
DOI: 10.24411/2658-6789-2019-10002

SOME ASPECTS OF HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION OF JAPAN WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EAST ASIA

O.I. KAZAKOV

Abstract. The article presents a non-traditional approach to evaluation of Japan's soft power in the context of its humanitarian cooperation with East Asian states (primarily, China and South Korea) and also Russia. The characteristic features of current Japan's soft power and the historic prerequisites for the development the Japanese foreign policy of this sphere are analyzed. In the author's opinion, there is no alternative of Japan's soft power to hard power currently employed by other countries of East Asia. The article stresses the successes of Japanese policy of simulating the inflow of foreign tourism and analyzes the reasons for the steady growth in the number of tourists arriving in Japan. Recent statistics shows the predominance of Chinese and South Koreans among foreign guests, both tourists and expats, with the mostly negative attitude to China and South Korea among the Japanese citizens. The deterioration of the demographic situation in Japan is also marked: the percentage of foreigners is growing, which prompts the Japanese to adjust.

The article highlights humanitarian cooperation between Japan and Russia in the Cross-year Year of 2018, which was initiated by the country's leaders to boost contacts in a broad range of areas. It indicates a decline in the bilateral trade in the past five years and points a low level of mutual tourism. There are different reasons for Russia and Japan for insignificant number of tourists travelling to the partner country. The antipathy of most Japanese toward Russia is a negative factor for bilateral relations. In conclusion, the author elaborates on the possible ways of enhancing the Russo-Japanese relations in the context of the highlighted issues.

The article's objective is to inform experts working in relevant areas about successful Japanese projects with the aim of borrowing some useful Japanese

practices of soft power and outbound tourism in relations with other countries. This experience could be beneficial for Russia.

Keywords: East Asia, Japan, “soft power,” Russo-Japanese relations, outbound tourism, inbound tourism, mutual tourism, public opinion, friendly sentiment, antipathy.

Foreword

Humanitarian cooperation between Japan and other countries, including East Asian nations (the article uses an notion of Expanded East Asia), can be evaluated not just by statistical methods, i.e. by the number and type of events related to Japan held in other countries or by the number and type of events associated with other countries held in Japan, but also from the viewpoint of the effectiveness of Japan’s “soft power”, the latter being manifested through such objective though non-traditional data as the structure and dynamics of inbound tourism, the number of permanent foreign residents in Japan, and the results of opinion polls held among the Japanese on their attitude to different countries and regions of the globe.

Apparently, these factors fairly reflect complicated relationships between the nations of East Asia, predominantly deriving from their tragic common history. Meanwhile, a specific layer of political, economic, and humanitarian interrelationship is being shaped among the Asian countries (China, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan). Multilevel processes are brewing in this Asian melting pot, presenting a criteria for assessment of the regional stability and security.

Apart from these processes, there exist the Russian-Japanese relations, locating themselves on the periphery of the region. They are characterized by a low level of trade and economic collaboration and by the often-conflicting diplomatic agenda.

Japan’s soft power is a key factor of external influence

As its economy was growing, post-war Japan focused on promoting its national traditions and achievements abroad with the aim of creating

favorable business climate and building relationships comfortable for cooperation. Such outer world activity has recently been dubbed worldwide as “soft power”, in contrast to “hard power”, which appeals to the military force as an instrument of influence by one country to another.

Given that following the political outcome of WWII Japan does not possess full-fledged armed forces as the Constitution of the 1947 actually prohibits its Self-Defense Forces to conduct military operations abroad, Japan’s soft power has become Tokyo’s a pivotal operational instrument for achieving specific diplomatic goals [Kazakov 2014].

Evidently, today’s Japan is also deprived of the military force alternative to soft power. Being sensitive to threats from DPRK (which launched missiles toward Japan and conducted nuclear tests) and from the growing military might of China (which uses military pressure in addition to other pressure methods in its territorial claims to Japan), Japan has stepped up military and political interaction with its strategic partner, the United States, including the procurement and deployment of new U.S. weapons on its territory. Yet, for Japan diplomacy still remains the key tool for achieving foreign policy objectives.

Meanwhile, Russia has never been Japan’s major foreign political or trade partner, though bilateral cooperation in the humanitarian field was sustained over years, including in the Soviet ‘golden age’ period. Cooperation intensified in 2018 thanks to the Cross-year of Russia in Japan and of Japan in Russia.

As an example of the traditional soft power toolkit, one can mention the Japan Foundation, which is positioned by the Japanese side as a sole Japanese organization engaged in comprehensive cultural exchanges with foreign countries. The Foundation aims to contribute to building a base of harmonious co-existence between Japan and other countries. Japan Foundation was established in 1972 as a special legal entity operating under the aegis of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to promote Japan’s international cultural exchanges. On October 1, 2003, it acquired the status of an independent administrative body. Public funds lay the financial basis of the Japan Foundation; operational costs are financed by capital management income, government subsidies, and private

donations. The Foundation is headquartered in Tokyo and has a branch in Kyoto and two affiliations in Japan (the Japanese Language Institute in Urawa and the Japanese Language Institute in Kansai), as well as 24 missions in 23 countries, among them Russia, China, South Korea, Vietnam, and other ASEAN nations.

The Japan Foundation is focused on three areas:

1. Art and culture (文化芸術交流[文化]),
2. Japanese language (日本語教育[言語]),
3. Japanese studies (日本研究・知の交流[対話]). [Three Fields...]

Its budget almost tripled in 2012-2016, from 2 billion yens in 2012 to 5.7 billion in 2016 (roughly from \$18 million to \$52 million; based on the technical exchange rate of \$1 to 110 yens) (table 1). Yet, a lean-budget trend seems to be emerging when the growing number of events are funded by a more economical expenditure scheme (the effectiveness of the Japan Foundation activity requires a separate and more thorough analysis).

Table 1.
Key performance indicators of Japan Foundation in 2012-2017

Fiscal year:	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Budget, thousand yen	1 977 181	1 908 097	4 664 476	4 138 000	5 708 733	3 536 628
Number of events	335	349	312	346	754	1144

Based on: [Gyomu jissekito hokokusho 2017]

The Japan Foundation spreads information about its activity in the popular social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.

It should be noted, that Russia, for example, lacks a similar institution: neither *Rossotrudnichestvo* (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International

Humanitarian Cooperation) nor the *Russkiy Mir Foundation* handle any goals and budgets comparable to the Japan Foundation. The latter's experience could be useful for the construction of Russia's soft power.

Many experts deem Japan's soft power to be quite effective and worthy borrowing in some aspects [Dobrinskaya 2015; Giang Thi Thom, Muratshina 2018].

Soft power helps Japan to successfully accomplish various missions, from attraction of foreign tourists to promotion of business done by the Japanese companies in other countries and regions. The rapidly developing China and South Korea have lately also given much attention to soft power, creating a specific competition environment in the struggle for peoples' minds in East Asia. China which surpassed Japan by the GDP level in 2010 has been particularly effective in this respect [Lomanov A.V., Kobelev E.V. (ed.) 2015]. Under these circumstances, Japan was compelled to pay much more attention to its soft power, to improve it and to optimize its cost. Eventually, if soft power becomes the only dominating factor in East Asia's international relations while interstate tourism flows are maintained at high levels, it would stimulate the improvement of relations between nations on the grassroots¹ level and the reduction of risk of resorting to hard power. Such development could only be welcome.

As for the attitude of the Japanese to the use of military force in the future, the debate on modifying the pacifist clause of the Constitution (Article 9), which was going on for years, has not brought Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party any palpable success in this direction. According to the opinion poll conducted in Japan on the eve of the 71st anniversary of the entry into force of the Constitution on May 3, 1947, constitutional amendments gained support of 61% respondents and were rejected by 38%. The poll has also shown that 58% respondents deem eventual constitutional amendments to be "necessary"

¹ The Japanese term *kusa-no ne* is literary translated as "grass roots" and has a meaning close to the U.S. *grassroot* term (which describes spontaneous movement originating from below), contacts and interaction between average people, rather than officials, citizen diplomacy.

or “rather necessary,” while 39% disagree [60% opposed to amendment... 2018]. The poll outcome indicates that, on the one hand, many people in Japan realize that the Constitution should be changed in compliance to the currents of the time, but, on the other hand, they see no need to hurry. The latter factor might also indicate popular mistrust to the Abe administration amid a number of political scandals with his participation. Besides, the poll showed that the Japanese public appreciates the renouncement of war, and 69% believe it was the reason why Japan never used military force abroad after WWII (This fact repeatedly caused irritation of the United States, which criticized Japan for “buying itself out” of military operations and letting its partners bear the risks and suffer casualties of war). Still, ahead of the Liberal Democratic Party president’s election in September 2018, Abe kept trying to modify the “pacifist article” of the Constitution and expressed the wish to “step up the debate” [Yamaguchi 2018a].

Yet, at present the Japanese public is split over the issue of the revision of the pacifist clause [Yamaguchi 2018b]. This topic serves a “litmus test” for people’s attitude to shifting from soft power to hard power. Nonetheless, the demonstration of military force and the “muscle flexing” , the practice widely used on the international arena by, say, the United States and Russia, would seemingly remain unacceptable for Japan in the coming years².

Some features of Japan’s inbound tourism

Having enough economy and image-related reasons to be interested in a higher level of inbound tourism, Japan takes relevant organizational and economic measures to reach this goal [Kazakov 2016]. One can note two substantial factors, which gave a boost to inbound tourism in Japan in recent years.

² Still, certain Russian commentators regularly mention Japan’s militarization in the light of its strengthening military-political alliance with the United States and the reinforcement of the Self-Defense Forces amid the threats posed by China and North Korea.

First, on March 11, 2011, Japan encountered a powerful earthquake, the so-called Great East Japan Earthquake, which involved a devastating tsunami, large human casualties and the man-made disaster at the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant. The latter was a shock not only for the Japanese people but for the entire humanity. There emerged a threat of radioactive contamination, Japanese residents were evacuated from the risk zone, and many foreigners left Japan. The threat resulted in a 27.8% year-on-year plummet in foreign tourist arrivals in 2011 compared to the previous year. The Japanese government set the task of restoring the national economy, including the tourist industry, severely wounded by the natural and man-made disaster. Since 2012, Japan has been demonstrating a stable growth of foreign tourist arrivals and has even registered a number of records of this indicator.

To date, the efforts taken by the Japanese government resulted in almost a complete recovery of the national economy from the 2011 disaster, though the problems of relaunching nuclear power plants and of the future of the atomic industry in Japan remain unsolved. Japan has enhanced, although not fully, its image undermined by the radioactive contamination of a part of its territory. Despite earthquakes, typhoons and tsunami which are inseparable from Japan's natural conditions, for foreign tourists Japan remains to be one of the safest places in the world.

Secondly, the 125th session of the International Olympic Committee held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on September 7, 2013, named Tokyo the host city of the 2020 Summer Olympic Games. Japan started energetic preparations for the Olympic and Paralympic events, and the Japanese government set the goal of doubling the number of incoming foreign visitors, from 20 million in 2015 to 40 million by 2020.

The dynamics of growth in foreign tourist arrivals indicates that Japan is likely to achieve this objective provided that there are no natural or military emergencies. The Japanese government is currently making a lot of efforts, as a part of systemic and comprehensive work, to promote foreign tourism. Using its soft power, Japan creates an attractive image of the country by accentuating, on the one side, its traditions (samurai,

geisha, ninja, karate, tea ceremony, ikebana, bonsai, Shinto and Buddhist temples, Noh and Kabuki theaters, traditional Japanese cuisine, etc.), and, on the other side, modernity (music, fashion, architecture, theater, anime, sport, etc.), and technological leadership (robotics, artificial intelligence, clean energy, automatic transport, drones, etc.), which in turn simulates foreigners to see Japan with their own eyes (Cool Japan)³. As relatively high prices in Japan remain a major factor preventing tourism from countries with low incomes, the bulwark of tourists arrive from countries with growing economies and solvent population, such as China, South Korea, the United States, and others. Russia does not belong to this category.

The Japanese government has been constantly liberalizing visa procedures, tightening control over visitors for security purposes, promoting the expansion of air and marine transport corridors, supporting the creation of new tourist routes, and developing popular tourist destinations. The work aimed at developing various economic sectors (tourist services, catering, entertainment, shopping, etc.) is done not only by the central government, but by prefectures and municipalities. A special attention is paid to improving the conditions of the stay of foreign tourists in Japan (quality of interpreting services, development of tourist information systems, including mobile services, systems of road signs and alerts, duplication of names and announcements in English and other languages, rapid support in case of emergencies and security measures, like the interaction with police, emergency measures in case of natural disasters etc.).

It should be noted that the government relies on traditional hospitality and politeness of the Japanese people, *omotenashi*, which create a very comfortable environment for foreign guests, and on the special treatment of foreigners by the Japanese, which is viewed by foreigners as tolerance. (Japanese term *omotenashi* actually means hospitality, courtesy, service, etc.). Judging by statistics, since 2012 Japan has achieved a great success in attracting foreign tourists.

³ Cool Japan – translated into Russian as “Amazing Japan” – is the Japanese government initiative aimed to boost relations with foreign countries in the economy, culture, and diplomacy. URL: http://www.cao.go.jp/cool_japan/english/index-e.html

Foreigners in Japan and the predominance of the Chinese

According to the Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO), foreign tourist arrivals in Japan grew by 34.4% (over 1.4 million) in 2012. In 2017 the number of foreign visitors exceeded 28 million (table 2), including over 7 million from China, which ranks the first among Japan's inbound tourism partners and amounts to over 25% of all foreign tourists in Japan. However, the year of 2017 witnessed a 40% surge in arrivals from South Korea. Their number has also exceeded 7 million, nearing 25% of all tourist arrivals.

Table 2.
Number of foreign tourists in Japan, information in brackets
indicates year-on-year growth/decline, %

Country	Year					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
China	1 425 100 (36,6 %)	1 314 437 (-7,8 %)	2 409 158 (83,3 %)	4 993 689 (107,3 %)	6 372 948 (27,6 %)	7 355 818 (15,4 %)
South Korea	2 042 775 (23,2 %)	2 456 165 (20,2 %)	2 755 313 (12,2 %)	4 002 095 (45,3 %)	5 090 302 (27,2 %)	7 140 165 (40,3 %)
Taiwan	1 465 753 (47,5 %)	2 210 821 (50,8 %)	2 829 821 (28,0 %)	3 677 075 (29,9 %)	4 167 504 (13,3 %)	4 564 053 (9,5 %)
Hong Kong	481 665 (32,0 %)	745 881 (54,9 %)	925 975 (24,1 %)	1 524 292 (64,6 %)	1 839 189 (20,7 %)	2 231 568 (21,3 %)
U.S.	716 709 (26,7 %)	799 280 (11,5 %)	891 668 (11,6 %)	1 033 258 (17,8 %)	1 242 702 (20,3 %)	1 374 964 (10,6 %)
Total:	8 358 105 (34,4 %)	10 363 904 (24,0 %)	13 413 467 (29,4 %)	19 737 409 (47,1 %)	24 039 053 (21,8 %)	28 691 073 (19,3 %)

The table indicates countries whose tourist arrivals in Japan exceeds 1 mln. Tourists from these countries amount to approximately 80% of all tourist arrivals in Japan.

Based on: [Kokuseki/mokuteki betsu honichi gaikyaku 2004-2017].

Table 3.
Number of expats in Japan in 2012-2017

Country*	Year					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017 (share, %)
China	652 595	649 078	654 777	665 847	695 522	730 890 (28.5 %)
South Korea	489 431	481 249	465 477	457 772	453 096	450 663 (17.6 %)
Vietnam	52 367	72 256	99 865	146 956	199 990	262 405 (10.2 %)
Philippines	202 985	209 183	217 585	229 595	243 662	260 553 (10.2 %)
Brazil	190 609	181 317	175 410	173 437	180 923	191 362 (7.5 %)
Nepal	24 071	31 537	42 346	54 775	67 470	80 038 (3.1 %)
Taiwan	22 775	33 324	40 197	48 723	52 768	56 724 (2.2 %)
U.S.	48 361	49 981	51 256	52 271	53 705	55 713 (2.2 %)
Thailand	40 133	41 208	43 081	45 379	47 647	50 179 (2.0 %)
Indonesia	25 532	27 214	30 210	35 910	42 850	49 982 (2.0 %)
Other countries	284 797	290 098	301 627	321 524	345 189	373 339 (14.6 %)
Total:	2 033 656	2 066 445	2 121 831	2 232 189	2 382 822	2 561 848 (100 %)

*) Russia is not reviewed, probably because of the insignificant number of Russian nationals residing in Japan.

Source: [Kokuseki chiiki betsu zairyu... 2017]

The majority expats permanently residing in Japan also come from China. According to the Japanese Justice Ministry, more than 730,000 Chinese nationals were residing in Japan in the end of 2017 (which is

a record figure), or 28.5% of all expats. South Koreans, over 450,000 persons, ranked the second, with the share of 17.6% (table 3).

According to the records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the total population of Japan as of January 1, 2018 was as follows:

	All registered persons	Japanese	Foreign residents
Number, persons	127 770 259	125 290 603	2 497 656
Growth (persons, %)	-99 827 (-0.16 %)	-374 055 (-0.30 %)	+174 228 (+7.50 %)

Based on: [Jumin kihondaichyo ni motodzuku... 2018]

Hence, the Japanese population reduced by 374,000 since 2016. The decline was an all-time high since the start of monitoring in 1968. At the same time, the number of permanent foreign residents in Japan has been constantly growing, reaching 2.5 million.

Japan is demonstrating the following demographic trends. On the one hand, the number of Japanese citizens is on the decline and, on the other hand, the number of expats and foreign tourists is growing. Thus, the share of foreigners permanently staying in Japan is steadily rising. In view of that, the Japanese people with their “insular mentality” and the traditionally cautious attitude to foreigners are forced to adopt to this new reality.

The attitude of the Japanese toward other nations

Statistics show that most foreign tourists (about 50%) come to Japan from China and South Korea, and the diasporas from these countries are also the biggest (approximately 46% of all foreigners living in Japan). Still the Japanese exhibit a high degree of antipathy toward South Korea and China, especially toward China. The said antipathy is rooted in the recently aggravated historical dispute on the behaviour of the Japanese in the period of occupation and Japan’s territorial disputes over the

Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands with China and the Takeshima (Tokto) islands with the Republic of Korea.

Since 1978, the PR department of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Prime minister and the Central Research Services have been carrying out a nationwide poll to learn the attitude of the Japanese to other countries and regions. Respondents were mostly asked about their sympathy and antipathy towards other countries and regions. Some of the poll results for the past six years are presented in Table 4. Other questions regarding the attitude to foreign countries were asked, too (tables 5 and 6).

Table 4.
Attitude of the Japanese to the United States, Russia,
China, South Korea in 2012-2017, %

Country*	Answers	Year					
		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
U.S.	Sympathy	84.5	83.1	82.6	84.4	84.1	78.4
	Antipathy	13.7	15.8	15.3	13.5	13.2	19.1
	Undecided	1.8	1.1	2.1	2.1	2.6	2.4
Russia	Sympathy	19.5	22.5	20.1	17.4	19.3	18.0
	Antipathy	76.5	74.8	76.4	79.3	76.9	78.1
	Undecided	3,4	2.8	3.5	3.3	3.8	3.9
China	Sympathy	18	18.1	14.8	14.8	16.8	18.7
	Antipathy	80.6	80.7	83.1	83.2	80.5	78.5
	Undecided	1.4	1.2	2.2	2.1	2.7	2.8
South Korea	Sympathy	39.2	40.7	31.5	33	38.1	37.5
	Antipathy	59	58	66.4	64.7	59.1	59.7
	Undecided	1.8	1.3	2.2	2.3	2.8	2.8

*) Hereinafter the countries are listed in the survey order.

Based on: [Gaiko ni kansuru Seronchosa 2012-2017]

Table 5.
Are the relations between Japan with the indicated country good? (%)

Country	Answers	Year					
		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
U.S.	Good	73.4	79.3	83.8	88.0	87.1	84.4
	Not good	23.2	17.7	14.0	9.2	9.8	12.4
	Undecided	1.6	1.4	0.8	1.3	1.3	1.4
Russia	Good	17.0	24.9	30.4	21.8	27.8	28.7
	Not good	75.8	69.2	64.6	71.0	65.2	64.5
	Undecided	2.5	2.0	1.1	2.9	2.5	2.0
China	Good	18.8	4.8	6.8	9.5	12.5	14.9
	Not good	76.3	92.8	91.0	85.7	83.0	79.8
	Undecided	2.0	1.1	0.6	1.9	1.7	2.1
South Korea	Good	58.5	18.4	21.1	22.7	29.2	26.8
	Not good	36.0	78.8	76.0	73.1	65.4	67.7
	Undecided	2.2	1.3	0.8	1.7	2.3	2.1

Based on: [Gaiko ni kansuru Seronchosa 2012-2017]

Results of the survey demonstrate a high degree of antipathy among the Japanese toward China and Russia, which stands at around 80%, and toward South Korea, about 60% (Table 4). Over 80% of the Japanese believe that their country has “good” relations with the United States, while relations with Russia, China, and South Korea are estimated as “not good” by, respectively, 60-70%, 80-90%, and about 70% respondents (Table 5). Notably, the biggest number of Japanese with “undecided” attitude is seen in regard to Russia (4% or more). At the same time, the Japanese demonstrate a desire to develop relations with all their neighbors: over 90% with the United States, over 75% with Russia, and

over 70% with China and South Korea (Table 6). The Japanese exhibit an inclination to cooperate, which could evidence an aspiration for peaceful and harmonious co-existence with other countries of the region.

Table 6.
Is it important to develop relations between Japan
with the indicated country?* (%)

Country	Answer	Year		
		2015	2016	2017
US.	Yes	95.8	95.0	95.2
	No	2.1	2.5	2.2
	I can't say for sure	0.4	0.7	0.7
	Undecided	1.7	1.8	1.9
Russia	Yes	76.0	77.0	77.0
	No	18.9	18.3	17.2
	I can't say for sure	1.0	0.9	1.4
	Undecided	4.1	3.8	4.4
China	Yes	73.3	72.9	76.9
	No	22.5	22.3	18.7
	I can't say for sure	1.0	1.6	1.4
	Undecided	3.1	3.2	2.9
South Korea	Yes	69.7	69.0	69.1
	No	26.0	26.5	26.3
	I can't say for sure	1.2	1.3	1.4
	Undecided	3.1	3.2	3.2

*) The question is asked since 2015.

Based on: [Gaiko ni kansuru Seronchosa 2012-2017]

Despite a high level of antipathy toward China, a 2017 survey held by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in China revealed that Japan ranked first amongst countries and territories which Chinese citizens wished to visit (40.2%). The United States ranked second (39.9%), and Italy ranked third (37.4%) (table 7). Answering the additional question, whether they would like to visit Japan in future, some 88.9% of the interviewed Chinese opted for “yes” and 11.1% – for “no”.

Table 7.

The response of Chinese citizens to the task to choose three countries which they would like to visit in future (three options were permitted), %

Country	Year (month)						
	2013	2014	2015.01	2015.07	2016.01	2016.10	2017.08
China	18.3	23.6	26.2	19.3	17.4	17.6	15.9
Japan	22.3	24.2	25.7	33.4	34.2	35.4	40.2
U.S.	43.6	37.6	40.9	33.6	37.2	38.8	39.9
UK	30.9	25.9	25.0	24.2	25.5	26.9	24.1
Italy	37.3	35.8	31.1	37.1	38.9	36.4	37.4
France	44.8	46.6	41.4	35.8	36.0	33.3	34.9
Germany	22.6	22.3	17.9	18.8	19.6	21.2	23.9
Republic of Korea	20.8	23.3	25.3	19.9	20.8	18.8	18.3
Thailand	14.3	14.2	14.4	9.3	9.7	11.0	11.4
Other	0.8	0.8	1.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2

*) Domestic tourism

Source: [Anata ga kongo ikitai kuni wo... 2017]

JETRO polls residents of six big Chinese cities with relatively high incomes every year. Since the start of such surveys in 2013 Japan was for the first time ranked 1st in 2017. In the same survey, the Chinese gave Japan a higher ranking compared to other countries by such parameters as (1) clean environment, (2) service quality, and (3) politeness. Apparently, in Japan Chinese visitors do not feel antipathy toward their own country, which creates them a comfortable environment for relishing all possible pleasures they are ready to pay for during their journey.

It is noteworthy that over the past three years, the level of the Japanese antipathy toward China reduced from 83.2% in 2015 to 78.5% in 2017, while the level of sympathy grew from 14.8% in 2015 to 18.7% in 2017 (Table 4). However, from the point of view of de-facto deep historical, cultural, trade and economic ties rooted between Japan and China, negative attitude of the Japanese to China demonstrated by the survey cannot be described as normal.

Importantly, the level of sympathy toward the United States decreased from 84.1% in 2016 to 78.4% in 2017, while the level of antipathy grew from 13.2% in 2016 to 19.1% in 2017 (Table 4). Presumably, this is a result of the increasingly negative attitude of the Japanese to the U.S. President Donald Trump. The attitude of the Japanese toward the leader of a foreign country seems to serve a substantial factor for projecting such attitude on this country.

As for DPRK is concerned, Japan in 2017 still viewed it as a rogue country. The top three concerns of the Japanese about North Korea are missile launches (83.0%), abductions of Japanese citizens (78.3%), and the nuclear problem (75.3%). DPRK is perceived by the Japanese citizens as a country posing military threat associated with regular missile launches toward Japan and the nuclear tests which should appeal Pyongyang's ability to build nuclear weapons. Besides, the Japanese believe that North Korea is reluctant to resolve the sensitive abductions problem. According to a Nikkei poll, 52% of the Japanese deem that the international community should continue the policy of sanctions against DPRK, while 11% favor a military resolution of the problem of Pyongyang's missile and nuclear programs [Opros: Bolee 50% yapontsev... 2018].

Russian-Japanese humanitarian relations

Even in the cold war period the level of humanitarian cooperation between the USSR and Japan surpassed the level of their official political contacts or trade and economic cooperation. To date the situation has not changed remarkably, and in the recent years, especially after the Crimean events of 2014 when the bilateral trade between Russia and Japan more than halved (from \$33.2 billion in 2013 to \$16 billion in 2016 and \$18 billion in 2017), the humanitarian dimension acquired the role of an even bigger driving factor role for the bilateral relations.

In the 21st century, Moscow has been holding since 2006 the annual Festivals of Russian Culture in Japan. The 13th Festival of Russian Culture in Japan opened at the Santori Hall in Tokyo on June 12, 2018 [V Tokio proshlo torzhestvennoye otkrytiye... 2018].

Meanwhile, in 2017 the Russian Ministry of Culture launched a new project, Russian Seasons, which, according to the plan of the Ministry, among other things should involve the mentioned Festival of Russian Culture in Japan [Ob organizatsii ezhegodnogo... 2017]. Yet, the responsibility for promoting Russia abroad is blurred, which affects the quality of its soft power.

The year of 2018 had a special meaning due to a boost of humanitarian cooperation inspired by the Cross year of Japan in Russia and of Russia in Japan. Japanese Ambassador to Russia Toyohisa Kozuki made the following comment on this event: “Prime Minister Abe and President Putin have decided to declare 2018 the Cross-year of Japan and Russia to encourage bilateral exchanges in all spheres. Such Cross-year is also my old dream. After all, it will involve not only culture and art, but also business, science, education, youth, sports and inter-regional exchanges, which in turn would help to maximally use the potential of Japanese-Russian relations. More than 300 events are planned within the framework of the Year of Japan in Russia” [Toyokhisa Kodzuki: Abe pervym ... 2018].

In 2018 the number of various events grew significantly, although, according to various sources, the budgets of the two countries for

humanitarian cooperation did not expand much. Some of the events were funded by national budgets, and some - by the Japan Foundation and other entities. Certain events in Russia and Japan are sponsored by the International Chodiev Foundation (URL: <http://www.international-chodievfoundation.org>).

The Year of Japan in Russia is held under the aegis of the Japanese Embassy and is partially sponsored by the Japan Foundation. The projects of the Year involved numerous Russian organizations promoting relations with Japan and Japanese culture. Many of the events of the Year are carried out by the regional branches of the Russia-Japan Society. The list of events of the Year of Japan in Russia was posted on the Japanese Embassy's website [Informatsiya o meropriyatiyakh... 2018].

A similar list of events of the Russian Year in Japan was posted on the Russian Foreign Ministry's website on January 25, 2018. In view of the intensification of humanitarian contacts between Russia and Japan caused by the Cross year, the attitude of Russians to Japan deserves a special interest.

In contrast to Japan, where only 20% of citizens are sympathetic to Russia (Table 4), the Russians are generally favorably disposed to Japan, except for their negative attitude to the Japanese territorial claims to Russia. The negative sentiment is displayed, for instance, in the opinion polls on Russia's "friends" and "foes".

According to a poll of the Levada Analytical Center ["Druz'ya" I "vragi"... 2018], Japan is listed in neither the top ten "friends" of Russia (Table 8), nor in the top ten of its "foes" (Table 9). Nevertheless, even such polls exhibit the inclination of Russians to rather see in Japan a friend, than a foe, although such situation cannot be called satisfactory. Other polls occasionally demonstrate a bigger shift of the Russian sentiment toward Japan as a "friendly" country (for instance, [O Rossii I stranakh mira... 2017.]).

The territorial problem in Russian-Japanese relations has a definitely negative impact on Russian's sentiment toward Japan. The attitude of the overwhelming majority of Russians to Japan's territorial claims for the South Kuril Islands (the "Northern territories") is known very well

[Kazakov, 2012]. The REGNUM news agency conducted a survey in 2017 using the STIRVOX crowd-sourcing platform to study the attitude of the Russians to the Kuril Islands and the associated problems in relations with Japan [Kuril'skiye ostrova Rossii... 2017] Respondents gave the traditional answer to the question: “Imagine that the future of the Kuril Islands depends solely on your decision. Weigh all cons and pros and say what you decide.” As many as 85% of the respondents opted for the Kuril Islands to be left with Russia forever, 8% were undecided, and only 7% deem the Kuril Islands should be transferred to Japan either at once or in the future [Problema russkikh Kuril...].

Table 8.

Answers to the question “Name five countries that you can call the closest friends and allies of Russia” (Respondents could choose several options from the list of countries; answers were listed in descending order, 2018) %

Country	No*	Year						
		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
China	2	16	20	40	43	34	39	40
Japan	14	4	4	4	2	5	4	7
Vietnam	17	–	–	–	–	4	4	5
North Korea	22	1	1	3	3	3	3	4
South Korea	31	2	3	1	1	2	2	2

* The country’s ranking number on the “friend” list. China, which is one of the top ten “friends,” and some other East Asian countries ranking below Japan are given as example.

Source: [“Druz’ya” I “vragi”... 2018]

Table 9.
Answers to the question “Name five countries that you can call the most unfriendly and hostile towards Russia”
(Respondents could choose several options from the list of countries ; answers were listed in descending order, 2018) %

Country	No*	Year						
		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
U.S.	1	35	38	69	73	72	69	78
<i>Japan</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>3</i>
North Korea	20	1	4	2	1	1	2	2
China	22	4	5	1	<1	1	2	1
South Korea	23	1	2	2	<1	1	1	1

* The country’s number on the “foe” list. The United States, which tops the list of “foes” and some other East Asian countries ranking below Japan are given as example.

Source: [“Druz’ya” I “vragi”... 2018]

Another factor slowing down the Russian-Japanese relations is the low income of most Russian citizens, who have to choose relatively cheap countries as travel destinations. According to Levada Center [Poezdki za granitsu (2018)], over the 12 months before April 2018 russians had traveled mostly to Turkey, Thailand, Greece, Italy, and Spain (in case of Muscovites – to Turkey, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, and Thailand). It is not surprising that only a handful of russian tourists visited Japan in recent years, less than 1/3% or even 1/4% of all tourist arrivals (table 10).

Table 10.
Number of Russian tourists in Japan, persons;
year-on-year growth/decline indicted in brackets, %

Country	Year					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Russia	50 176 (48,5 %)	60 502 (20,6 %)	64 077 (5,9 %)	54 365 (-15,2 %)	54 838 (0,87 %)	77 251 (40,9 %)
Russia's share	0,60 %	0,58 %	0,48 %	0,28 %	0,23 %	0,27 %
Total number of foreign visitors:	8 358 105 (34,4 %)	10 363 904 (24,0 %)	13 413 467 (29,4 %)	19 737 409 (47,1 %)	24 039 053 (21,8 %)	28 691 073 (19,3 %)

Based on: [Kokuseki/mokuteki betsu honichi gaikyaku 2004-2017]

At the same time, according to the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), Japan is one of the top five countries Russians would like to visit (table 11).

Table 11.
Which five countries would you choose from the list if you had
a chance to travel for free? (A card, no more than five answers), %

No	Country	June 29, 2014	April 30, 2015	April 3, 2016	July 9, 2017
1.	Italy	35	30	34	36
2.	France	37	27	34	33
3.	Germany	28	20	26	28
4.	China	13	19	22	24
5.	Japan	23	16	23	24

Source: [O Rossii I stranakh mira... 2017].

Japanese tourists amounted to less than 0.5% of all foreigners visiting Russia in 2017. According to Rosstat (the quality of Rosstat’s data on foreign tourists is incomparably low vis-a-vis the detailed Japanese statistics) [Chislo v’yezdnykh turistskikh poezdok... 2014-2019], about 24.5 million foreign citizens visited Russia in 2017, while the number of Japanese tourists was 14.5 times smaller than of Chinese tourists (table 12). Notably, in 2016 an almost equal number of tourists (around 24 million) visited Russia and Japan, but in 2017 Japan surpassed Russian by the number of coming foreign tourists (28.7 million) (table 2).

Table 12.
Number of foreign tourists in Russia, thousand persons

Year	Country					All countries
	China	U.S.	Republic of Korea	Japan	Vietnam	
2017 (share, %)	1 478 (6 %)	282 (1,2 %)	254 (1 %)	102 (0,42 %)	43 (0,18 %)	24 390 (100 %)
2016	1289	239	161	85	36	24 571
2015	1122	233	136	N/A	N/A	26 852
2014	874	245	114	N/A	N/A	25 438

Source: [Chislo v’yezdnykh turistskikh poezdok... 2014-2019]

According to Table 10, as many as 77,251 Russians visited Japan in 2017, which was equal to 0.27% of all foreign tourist arrivals. Therefore the share of Russian tourists visiting Japan (0.27% in 2017) and Japanese tourists visiting Russia (0.42% in 2017) do not match the potential of the two neighboring countries, whose leaders publicly declare the course of comprehensive development of bilateral relations.

The dynamics of Japanese tourist arrivals in Russia is largely determined by Russia's attractiveness in Japan's eyes (according to Table 4, only 20% of the Japanese feel sympathy to Russia), which it turns roots in the effectiveness of Russia's soft power in Japan. For its part, a growth in Russian tourists' arrivals in Japan is limited not so much by the lack of Russians' interest to Japan, but by their financial capacity for such travels.

One can notice another trend. Given a drop in trade turnover and low investment activity, the eight-point cooperation plan proposed by Abe [Abe predstavit Putinu plan... 2016] is positioned not as a project of an "economic breakthrough" in bilateral relations but as a framework agreement on Japan's localized assistance to Russian regions in improving healthcare services, creating comfortable and clean living environment, promoting cooperation and exchange between Japanese and Russian small and medium business and the energy sector, renewable energy included, diversifying Russian industries for the purpose of higher productivity, developing industries in the Russian Far East, etc.

Notwithstanding the implementation of these intentions, which comprise a modernized type of Japan's soft power applied to Russia, and the "small business policy" (the Russian term was coined from the "theory of small deeds", which was developed by populist intelligentsia in the 1880s, and correlates to the English-language notion of *Small Business Policy* in case of entrepreneurship), bring certain positive results, the mentioned plan does not help to solve serious problems which drastically impede bilateral trade and economic relations.

Hence, enthusiastic speeches of certain politicians and diplomats in both countries lauding "the high level of relations" between Russia and Japan, including over 20 meetings held between Russian President Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Abe on various venues, far from always conform with the reality expressed in facts and numbers. They actually mislead the public about the actual condition of Russian-Japanese relations and conceal the existence of complicated problems hindering multifaceted political and economic interaction.

Conclusion

1. Due to the absence of the hard power alternative, Japan's soft power, ensuring its fruitful humanitarian cooperation with other states, primarily with other East Asian nations, to a large extent, is a key element of the country's foreign policy. Japan's "soft power" is quite effective and in many areas it can be an example to follow.

2. Inbound tourism in Japan has been demonstrating a steady growth since 2012 (primarily from China and South Korea) due to Japan's attractive appeal in the eyes of foreigners and the effective measures taken by the Japanese government to develop inbound tourism. Other countries could benefit from studying and borrowing Japan's tourism practices.

3. The high level of Russian-Japanese humanitarian cooperation in 2018 resulted from the Cross-year of Russia and Japan. But this was a temporary factor related to the intensive talks between the state leaders.

4. The existence of the territorial problem, which is addressed at various formats, including Putin-Abe regular summit meetings, has a negative effect on the opinion of Russians about Japan. However, the main factor hindering Russian tourist arrivals in Japan lies in Japan's relatively expensiveness for Russians, compared to the rapidly developing economies of China and South Korea providing increasingly high living standards for their citizens, who comprise the bulk of tourist flow to Japan.

5. The number of Japanese travelers in Russia cannot be assessed as satisfactory. However, the resolution of this problem is in Russia's hands: Russia should develop its soft power on the Japanese track and create more comfortable conditions for foreign tourists, including visitors from Japan.

6. Apparently, positive development of Russian-Japanese humanitarian relations should rest upon a substantial institutional and financial foundation and be immune from momentary considerations. To pursue that goal, Russian government should create political and economic conditions for boosting Japanese sympathy toward Russia, intensifying bilateral tourist exchanges, expanding contacts on various levels and in a broad range of areas.

References

“Druz’ya” I “vragi” Rossii [Russia’s “friends” and “foes”]. (2018) // Levada-Center. 14 June 2018. URL: <https://www.levada.ru/2018/06/14/druzya-i-vragi-rossii-3/> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

60 % opposed to amendment of Japan’s Constitution under Abe (2018). // Japan Today. 26 April 2018. URL: <https://japantoday.com/category/politics/60-opposed-to-amendment-of-japan’s-constitution-under-abe> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Abe predstavil Putinu plan po ekonomicheskomu sotrudnichestvu [Abe presents economic cooperation plan to Putin]. (2016) // Interfax, 6 May 2016. URL: <http://www.interfax.ru/world/507241> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Anata ga kongo ikitai kuni wo mitsu made okotaete kudasai (Fukusu kaito) [Please choose up to three countries where You want to go (Multiple answers)] 2017 // Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). URL: http://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/_News/releases/2017/9c767c469d4a6467/1.pdf (accessed: 15 June 2018)

Chislo v”yezdnykh turistskikh poyezdok inostrannykh grazhdan v Rossiyu [Number of foreign tourist arrivals in Russia]. (2014-2019) // Rosstat. URL: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/business/torg/tur/tab-tur1-1.htm (accessed: 30 July 2018).

Dobrinskaya, O.A. (2015) Osobennosti “myagkoy sily” Yaponii v tranakh Tsentral’noy Azii [Specifics of Japan’s “soft power” in Central Asia]. *Ezhagodnik Yaponiya [Yearbook Japan]*. (Vol. 44). Pp. 36-56.

Gaiko ni kansuru Seronchosa [Opinion poll on diplomatic relations] (2012-2017) // Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. URL: <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index-gai.html> (accessed: 15 June 2019)

Giang Thi Thom, Muratshina, K.G. (2018) Proyavleniya “myagkoy sily” v gumanitarnom sotrudnichestve Yaponii i V’yetnama [Soft Power in Japan-Vietnam cultural interaction]. In *Yaponskiye issledovaniya*

[*Japanese Studies in Russia*]. № 1. Pp. 38–50. DOI: 10.24411/2500-2872-2018-10003

Gyomu jissekito hokokusho [Reports about results] (2017) // Japan Foundation. URL: <http://www.jpff.go.jp/j/about/result/br/index.html> (accessed: 15 June 2019)

Informatsiya o meropriyatiyakh [Event index] (2018). // Embassy of Japan in Russia. URL: <http://www.ru.emb-japan.go.jp/japan2018/ru/event/index.html> (accessed: 30 July 2018). (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Jumin kihondaichyo ni motodzuku jinko. 01/01/2018. [Population of Japan based on Basic Resident Register as of 01.01.2018.]. // The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications URL: http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/01gyosei02_02000177.html (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Kazakov, O.I. (2012). Yaponiya dlya rossiyan: “I ne drug, i ne vrag, a tak...” [Japan for Russians: “Neither a friend, nor a foe, just so...”]. *Yaponiya nashikh dney*. №1. Pp. 125–133.

Kazakov, O.I. (2014). “Myagkaya sila” Yaponii i informatsionnyye voyny [Japan’s “soft power” amid information warfare]. *Yaponiya nashikh dney*. №2. Pp. 20–35.

Kazakov, O.I. (2016). Rekordnyy turizm v Yaponiyu v 2015 godu na fone otnosheniya yapontsev k drugim stranam [The Number of Foreign Tourists in Japan in 2015 Beats all Records Regardless of the Attitude of the Japanese to Other Nations]. *Yaponskiye issledovaniya [Japanese Studies in Russia]*. № 3. Pp. 13–24. DOI: 10.24411/2500-2872-2016-00019

Kokuseki chiiki betsu zairyu gaikoku ninzu no suii 2012-2017. [Changes in the number of foreign residents by nationality/region 2012-2017]. // Ministry of Justice. URL: <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001256897.pdf> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Kokuseki/mokuteki betsu honichi gaiyakusu 2004-2017 [Number of foreign arrivals in Japan by nationality and purpose 2004-2017] // The Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO). URL: https://www.jnto.go.jp/jpn/statistics/tourists_2017df.pdf (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Kuril'skiye ostrova Rossii: Chto s nimi delat'? [The Kuril Islands of Russia: What should be done about them?] (2017). // REGNUM. 25 October 2017. URL: <http://regnum.ru/news/detail/2338238.html> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Lomanov, A.V., Kobelev, E.V. (ed.) (2015) "Myagkaya sila" v otnosheniyakh Kitaya s vneshnim mirom ["Soft power" in China's international relations]. Moscow: RAS Institute of Far Eastern Studies.

O Rossii i stranakh mira [About Russia and the world]. (2017) // FOM. 24 July 2017. URL: <http://fom.ru/Mir/13624> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Ob organizatsii ezhegodnogo mezhdunarodnogo proyekta «Russkiye sezony» v Rossii i za rubezhom. Resheniye kollegii ot 24 Maya 2017 g., № 11 [On organizing the annual international project "Russian Seasons" in Russia and abroad. Board Resolution No 11 dated May 24, 2017]. // Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation. URL: <http://www.mkrf.ru/documents/ob-organizatsii-ezhegodnogo-mezhdunarodnogo-proekta-russkie-sezony-v-rossii-i-za-rubezhom-11/> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Opros: boleye 50 % yaponsev podderzhali sanktsii protiv KNDR [Poll: Over 50 % of Japanese backed sanctions against North Korea]. (2018) // TASS. 29 January 2018. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4909980> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Poyezdki za granitsu [International travel] (2018) // Levada-Center. 13 April 2018. URL: <https://www.levada.ru/2018/06/13/poezdki-za-granitsu-3/> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Problema Russkikh Kuril [The Problem of Russia's Kurils]. // STIRVOX. URL: <https://stirvox.com/ru/survey-results/1008-problema-russkikh-kuril> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Programma Goda Rossii v Yaponii v 2018–2019 godah [The program of the Russian Year in Japan in 2018–2019]. (2018) // Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation. 22 February 2018. URL: http://www.mid.ru/ru/god-rossii-v-aponii-i-god-aponii-v-rossii/-/asset_publisher/HCN0yFLs7lFy/content/id/3088979 (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Three Fields. The Japan Foundation operates programs in partnership with other organizations in and outside Japan. // Japan Foundation. URL: <https://www.jpf.go.jp/e/project/index.html> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Toyokhisa Kodzuki: Abe pervym iz prem'yer-ministrov Yaponii vystupit na PMEUF [Kozuki Toyoshia: Abe is first Japanese prime minister to speak at SPIEF]. (2018) // RIA Novosti. 20 March 2018. URL: <https://ria.ru/20180320/1516783601.html> (accessed: 15 June 2019)

V Tokio proshlo torzhestvennoye otkrytiye festivalya rossiyskoy kul'tury [Festival of Russian Culture opens in Tokyo]. (2018) // RIA Novosti. 12 June 2018. URL: <https://ria.ru/world/20180612/1522564969.html> (accessed: 30 July 2018)

Yamaguchi Mari. (2018a) LDP gears up for leader's race; Abe eyes constitutional revision. // Japan Today. 22 August 2018. URL: <https://japantoday.com/category/politics/ldp-gears-up-to-revise-pacifist-constitution> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

Yamaguchi Mari. (2018b) Abe seeks support for constitutional revision. // Japan Today. 2 May 2018. URL: <https://japantoday.com/category/politics/japan-pm-seeks-public-support-for-revision-to-constitution> (accessed: 15 June 2018).

KAZAKOV Oleg Igorevich – Head of Scientometrics and Information Technology Department, Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. ORCID: 0000-0002-9009-3225.

E-mail: kazakov_oleg@mail.ru

Russian edition of the article:

Yearbook Japan 2018. Vol. 47. Pp. 77-100.

URL: http://yearbookjapan.ru/images/book/japan_2018.pdf

DOI: 10.24411/0235-8182-2018-10004