂毛亦比肩

寒蟬鳴葉後
朔雁度雲前
獨有飛鸞曲
並入別離絃

Most of the *Kaifuso* poems were written on the occasion of imperial ceremonies — the sovereign’s decrees, accompanying the sovereign’s palanquin on a trip, hunts, or aristocratic feasts attended by envoys from the Korean state of Silla. There are numerous descriptions of nature, but it is hard to say that the landscape described by *kanshi* is realistic, it is rather a “symbolic space” [Toropygina 2006, p. 81] designed consistent with the system of images characteristic of the Chinese tradition. In other words, the personal experience of *kanshi* authors was rarely reflected in their poems. Researchers even doubt whether the Japanese of the time were familiar with chrysanthemum, the fragrance (and taste, in the case of ‘chrysanthemum wine’ in poems No 51, 71) of which is lauded in the 6th *kanshi* of the collection [Sato 2008].

We do not know who was deemed to be the best *Kaifuso* poet in the Nara period, but the Chinese language foreword to the first state-commissioned *waka* collection *Kokinwakashu* (905), written by Ki-no Yoshimochi (died in 919), is of certain interest in this respect: “After Prince Otsu composed the first poems in Chinese, those who were proficient in that art admired and imitated his style. The introduction of the Chinese writing system caused a change in our Japanese customs, which led in turn to the gradual decline of the Japanese poem”. [Kokin Wakashu 1985, p. 257]. Yoshimochi is mistaken — according to *Kaifuso* and the later tradition, the composition of *kanshi* begins with Prince Otomo, not Otsu. Opinions on whose poems were better also differ. Emura Hokkai wrote in *Nihon Shishi*: “In fact, the first author of Chinese poems was Prince Otomo, after him it was Prince Kawashima, and after
him Prince Otsu. <...> Although Prince Kawashima composed the [first] penta-syllabic 8-liner, and Otsu composed a hepta-syllabic poem, none of them were comparable with the talent of Otomo [Nihon Shishi... 1991, p. 45].

The author of Kaifuso does not prefer any of the authors and does not dwell on merits and flaws of poems, but mentions four poets and refers to their kanshi in the foreword: “The hidden dragon, the sovereign’s son\(^\text{10}\), swirled the cloud crane with the brush of wind, the flying phoenix, the sovereign\(^\text{11}\), sailed in a lunar boat along the foggy coast, counselor Shin lamented that his temples had turned gray\(^\text{12}\), and minister To\(^\text{13}\) praised the wise reign” [Kaifuso... 1985, pp. 58-59], which could be seen as the recognition of high quality of the poems or special attention given to their authors.

**Kaifuso political collection**

In our opinion, the author (or authors) of Kaifuso were guided by definite political reasons. This is particularly clear from four biographies of princes in the collection that emphasize the issue of succession and the “right” power transition. All biographies remind us of the events known as the Jinshin War (672), which is a “sore spot” of the early Japanese history and the outset of a long confrontation and fierce political struggle, which had various forms and manifestations, including the poetical one.

In 645, Prince Naka-no Oe, the future Emperor Tenji (reigned in 668-671), in front of Empress Kogyoku\(^\text{14}\), his mother, attacked an influential official, Soga-no Iruka\(^\text{15}\) with a sword. The empress retired to

\(^{10}\) Prince Otsu, poem No 6.

\(^{11}\) King Mommu, poem No. 15.

\(^{12}\) Omiwa-no Takechimaro, poem No.18.

\(^{13}\) Fujiwara-no Fuhito, poem No. 29.

\(^{14}\) Empress Kogyoku (641-645), mother of Princes Naka-no Oe and Oama (Tenchi and Temmu), for the second time ascended the throne under the name of Empress Saimei (655–661).

\(^{15}\) See episode description: Nihongi: [645] Kogyoku 4-6-12.

115
inner chambers of the palace and Naka-no Oe and his assistant, Nakatomi-no Kamatari (614–669) finished their business and killed the official. According to the mythical-historical chronicle *Nihon Shoki* (720), the prince killed Iruka because the latter “intended to tear down heavenly temples and to stop the line of succession to the Sun”\(^\text{16}\). So, one of the first deeds of the future emperor, who ruled the all under heaven from the Omi-Otsu Palace and was mostly known by his posthumous Chinese name given by historians of the 8\(^{th}\) century, Emperor Tenji (天智), the ‘Heavenly Sage’, was murder (See details about Tenji and Temmu in: [Rodin 2012]).

Death and blood were deemed to be the strongest sources of ritual impurity *kegare*, and sovereigns were supposed to avoid any contact with these [Rodin 2011, p. 19]. The killing of Soga-no Iruka was a blatant violation of the court protocol and the traditional notions of the allowed and the forbidden called Shintoism, because the sovereign’s chambers were exposed to ritual pollution. It was inadmissible to unsheathe a weapon in the empress’ presence. Prince Naka-no Oe intentionally broke these rules and had only one excuse: he did so to protect the imperial family and to preserve the right line of succession, “succession to the Sun.”

Prince Naka-no Oe and his uterine younger brother, Prince Oama (Emperor Temmu, 天武, Jp. ‘Heavenly Warrior’, reigned in 672–686), were involved in the most complicated intradynastic conflict, which lasted from the second half of the 7\(^{th}\) century to the end of the 8\(^{th}\) century and began with the Jinshin War. Shortly before he died, Tenji appointed his son, Prince Otomo (Emperor Kobun, 671–672) as his successor, yet Otomo was overthrown by Prince Oama, who took the throne as Emperor Temmu. Until the reign of Emperor Konin (770–781), the throne was occupied exclusively by descendants of the Heavenly Warrior. He is known for significant social and political reforms. Before Temmu, sovereigns were called *ookimi*, while now the term *tenno* came into consistent use. In China, the term *tianhuang* meant the heavenly emperor

\(^{16}\) Nihongi: [645] Kogyoku 4-6-12.
or the Polar Star, which is located in the north of the sky. According to Confucian ideas, a reign should resemble the Polar Star, which is immobile, while other stars turn around it (See details about titles of Japanese sovereigns in; [Meshcheryakov 2004]). Tianhuang, the heavenly emperor and the supreme deity of the Taoist pantheon, lives in the heavenly palace and guides Taoist sages zhenren (mahito in Japanese). The mahito title was the most prestigious one in the titular system yakusa-no kabane established by Temmu in 684. In addition, Temmu intensified the development of ideological fundamentals of the state – a decree was issued to compose state chronicles and Laws of Kiyomihara (the text did not survive) [Rodin 2011, pp. 21-22]. The emphasis put by Temmu on the ideological aspect of power can be explained by the general course toward the sinicization of society (which continued the policy of Tenji) and the insufficient legitimacy of the sovereign. There were no strict succession rules, but the fact that a brother, not a son of Emperor Tenji took the throne was taken negatively in the historical perspective. For instance, everything was done in 781 to prevent the enthronement of a Temmu descendant, Prince Osabe, who had been designated as the crown prince by then. Prince Shirakabe, a descendant of Tenji, was enthroned in his stead, although his mother did not belong to the Japanese aristocracy, but came from the Takano clan, descendants of the royal family of Baekje [Rodin 2011, p. 22].

In our opinion, the dynastic conflict, which put Temmu and his descendants on the throne, was reflected by most written monuments of the 8th century [Rodin 2012, p. 286]. Authors of chronicles and collections had to keep several factors in mind. First of all, the text had to accommodate the demands of the client and the recipient: in case of chronicles, it was the sovereign representing the state and belonging to a particular branch of the ruling family. Secondly, the text had to accommodate the clans to which the authors and the hypothetical addressees, the Japanese court elites, belonged. Hence, we will not find an open expression of discontent with the reign of Tenji or Temmu, but an analysis of the structure and the symbolic system of the said texts reveals evaluations of their actions.
Although Emperor Tenji was known as the killer of Soga-no Iruka and suffered a defeat from the Korean state of Silla and the Chinese Tang dynasty in 663, he was remembered not for his military deeds but for introducing ideas of Chinese learning and promoting literature, including Chinese poetry *kanshi*. Tenji’s image of a perfectly wise sovereign is created by the *Kaifuso* foreword amongst other documents: “<…> It was so until the previous sovereign, Omi [Tenji] received the mandate¹⁷. He furthered deeds of the sovereign and explained the high intentions; his path accorded with the Heaven and the Earth, and his merits illumined the universe¹⁸. He also believed that there was no better way to harmonize manners and adjust customs than the written language, and that learning was the shortest way to virtue. He founded a school, called for the talented, established five ceremonies, and endorsed a hundred laws. The laws, regulations, rules, and bans had no precedents since the ancient times by their scope and breadth. The three foundations¹⁹ were calm and shiny, and the four seas were thriving.” [Kaifuso... 1985, pp. 58-61].

The *Kaifuso* collection seems to have been composed under the control of the Fujiwara clan, whose founder, Nakatomi-no Kamatari, was a close associate of Tenji. The Fujiwara clan was discontent with the enthronement of descendants of Emperor Temmu and his spouse Jito. Apart from the solid Tenji-Kamatari association, the rejection of Temmu might have been caused by the execution of Kamatari’s brother, Kane²⁰, during the Jinshin War.

In the 8ᵗʰ century, the position of the Fujiwara clan was endangered many times, but the biggest trouble was caused by a grandson of Temmu and a son of Prince Takechi, Prince Nagaya. After the death of Fujiwara-no Fuhits, the second son of Kamatari, the career growth of the clan

¹⁷ Mandate – 命 – means the heavenly mandate.

¹⁸ 宇宙 (uchu in Japanese) – literally - “eaves and rafters”, also the entire space, Heaven and Earth, the past, the present and the future. The word has both spatial and temporal connotations.

¹⁹ Two interpretations are possible: three foundations (Earth, the man, and Heaven), and three groups of people (talented, ordinary, and silly), yet, considering the cosmogonic description, the first variant looks more preferable.

members slowed down, and Prince Nagaya took the top position in the official hierarchy in 724 [Meshcheryakov 2010b, p. 307]. The ambiguity of relations between members of the Fujiwara clan and Prince Nagaya is evidenced by the *Kaifuso* collection and the *Shoku Nihongi* chronicle. To our mind, *Kaifuso* may imply the inappropriate behavior of Nagaya and his unrighteous desire to compete with the sovereign.

First of all, in most cases Prince Nagaya’s name is written Chinese-style, as Zhang wang (長王), 21 which, on the one hand, derives from the characteristics of the collection and, on the other hand, describes Nagaya as a wang, i.e a tributary of China, rather than a pillar of the Japanese sovereign. We should also note that the character 王 is often read by researchers as ookimi and could serve as a respectful name of an aristocrat or a prince. Secondly, many poems written at poetic assemblies in the prince’s mansion ascribe to him qualities which are characteristic only of a ruling sovereign: virtue-toku, peacemaking capacities, while the foreword to Poem No. 65 (Feast on an autumn day in the mansion of Prince Nagaya honoring guests from Silla) claims that he set “the unity of written language and the width of roads.” Meanwhile, members of the Fujiwara clan were extremely careful about possible interpretations of their actions as an encroachment on the rights of the imperial family. For instance, Fujiwara-no Fuhito rejected the position of the Chief Minister (which was given to him posthumously) because the position had only been given to descendants of sovereigns in the past. According to *Shoku Nihongi*, Nagaya was accused of sorcery and sentenced to death in 729; he was acquitted in 738 after Tachibana-no Moroe’s accession to power and another weakening of the position of the Fujiwara clan [Meshcheryakov 2010b, p. 309]. Naturally, we can hardly speak of like-mindedness of all members of the vast Fujiwara clan, which split into four houses in the 8th century, but the entire clan was rejecting descendants of Temmu, in this case, Prince Nagaya, and glorifying Tenji.

The three princes whose biographies were included in *Kaifuso* were descendants of Tenji, and only one of Temmu. The collection begins with

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21 See, for e.g. poems No. 50 and 51.
a biography of Prince Otomo (Emperor Kobun). Researchers describe Otomo as the most talented of Tenji’s children. He became Japan’s first Chief Minister in 670 and headed the State Council Dajokan, which was founded a year later [Nihongi: 671, Tenchi 10-1-5]. A translation of his biography follows:

«The crown prince was the elder son of Emperor Omi22. He had a remarkable constitution and a profound and sharp mind. His eyes were bright and illuminating everything around him. Tang Ambassador Liu Degao said when he saw him, ‘This prince looks different from other people, he is not from this country!’ One night, the prince saw a dream, in which the heaven opened, an old man in red approached the prince and gave him the Sun; he raised it above his head and put into the prince’s hands. Suddenly, someone squeezed under the man’s arm, stole the Sun, and got away. The prince was very excited when he woke up and asked Inner Minister Fujiwara23 for an interpretation. He sighed and said, “I am afraid that after 10,000 years of the sacred reign24 a deceiver will seek to ascend the throne. I do not want this to happen. Your subject has heard that there are no favorites on the Path of Heaven, and that Heaven helps only those who do good. I am asking for multiplying the prince’s virtue-toku with his deeds. Then there will be no disasters and misfortunes. I have a daughter, and all I wish is that she becomes your spouse and helper”. They soon became family, and it was wonderful.

As soon as the prince reached the age of service, he was appointed Chief Minister and he dealt with hundreds of matters. The crown prince learned a lot, he was talented in literature and art of war. While dealing with 10,000 matters, he always won respect and revered awe of officials. He was appointed crown prince at the age of 23. He invited and took in many learned men. The prince had a bright mind and honored teachings of the ancients since his young days. Whenever he picked up a brush, he created a literary work, and whenever he talked, an academic dispute

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22 Tenji
23 Kamatari.
24 The Tenji reign is implied.
began. Contemporaries who took part in those disputes were stunned by his erudition. Days passed, but his poetic talent was only improving. The prince lost the heavenly mandate during the Jinshin War. He was 25 years old.” [Kaifuso... 1985, pp. 68-70].

The biography praises Otomo and accuses Temmu of usurping the throne, calling him a ‘deceiver’. Notably, a prediction of this event is ascribed to Kamatari, but he failed to prevent Prince Otomo from losing the heavenly mandate. The biography is followed by the prince’s poem, which lauds the virtue of Tenji:

The sovereign’s radiance shines as the Sun and the Moon!
The emperor’s virtue-\(toku\) embraces Heaven and Earth!
Three fundamentals of the great world are thriving!
Ten thousand countries feel humbled as subjects.

Kaifuso also gives a positive description of Prince Kawashima, the second son of Tenji, and Prince Kadono, a grandson of Tenji and a son of Otomo. A translation of his biography follows:

“Prince Kawashima was the second child of Emperor Omi\(^{25}\). He had a calm and generous temper and graceful manners. Soon enough, Prince Otsu and he agreed not to act against each other. Learning that Tsu\(^{26}\) was plotting a revolt, Shima\(^{27}\) reported treason. The sovereign appreciated his loyalty, but friends said he did a bad thing. Learned men are still undecided what to think of it. I think that a subject must serve the public cause and forget about personal affections, while opposition to the master

\(^{25}\) Tenji.
\(^{26}\) Otsu.
\(^{27}\) Kawashima.
and parents contravenes virtue. I still doubt that he blackened his friend without trying to reason first. [Kawashima] died in the rank of shodaisan\textsuperscript{28}. He was 35 years old. [Kaifuso... 1985, pp. 72-73]

Kawashima had “a calm and generous temper and graceful manners” and was loyal to the sovereign. The text indicates that Kawashima was a friend of Prince Otsu, the third son of Temmu, but informed the sovereign about the intentions of his friend, who was allegedly plotting a coup. The authors of the collection speak in defense of the Tenji’s descendant: “We still doubt that he blackened his friend without trying to reason first.” Their stance is completely clear – a personal pronoun is used in this text, which is extremely rare for such monuments. There is no direct negative description of Prince Otsu. It is only mentioned that he “was confused” by slander of the “nasty monk” from Silla and “plotted to break the law.” The prince’s biography follows:

“The prince was the elder son of Emperor Kiyomihara\textsuperscript{29}. He was handsome, had a robust constitution, a majestic temper, and vast knowledge. He loved learning since he was young, he knew a lot, and he composed poems well. He grew older, became keen on the art of war, gained strength, and mastered the use of his sword. His morals turned loose. He disregarded the law and bent his knees to express respect for warriors, so many of those people served the prince. There was a monk from Silla called Gyoshin, who interpreted heavenly signs and told fortune. This is what he told the prince, ‘A crown prince differs from a subject by his constitution, and I am afraid he won’t be able to preserve himself if he stays in the low rank for so long despite such qualities.’ This is why [Otsu] dared to plot a revolt. He was confused by slander and intended to break the law. Alas, how sad! He had remarkable talents but did not use loyalty and filial duty to preserve himself. He became close with a nasty monk, was sentenced to death, and took his life. This is why ancient wise men showed restraint in their communication with

\textsuperscript{28} Corresponds to the senior rank 5 of the upper level
\textsuperscript{29} Emperor Kiyomihara is Temmu
friends. There is a profound meaning to this, if you think on it. He was 24 years old.” [Kaifuso... 1985, pp. 73-75].

Once again, the author says “Alas, how sad! He had remarkable talents but failed his loyalty and filial duty.” An attempt to take the throne was the gravest crime in the eyes of Japanese elites and a weighty argument in favor of eliminating the potential rebel. To our mind, it is also true that helping the correct transition of throne was the ultimate service to the state. A confirmation to this is found in the biography of Prince Kadono, a grandson of Tenji:

“The prince was a grandson of Emperor Omi, and the senior son of Crown Prince Otomo. His mother was the senior daughter of Emperor Kiyomihara, princess of the blood royal Tochi. His nobility was comprehensive, and his manners were delicate. He was stunningly beautiful, and his insight was remarkable. His “wood”30 was worthy to be a pillar, and his “earth”31 combined merits of the sovereign and his mother’s clan. He was learned from the young age and acquired a profound knowledge of the canon and historical works. He liked to write poetry, and his poems were outstanding. He also mastered the art of painting. Being a direct grandson of Emperor Kiyomihara, he was granted the fourth big grade of the jo rank32 and was appointed the Minister of Governance. After Prince Takechi33 died, the widowed empress invited all princes and officials from all ministries to the Forbidden Chambers to appoint a heir to the Sun. All subjects selfishly presented themselves and many reasons were given in a chaotic manner. The prince stepped forward and said, ‘Since the age of gods, it has been a law of our state that the heavenly throne is inherited by children and grandchildren. So, as soon as we give the power to brothers, there will be unrest. I am humbly asking you if anyone can foretell Heaven’s will?

30 Wood means personal characteristics.
31 Earth means he comes from a noble family.
32 Corresponds to the junior fifth rank of the lower level.
33 Temmu’s son.
But speaking about human affairs, the sacred throne must be inherited in a natural way. Can anyone speak against this?’ Then Prince Yuge wanted to speak from his seat, but Prince scolded him, and he decided not to. The widowed empress approved of his opinion on the state structure. By a special decree, she granted the prince the senior fourth rank and appointed him Minister of Personnel. He died at the age of 37.” [Kaifuso... 1985, pp. 81-83].

This biography directly accused Temmu and his descendants of violating the order of “succession to the Sun,” while a descendant of Tenji is presented as a guarantor of the “right” transition of throne. His speech about a certain “law established in the age of gods,” which says that the throne could be handed only to one’s children but not brothers to avoid unrest, is indicative. There is no such law in the legislative codes of the 8th century, but it could be one of the “eternal laws” of Tenji, to which sovereigns refer in their semmyo orders. In the eyes of Temmu’s descendants, this statement meant the absence of legitimacy, because the Heavenly Warrior was a brother of Tenji and the person who initiated the murder of his son. Speaking of the hypothetical author of Kaifuso in this political context, we believe he was one of the people feeling discontent or even antipathy towards the Temmu dynastic line and closely related to the Tenji line. The most suitable candidate is Omi-no Mifune, a grandson of Prince Otomo. It is not accidental that the collection starts with the biography and poems of Otomo, which could be more than a mere poetical birthright.

In our opinion, it is allowable to speak of Kaifuso as a monument of political thought, which reflected the attitude of its authors to the enthronement of the Temmu dynastic line. The attitude to the reign of the Heavenly Warrior and his descendants was negative, which is proven by the contents of the biographies and poems of the collection. Naturally, not all poems in this monument are related to politics, but when they speak about the beauty of the world or nature, they not just express an

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34 Younger brother of Prince Takechi, Temmu’s son.
esthetic or lyrical sentiment of the observer but also suggest a model of the ideal world, which is correctly governed and therefore beautiful. A “sage”, not a “warrior” was capable of the right reign, and rhymed lines were the most preferable instrument of keeping harmony and the right order of things, as well as an indicator of public stability.

References


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**Russian edition of the article:**

CREATING A MINORITY: THE VIEWS OF JAPANESE INTELLECTUALS AND JAPAN’S POLICY TOWARDS AINU IN THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES

V.V. SHCHEPKIN

Abstract: The article traces how the image of the Ainu formed by Japanese intellectuals in 18th and early 19th centuries influenced the formation of Japan’s policy towards this ethnic minority in the Meiji period (1868-1912).

Keywords: Ainu, Japan, colonization, Meiji period, nation state, ethnic minorities

Introduction

Ainu, an ethnic minority of Japan (about 25 thousand people), are living in the country’s northernmost island, Hokkaido, as well as in the Capital Region. As all institutions of the state began to be reformed following Western patterns in the 1860s, the Japanese government, on the one hand, undertook the construction of the nation-state by starting the assimilation of ethnic minorities of the country, while, on the other hand, proclaimed itself an empire and, as a consequence, increasingly felt the need for colonies and subordinate population ethnically distinct from the Japanese people. In such an ambiguous situation, the “Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Law” was adopted in 1899. Nominally an act of positive discrimination granting Ainu rights equal to those of ethnic Japanese, the law in fact turned out to be the legal basis
for a nearly century-long oppression\textsuperscript{1}. In our opinion, such ambiguous consequences of the law were attributable, to begin with, to the politicized role of ethnicity deeply rooted in Japanese political culture. Since the early stages of the formation of the Japanese state in the 8\textsuperscript{th} and 9\textsuperscript{th} centuries, the ruling elite took measures to limit the political rights of Chinese and Korean immigrants. However, what was even more significant was the situation that had formed by late 19\textsuperscript{th} century and under which the Ainu were perceived as the main ethnic minority in the territory of the Japanese archipelago to whom the civilizing activities of the central government were directed. In this article, we would like to show how the perception of the Ainu by the Japanese authorities and among intellectuals in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries was changing, and to find out what impact it had on the adoption of the “Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Law”.

**Japan’s policy towards Ainu from the 17th to the middle of the 19th centuries**

Politically independent, the Ainu of Hokkaido, the Kuril Islands, and Sakhalin maintained trade relations during the 14\textsuperscript{th} – 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries among themselves and with other peoples of the Okhotsk Sea region: Sakhalin Ainu with Nivkhs, Oroch, and Nanai, Ainu of Hokkaido with Japanese, and Kuril Ainu with Kamchadals and, since the beginning of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, with Russians.

By the 16\textsuperscript{th} century the southern tip of Hokkaido was put under control by a Japanese warrior house of Kakizaki. In 1599, the head of the house came into direct vassal relationship with Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616), who was completing the unification of the country, and received a new clan name of Matsumae. The newly formed domain was ordered to provide the security of the northern boundaries of Japan, as an attack from the north by the Jurchen tribes, who at that time waged

\textsuperscript{1}It was only in 1997, when the “Law for the Promotion of the Ainu Culture” was enacted, that the legal status of the Ainu began to change, which culminated in their official recognition as an ethnic minority of Japan in 2008.
unification wars on the continent, was considered possible. In exchange, the Matsumae clan was granted a monopoly right to control trade with the Ainu. It was then when the Ainu of Hokkaido first became an object of legal regulation by the Japanese government. Tokugawa Ieyasu’s license with a black seal reaffirmed their right to freedom of movement.

After some time, as a part of policies aimed at strengthening control, the so-called “lands of Japanese people” (wajinchi 和人地), to which the Japanese laws extended, were designated in the southern part of Hokkaido. The rest of the territory, mainly inhabited by Ainu, became known as the “Ainu lands” (ezochi 蝦夷地). Besides, the coastline of the Ainu lands was divided into trade districts which were given to vassals of the Matsumae clan as a payment for their service. Each vassal had the right to send ships to his district for trade with local population. The Ainu, meanwhile, were forbidden to leave their places of residence (before then, the Ainu came to trade to the city of Matsumae). These changes were stipulated in the text of a new license with a black seal issued by the 4th shogun, Tokugawa Ietsuna, which did not provide for freedom of travel for Ainu any more [Kamiya 1994, pp. 49-68].

Since the beginning of the 18th century, vassals of the Matsumae clan began to lease the rights to trade with Ainu to merchants for a fixed payment. This gave rise to a system of trade districts farming. Pursuing profit, merchants began to diversify their activities in the Ainu lands, proceeding from trade to organizing fisheries. The Ainu were hired as seasonal workers, receiving rice, wine, tobacco, and other Japanese goods as payment. By the second half of the 18th century this system had extended to all territory of the island of Hokkaido [Kamiya 1994, pp. 49–68].

By this time Russian pioneers, moving ahead from Kamchatka along the chain of the Kuril Islands, had brought the population of the archipelago — the Kuril Ainu — up to the island of Urup under Russian control. In 1778–1779, Russians encountered Japanese for the first time in the northeastern area of Hokkaido. The Russian proposal to establish direct trade relations with the Japanese was rejected, though officials of the Matsumae clan permitted to trade through the Kuril Ainu, who could
come from the island of Urup to Hokkaido and trade with local Ainu. The Matsumae domain tried to keep the visit by Russians a secret, but by the early 1780s rumors about it had reached intellectuals and officials of the central government in Edo.

The visit of the Russian embassy of A. Laxman in 1792–1793 and entries to the harbors of Hokkaido of the ships of the British expedition of W. Broughton in 1796–1797 pushed the central government of Japan to transfer the Ainu lands under its direct control. The transfer was conducted gradually: the eastern lands of Ainu (the Pacific coast of Hokkaido, as well as Kunashir and Iturup) were put in 1799 under temporary, and in 1802 under permanent control; in 1807 direct control was extended to the western lands of Ainu (the west of Hokkaido) and Sakhalin. The lands of the Matsumae domain in the south of Hokkaido were also appropriated, and the domain itself was transferred to the northeast of the island of Honshu. Such situation remained till 1821, when, as the threat from the Western powers decreased, the territories of Hokkaido and adjacent islands were returned to the Matsumae domain.

As far as the policies aimed at indigenous population during the period of direct control of the territories by the central government are concerned, at the first stage, measures aiming at Japanization of Ainu and encouragement of agriculture among them were undertaken. However, facing unrest of the population, the Japanese government quickly abandoned these measures and essentially returned to the system of leasing trade districts to wealthy merchants. An increasingly large number of Ainu were employed in the fisheries, becoming unable to maintain their traditional way of life. This was aggravated by increased environmental stress that broke the fragile balance between nature and humans that had been forming for centuries.

Nevertheless, up to the middle of the 19th century, the Japanese government did not consider Ainu its subjects, until the question of demarcation of lands to the north of Japan arose during the negotiations with the Russian envoy Yefimiy Putyatin. Despite a large number of regulatory acts concerning Ainu, during the first half of the 19th century,
for the Japanese government, the primary question was control over territories where representatives of Russia and other European countries could potentially arrive, while Ainu were seen as an integral part of these territories. Partly this was reflected in the name of Ainu that had become established by this time — the ‘indigenous’, or ‘local’ population (dojin 土人), instead of the heretofore widespread words ezo (蝦夷) or ijin (夷人).

During the 18th and 19th centuries, as the northern frontiers of Japan and their population were gradually brought under the attention of the central government, Ainu also began to draw the interest of many Edo and provincial intellectuals. Some of them devoted separate essays to Ainu and their lands, while others mentioned them in texts not touching upon the problem of development of northern lands directly.

Perhaps, the most typical image of Ainu which was widespread in Japanese society in the Edo period is to be found in the Ezoshi (蝦夷志, Description of Ezo), written by a statesman and thinker Arai Hakuseki (1657–1725) [Shchepkin 2013, pp. 281–289]. He systematized the information about Ainu and their lands which was available to him from neo-Confucian positions, having placed emphasis on the differences in customs and culture. The way to understand distinct culture by determining the meaning and functions of Ainu customs in terms of the way of life of Ainu society wasn’t essential for Hakuseki. He tried to fit them inside the established system of values to which he subscribed as a Confucian. The fact that his work was written in Chinese with a large number of cliches (for example, 左衽 ‘are wrapped up from right to left’, 被髪長鬚 ‘hair that randomly hang down, and long beards’) left a clear imprint too. Willing or not, these cliches put the Ainu customs to the category of the barbarious within the dichotomy of the civilized center and the barbarians (Ch. huayi zhibian 華夷之辨).

The kokugaku scholar Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), who adhered to different doctrinal positions, in his commentary on one of the oldest Japanese texts, Kojiki, correlated emishi mentioned in it with the Ainu of his time, insisting on their radical ethnic difference from the Japanese people. In this sense, he hardly differed from the Confucian Hakuseki. At the same time, Norinaga admitted that Ainu were able to become
subjects of the Japanese emperor, like it had happened in the ancient times [Kojima 2009, pp. 149–150].

The above-described views are contrasted by the perception of Ainu by an original Japanese thinker Ando Shoeki (1703–1762). Describing the society and life of Ainu, he makes them an example for his historical concept, according to which all societies initially live in the world of nature, and only later some of them enter the world of law. Being critical towards the Japanese society of his time, an obvious example of the ‘world of law’, Shoeki idealizes the simple and more human ‘world of nature’ of Ainu in which there is no place for greed, luxury, and insidiousness [Kikuchi 1999, pp. 219–221].

In the 1780s, when the question of Ainu began to be associated with the problem of relations with Russia and possible development of Hokkaido, the Japanese intellectuals addressed the European experience of colonization of new lands and conquest of the ‘wild’ peoples. Kudo Heisuke (1734–1801) in his work _Kamusakatsutoka koku fusetsuko_ (加摸西葛杜加國風説考 Studying of Rumors about Kamchatka, better known as _Akaezo fusetsuko_ 赤蝦夷風説考) proceeded from Dutch sources and covered in detail the nature of colonial policy of the Russian Empire, bringing up the question of development of Hokkaido, of opening trade with Russians, and of the importance of subordinating the Ainu of Hokkaido in order to prevent Russians from entering the island [Shchepkin 2015, pp. 297–310]. Hayashi Shihei (1738–1793), who studied colonial experience of European countries and was inspired by the activities of the Russian empress Catherine II, suggested to revise the treatment of the lands inhabited by Ainu and to consider them a part of the Japanese state, and to pursue a peaceful policy of enlightenment in relation to Ainu [Shchepkin 2011].

Mogami Tokunai (1754–1836), a well-known explorer of northern lands and a participant of several government-sponsored expeditions, went further than others who dealt with the policy towards Ainu. He declared that Ainu were not a distinct people and that they had common roots with the Japanese, while the reasons for the differences lied in the fact that in ancient times they had not been affected by the teaching of
sages, did not observe laws and kept their wild customs. Thus, he believed them to be inhabitants of remote reaches of Japan whom the beneficial influence of civilization had not reached, and therefore considered it necessary to correct this situation. Such a position served as a kind of ideological basis for incorporation of Ainu lands in the Japanese state, of which Mogami Tokunai was a supporter [Kikuchi 1999, pp. 227–230].

Apparently, the common ground for all intellectuals was the recognition, in a varying degree, of distinctiveness of Ainu from Japanese, and their situation in the dichotomy of civilization and wildness being lower (in the European understanding) or further from the center (in the traditional Chinese understanding). Along with Ainu, inhabitants of the Kingdom of Ryukyu and Koreans were also often mentioned in the Edo period discourse concerning ethnic differences, and both were also located below Japanese in the imagined hierarchy of civilization. However, Ainu, probably owing to their greatest dissimilarity, took the predominant place in this discourse. It is remarkable that Hayashi Shihei, who described all the three mentioned peoples in his work *Sangoku Tsuran* (三国通覧 The General Review of Three Countries), devoted its largest part to Ainu. It is therefore no accident that the first foreign policy steps of the new Meiji government were aimed at Ainu and their lands.

**Policy of Japan towards Ainu in the Meiji period (1867–1912)**

With the conclusion of treaties of trade and friendship with the USA, Russia, and other Western powers in the middle of the 1850s, Japan entered a new period of its historical development. As a result of an economic crisis, political instability, civil wars the military government of the Tokugawa fell, and in 1867–1868 it was succeeded by a new Meiji government which headed for modernization and establishment of a nation state modelled after the European powers. During this period, the question of the status of Ainu gained renewed relevance, while its perception underwent certain changes. Initially, the question of Ainu was closely intertwined with territorial delimitation with the Russian Empire,
but after the conclusion of the Treaty of Saint Petersburg in 1875, which removed mutual contradictions, it began to be seen as a domestic problem.

In 1871, the Meiji government adopted the law on the family registers. At the same time, the old system of division of Japanese subjects into estates had undergone changes: now only three estates were in existence: the highest aristocracy (*kazoku* 華族), untitled aristocracy (*shizoku* 士族) — representatives of the estate of warriors (*bushi* 武士) that had existed during the Tokugawa period, and commoners (*heimin* 平民). Ainu began to be ranked in family registers as the last of estates, along with common Japanese people. However, in 1878 the Bureau of Development of Hokkaido (*kaitakushi* 開拓使), the governmental body that managed Hokkaido and adjacent islands in 1869–1882, sent to its divisions a directive on the need to standardize the name for Ainu, suggesting to use the description ‘former natives’ (*kyudojin* 旧土人) for this purpose. Here is the text of the directive:

“As for the former *ezo* people, in family registers and other similar documents, certainly, it is necessary to treat them as representatives of the common people, however, in cases when authorities need to separate [Ainu from Japanese], as the name for them is not established [uniformly], they use such names as ‘ancient people’, ‘natives’, ‘former natives’, which seems inconvenient. Therefore, from now on, in cases of need to separate [Ainu from Japanese], the name ‘former natives’ shall be used. At the same time, in order to avoid obstacles to future inspections, the increase or reduction in the number of former natives shall be calculated separately” [Kaitakushi jigyo... 1885].

The word ‘former’ in this name did not mean that Ainu had lost the name ‘natives’ distinguishing them from citizens of Japan. It only indicated that they were called ‘natives’ by the ‘former’ government of bakufu (it was introduced officially in 1856 by the directive of the governor of Hakodate, which divided Ainu into the ‘official’ (*yakudojin* 役土人), i.e. those received a position from the Japanese government, and the ‘common’ (*heidojin* 平土人) natives [Hirotani 1985, pp. 27–41]. Thus, despite the change of the official name, its separating aspect
remained. So why was the legislative separation of Ainu from the ethnic Japanese necessary? Let us address the contents of the new Meiji government’s policy towards Ainu.

In 1869, in the island of Hokkaido, separation into the lands of Japanese and the lands of Ainu was abolished, the island received its modern name, and the Bureau of Development of Hokkaido was established. The policy of the Bureau regarding Ainu came down to the following points:

1) release from feudal limitations and debts;
2) ‘Japanization’ by means of inclusion into family registers, change of customs and names;
3) cancelling the right to use woods and fields, suspension of provision of private ownership on land;
4) restrictions on hunting and fishing [Sekiguchi, Tabata, Kuwabara, Takizawa 2015, pp. 144–150].

On the one hand, all of this was aimed at equating the rights of Ainu with those of Japanese settlers in Hokkaido. The entire territory of Hokkaido was declared state-owned property, and now both Japanese settlers and native Ainu had to receive lands under common conditions. However, the development of Hokkaido meant, first and foremost, the development of agriculture and livestock breeding there, in which Ainu fared substantially worse than Japanese, and these were precisely the purposes for which land was provided. At the same time, because of numerous bans on traditional customs of Ainu, including use of traditional tools of hunting and fishing, the way of life of local population, which had developed over many centuries, was undermined, which eventually led to the decrease in the Ainu population. Thus, generally speaking, the policy of the Bureau put Ainu in a disadvantageous position compared to Japanese settlers.

In 1882, the Bureau of Development of Hokkaido was abolished, and the island was divided into three prefectures — Hakodate, Sapporo and Nemuro. Four more years later, in 1886, the prefectures were united in a single province of Hokkaido with its center in Sapporo while preserving divisions in Hakodate and Nemuro. The new authorities realized the weak
points of the earlier policy and headed for encouragement of agriculture among Ainu and for development of their education. The first task was generally carried out by allocation to Ainu of money for development of new lands, and also by provision of agricultural tools and seeds. At the same time, resettlement of Japanese people from the internal regions of Japan to Hokkaido was actively encouraged as well: in the fifteen years from 1869 to 1884 the population of the island grew from 40 to 220 thousand people, and in the next fifteen years — to 800 thousand. To provide the settlers with suitable sites for agriculture, the authorities of Hokkaido held events for selection of places for settlements, which forced Ainu to leave their native places. As a result, the authorities, along with selection of places for Japanese settlements, also began to designate sites for Ainu residence, which were called ‘lands with perspective of development by the former natives’, or even ‘reservations for the former natives’. The situation of Ainu was also aggravated by spreading epidemic diseases, years of poor harvests, and also forced relocation of big groups of Ainu from Sakhalin to Hokkaido, as well as from the northern Kuril Islands to the island of Shikotan after the 1875 Treaty of Saint Petersburg with Russia was signed, under which Japan abandoned its claims to the southern part of Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuril Islands to the north from Iturup.

Since the early 1890s, the governorship of Hokkaido and certain members of the Japanese Diet began to work on drafts of the “Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Law”, which resulted in the adoption of a law of the same name on March 1, 1899. This law consisted of 11 main and 2 supplementary articles. Articles 1–3 regulated the provision of agricultural lands to Ainu and the related rights. Article 4–7 gave the poorer Ainu the opportunity to receive technical and financial aid for housekeeping and for solving other household questions. Article 8 defined sources of funds for the purposes stipulated in the previous articles. Article 9 provided for construction of elementary schools in Ainu settlements. Article 10 regulated the issue of management of common Ainu properties. Article 11 established criminal liability for non-compliance with the law [Yamakawa 1996, pp. 112–115].
Though this law, given its name, was aimed at assisting the ‘former aborigines’ in need, in fact it became the logical conclusion of the previous thirty years of policies aimed at assimilating the Ainu. The traditions, interests, and opinions of Ainu were not taken into consideration: they had no right to choose their occupation, the Ainu customs were prohibited, the duty to learn Japanese and to change Ainu names to Japanese ones was imposed, and so on. However, at the same time, with the adoption of this law, the Ainu were officially defined as a separate ethnic group, which was enforced by the established practice to mark them in family registers books with the ‘士’ character (from the official name kyudojin 旧土人).


As a result of the former war, Japan obtained Taiwan from China, while the victory in the latter paved the way towards the annexation of Korea, which happened in 1910. The Japanese policy concerning the population of Taiwan and Korea had much in common with what happened during the second half of the 19th century in Hokkaido to the Ainu. Basically, the successful experience of ‘development’ of Hokkaido was taken as the basis for the colonization projects in Taiwan, Korea, and later in Manchuria. At the same time, the actions of the Japanese authorities in the colonies were justified by their civilizing mission aimed at other Asian peoples. Ainu and the law concerning them became, therefore, the first experience of Japanese imperialism, for the appearance and propaganda success of which the preservation of Ainu as a minority was necessary [Meshcheryakov 2014, pp. 340–371].

In this sense, the participation of Ainu as soldiers in the Russo-Japanese war is a good example. In total, 63 Ainu took part in it, among them three were killed in battle, five died of diseases, two remained disabled. For their battle service, three were awarded the Order of the
Golden Kite, and 51 Ainu received other awards [Sekiguchi, Tabata, Kuwabara, Takizawa 2015, pp. 218–220]. Among those who were awarded the Order of the Golden Kite, an Ainu soldier Kitakaze Isokichi became particularly known. The information about him was placed in textbooks intended for Ainu children — as a worthy example of service to the Japanese emperor, despite ethnic origin. Besides, Japanese newspapers wrote about his deeds, highlighting his Ainu origin, as the status of Ainu and their lands had remained one of the stumbling blocks in the Russia-Japan relations for more than a century. Thus, the duality of the Japanese government’s policy towards Ainu consisted, on the one hand, in forced change of Ainu way of life, their ‘japanization’, and, on the other hand, in intentional preservation of them as an ethnic minority for ideological purposes.

References


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THE ASSOCIATION OF JAPANOLOGISTS

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Being one of the most developed countries of the world and having all formal institutions of a market economy, in its organization of economic life, until recently, Japan retained a number of features that markedly distinguished it from other developed states. These differences are also evident in the Japanese labor market. On the one hand, there are processes that are characteristic of all developed countries which have passed to the stage of post-industrial development. On the other hand, national traditions, norms, and notions that have been established in the public consciousness demonstrate surprising vitality and give these processes a significant uniqueness.

The specific features of the Japanese labor market include the deep dividing line between permanent and non-permanent workers, the polarization of young people by status and income depending on the type of employment, the specific model of women's employment and participation in economic life, the practice of forced dismissal by age, etc. Most of these features formed under the influence of a specific Japanese system of labor management — the so-called system of lifetime employment.

Since Japanese society continues to be held captive by its previous ideas about proper work, decent career, separation of roles between men and women at home and at work, etc., the clash of these ideas with the new reality gives rise to a number of painful social phenomena. Among them are emergence of various groups of “non-standard” youth, a sharp increase in the proportion of unmarried young Japanese women and men, decreasing birth rate, deepening social stratification by status and income, etc.

The fact that the resources of the Japanese labor market are not fully used is indicated by the existence of various structural inconsistencies in it. Thus, under a low level of unemployment, structural unemployment increases, i.e. the discrepancy between the requirements of companies concerning the quality of workforce and the professional and qualification structure of workers entering the labor market. With a general shortage of labor, a rather high percentage of layoffs indicates that there is a gap between job expectations of workers and the actual conditions in which they find themselves.

Meanwhile, the issue of a more complete and effective use of the latent reserves of the labor market is becoming increasingly important due to the rapid aging of the country's population, accompanied by the exacerbation of the problem of labor shortage.

This publication is the result of a three-year research project between eminent Russian and Japanese historians. It offers an in-depth analysis of the history of relations between Russia and Japan from the 18th century until the present day. The format of the publication as a parallel history presents views and interpretations from Russian and Japanese perspectives that showcase the differences and the similarities in their joint history. The fourteen core sections, organized along chronological lines, provide assessments on the complex and sensitive issues of bilateral Russo-Japanese relations, including the territory problem as well as economic exchange.

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