

## **Japan and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons<sup>1</sup>**

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**Abstract.** The article discusses the attitude of Japanese government towards the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was introduced in the United Nations' agenda in 2017. The case of Japan is special and even unique, due to the fact that, in spite of its historical experience of atomic bombings and the position of its civil society, which supports the idea of a nuclear ban, Tokyo refuses to sign the Treaty. Moreover, the rejection of the TPNW does not correlate with Japan's active participation in the international nuclear non-proliferation initiatives. As far as Japan is undoubtedly an influential member of world community and a threshold state, possessing advanced nuclear technologies and ready to transform its peaceful nuclear program into a military one, its position regarding the TPNW can have a significant impact on the prospects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in Asia. The author concludes that Japan has demonstrated an obvious refusal to sign the TPNW, in spite of all factors which could have produced the alternative position. However, its views remain ambiguous, as Tokyo adheres to international nuclear non-proliferation regimes and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. On the one hand, Japan is one of the U.S.' main allies, remaining under the U.S. security guaranties, being protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella from external threats, and incorporated in the global system of nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, there is certain support for ideas of nuclear non-proliferation and prohibition of nuclear weapons in Japanese

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society, which is demonstrated by the activity of Japanese anti-nuclear non-governmental organizations. Consequently, in relation to the TPNW, Japan demonstrates an inconsistent course, involving the reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella in order to provide its security and active participation in the international nuclear non-proliferation initiatives simultaneously.

**Keywords:** Japan, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, international regimes, non-governmental organizations, disarmament, Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference.

The opening for signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which took place during the 72<sup>nd</sup> session of the UN General Assembly on 20 September 2017, became the result of a multilateral initiative of non-nuclear states and anti-nuclear NGOs [Sign the Nuclear Ban Treaty 2018]. The initiative is currently continued to be discussed in academic circles and political institutions of the non-proliferation regime. The treaty imposes on the states that accept its conditions the obligation not to have, use, produce, acquire, or deploy nuclear weapons, as well as to eliminate all existing stockpiles and to conduct an “irreversible conversion” [Dogovor o zapreshchenii... 2017]. As of 1 May 2020, the Treaty had been signed by 81 states, and 36 of them had ratified it [Signature and Ratification Status 2020]. Against the TPNW are the permanent members of the UN Security Council, which are the recognized members of the global “nuclear club”, other countries possessing nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan, Israel, and the DPRK), as well as some non-nuclear states – NATO members and Japan.

In the Russian and foreign academic circles, there are discussions concerning the legal aspects of the TPNW, its contradictions with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the struggle of interests within the campaign concerning the TPNW [Borrie, Spies, Wan 2018; Stefanovich 2017; MID: Moskva ne stanet... 2017]. In its most general version, the position of Russia and other nuclear states is that the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons is fraught

with the risks of a drastic change of status quo, the change in the existing global balance of power, and the deregulation of the international system of strategic deterrence, which, for more than half a century, has been successful in preventing armed conflicts of a global scale. Non-nuclear NATO member states do not join the TPNW due to the collective nature of the alliance, as the nuclear forces of the US, the UK, and France provide security guarantees to all its members.

When the multilateral Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons became open for signature, Japan's position immediately became the focus of attention. As the only state in the world that has been the target of a nuclear bombing and that continues to tackle the problems of long-term health consequences of the *hibakusha* (the survivors of the nuclear bombing), and that has in its constitution the renunciation of war as means of settling international disputes, Japan, it seemed, naturally had to join the treaty.

However, in reality, Tokyo essentially ignored the initiative. For example, the 2018 Diplomatic Bluebook does not say a single word about the treaty [Diplomatic Bluebook 2018]. The TPNW was also not mentioned in the Japanese side's statement in April 2018 at the meeting of the Preparatory Committee held at the UN Office in Geneva [Statement by H. E. Mr. Taro Kono 2018]. The most "articulated" expression of the nation's position can be considered to be the reply by Japan's Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō to a journalist's question at a press conference in October 2018: "[...] Japan has still not decided anything. However, Japan is not thinking of signing the TPNW" [Press Conference by Foreign Minister Taro Kono 2018]. It is worth noting that such a reply still leaves some space for maneuver. The evasiveness of the government representative's words obviously expresses the fact that Japan, being under the "nuclear umbrella" of the U.S., has to maneuver so as not to lose the support of and to retain its authority among non-nuclear states.

After that, Japan reaffirmed its refusal to sign the TPNW and demonstrated the duality of its nuclear disarmament policy during the UN General Assembly session in December 2018. Then, Japan and

other 40 countries (nuclear states, their allies and partners) voted against the Austria-backed resolution supporting the TPNW, which called for its early signature and ratification by all states that had not done it yet [A/RES/73/48 2018]. However, this was not the only anti-nuclear document not supported by Japan at that session. Its position became even more dubious after the Japanese delegation abstained during the discussion of the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons [A/RES/73/74 2018]. Given the historical experience of being a victim of nuclear bombing, an open vote against the resolution would look too outrageous. Therefore, it seems, such a compromise variant was chosen. As a “compensation”, at the same session, Japan introduced its own, much more general and neutral resolution, calling for general disarmament, strengthening of trust between states, and reduction of international tension [U.N. Adopts Japan’s Anti-Nuke Resolution... 2018]. The document was so vague and so thoroughly avoided mentioning the TPNW that even the U.S. did not vote against it and only abstained. Only Russia, China, the DPRK, and Syria voted against it [A/RES/73/62 2018].

In February 2019, during the UN disarmament conference in Geneva, the Japanese delegation did not make any references to the TPNW in its statement, though it made a pompous, virtually meaningless, and unsupported statement about the “responsibility” of the Japanese state to “lead international efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons” [Statement by H. E. Mr. Kiyoto Tsuji... 2019].

In late April – early May 2019, another session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference was held in New York. And, once again, the Japanese representative’s speech contained not a single word about the TPNW, even though the general necessity of nuclear disarmament was emphasized multiple times. Instead of this document, the Japanese delegation recommended all others to follow the NPT and to facilitate the coming into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and also to increase the transparency of information about their nuclear programs and to promote trust in the relations between nuclear and non-nuclear states [General Statement by H.R. Mr. Kiyoto Tsuji 2019].

To understand Japan's position regarding the TPNW, it is worthwhile to recall the legal framework defining this nation's policy regarding nuclear weapons. This framework is set by its participation in the NPT [Status of the Treaty 2018] and the CTBT [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 2018]. Japan attempts to position itself in the international community as a nation actively opposing nuclear weapons [Disarmament and Non-Proliferation... 2018]. At the official level, it follows the so-called Three Non-Nuclear Principles formulated in 1967 by Prime Minister E. Satō: not to possess nuclear weapons, not to manufacture them, and not to permit their introduction into Japanese territory [Three Non-Nuclear Principles 2018]. The country's commitment to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles was reaffirmed at different times by Japanese officials (for example, by prime ministers E. Satō [Three Non-Nuclear Principles 2018], Y. Noda [Message by Prime Minister... 2011], and N. Kan [Address by Prime Minister Naoto Kan... 2011]), and was stipulated in several Diet resolutions, though the nation's "Non-Nuclear Principles" have not become treaty obligations. Besides, the 2015 U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on the NPT expressed the Japanese side's commitment to the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and universal nuclear disarmament [U.S.-Japan Joint Statement... 2015].

Meanwhile, Tokyo's policy regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons contains substantial contradictions. Positioning itself as a non-nuclear state, in its security policy, Japan continues to rely on the "nuclear umbrella" – the U.S. nuclear security guarantees [Kristensen 2015]. Thus, if an enemy attacks Japan with nuclear weapons, the U.S. will take all measures to retaliate and will respond with a nuclear strike. The same is true in the case of an attack with non-nuclear weapons. In the Asia Pacific region, these obligations are extended to three U.S. allies – Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Essentially, these nations receive the same security guarantees as the U.S. citizens themselves [Jackson 2015]. For Japan, these guarantees became even more relevant given the nuclear threats from the DPRK, which pursues its own nuclear program, and the growing tension in relations with nuclear-armed China, whose military might is growing rapidly.

However, observers also note that the above-mentioned U.S. nuclear guarantees – seemingly, most significant and important, if not exceptional – nevertheless do not possess sufficient weight, as they represent “a promise for the least-likely situation”. Indeed, a nuclear attack, for example, by China seems less likely than an escalation of the two nations’ territorial dispute in the East China Sea and a clash caused by this issue. However, the U.S. prefer to either remain neutral in the situation with the East China Sea, or give minimal and almost exclusively verbal support to the Japanese claims to the islands [Jackson 2015], although Japan’s obligations of a U.S.’ ally are growing [Strel’tsov 2016].

A neighboring state, China, keeps growing its might, both nuclear and conventional, does not ratify the CTBT, regularly reminds its neighbors about its territorial claims, while, as far as the balance of power is concerned, Japan is inferior to the actively militarizing Beijing. As a result, Japan is increasingly building up its own military. And while this is still limited to conventional weapons, Japan lacks a direct legal prohibition of nuclear weapons, while the supporters of the “nuclear option” enjoy relatively strong positions in the military establishment of the nation. It is no accident that, during the past several decades, various political forces in Japan made statements about the possibility and even advisability of acquiring an independent nuclear arsenal [Strel’tsov 2010], which happened even (!) after the growth of public concern with the issues of nuclear security and the worsening of radioactive situation in some areas due to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster [Kingston 2012, p. 12].

Many experts, both from Russia and other countries, consider Japan one of the threshold states, which have all technical and economic possibilities to quickly create a nuclear arsenal [Fuhrmann, Tkach 2015; Burnie, Smith 2001; Turner 2003; Zemletryasenie v Yaponii... 2011; Pis’mo amerikanskikh... 2013]. Besides the cutting-edge level of its high-tech industry, Japan also possesses the amount of plutonium sufficient to produce at least 6,000 nuclear warheads. According to some estimates, these reserves reach 45 tons, while 8 kg is sufficient to create a nuclear device. Only Russia and the U.S. possess larger declared stockpiles,

and the amount of China's plutonium stockpiles is unknown. Besides, Japan has means of delivery – missiles capable of carrying a payload a long distance. The time it might take Japan to create nuclear weapons, provided such a political decision is taken, is estimated within the range of half a year to a year [Winn 2019].

The main Japanese political force that supports the acquisition of nuclear weapons are the far-right nationalists. As far as their representation in the nation's politics is concerned, their organized groups and communities number about a thousand. They conduct active propaganda, use every effort to convey their radical ideas to the people. As a result, according to surveys, nowadays every tenth Japanese person supports their country acquiring its own nuclear arsenal [Winn 2019]. And while no open steps towards its creation have been observed yet, Japan has often been in the spotlight of scandals related to fissile materials and nuclear technologies, for example, related to the disappearance of more than 200 kg of plutonium [Yaponskiye atomshchiki... 2003], failure to provide to the IAEA information about all stockpiles of plutonium in the country [MID KNR potrebovalo... 2014], etc. Several Western media reported informal contacts between nuclear scientists from Japan, North Korea, and Taiwan [Hayes, Cavazos 2015, p. 285]. And some Japanese politicians do not hesitate to state in their interviews that it is high time to leave only two out of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, at least permitting the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan's territory [Velloor 2019].

At the same time, Japan is very active in international non-proliferation regime institutes. For example, together with Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, since 2010, Japan participates in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). This group unites a number of influential non-nuclear states from all regions of the world. In the 2010s, the NPDI group of nations regularly published various documents on the current issues of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Among them were the suggestions to create in the Middle East a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ),

resolutions condemning the DRPK nuclear tests, calls to de-alert the nuclear weapons of nuclear states [Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 2018], etc. Of importance are the following activities of the group: involving a maximum number of nations in the CTBT, propaganda of the necessity of its signature and ratification, regular exchanges of information on the issues of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; demanding the increase of transparency of military programs of nuclear powers [Statement by H.E. Mr. Taro Kono 2018].

Besides its activities within the framework of the NPDI, Japan also calls for the spread of information about the consequences of use of nuclear weapons and for wider education in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also takes on the responsibility to promote these activities within the country [Statement by H.E. Mr. Taro Kono, 2018]. In 2015-2017 Japan co-chaired the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT [Kazakhstan vystupit... 2015]. At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Japanese side, in addition to the standard calls to universal disarmament and improvement of mechanisms of its verification, called the attention of the participants to the humanitarian consequences of use of nuclear weapons in relation to the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese representative voiced the suggestions of the NPDI group on securing the transparency of military programs of nuclear states [Statement by H.E. Mr. Toshio Sano 2015] and, on behalf of 76 states, made a statement on non-proliferation education.

Among the signatories of this statement were various nations of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America – both non-nuclear ones and the nuclear-possessing U.S. and Great Britain. The statement said that “a world without nuclear weapons is the common objective” of all NPT signatory states, and that the development of non-proliferation education and raising awareness of nuclear weapons-related threats and risks among all people of the planet, especially the young generation, should be one of the most important conditions of reaching this goal [Joint Statement on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education 2015]. The commitment to the ideas of the statement was also expressed by the

Japanese delegation at the session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2017 NPT Review Conference [Statement by Nobushige Takamizawa... 2017; Statement by Ambassador Mitsuru Kitano 2017].

It would be wrong to ignore the position of Japanese NGOs when covering the issue of the official Tokyo's position on the TPNW. These organizations, incorporating both experts and civil society activists, influence the government with their active efforts both by means of direct influence on the decision making process and by forming the public opinion, which the authorities have to pay attention to.

The most active of these are such organizations as the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, Peace Depot, Peace Boat, Nagasaki Youth, the Japanese Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (JALANA), various *hibakusha* societies (for example, Hibakusha Appeal, Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organisations, Japanese Liaison Council of Second-Generation Atomic Bomb Survivors, etc). A group of activists affiliated with the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) is also functioning in Japan. Some academic organizations are also engaged in the social activism. For example, the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) is an important participant of the global non-proliferation movement [Nagasaki daigaku kakuheiki haizetsu kenkyū sentā]. The activities of all these actors are similar – they include promotion of initiatives on development of non-proliferation education within the country, propaganda of ideas of the non-nuclear status of the country and universal nuclear disarmament.

Non-acceptance of the TPNW by Japan is partly explained in a detailed report by the Group of Eminent Persons issued in 2018. According to the authors of the report, the TPNW, despite all its humanitarian and political significance and its resonance with the aspirations and fears of non-nuclear nations, will not become efficient due to the non-participation of the “nuclear five”. Besides, the Treaty does not take into consideration the realities of international security and the threats due to which the nuclear states and their allies (an almost direct reference to Japan – *K. M.*) have to employ nuclear deterrence. The report's authors

justly note that the Treaty clarifies neither the mechanisms of verification of nuclear disarmament, nor the measures to facilitate it. Moreover, according to the Group of Eminent Persons NGO, the adoption of the TPNW leads to the “delegitimation of the foundations of the international non-proliferation regime” [Building Bridges... 2018, p. 17-18].

During the 2018 Preparatory Committee, the Group of Eminent Persons held a special briefing. The experts representing the organization voiced the ideas of “non-compatibility of nuclear weapons with the norms of international humanitarian law”, the importance of joint work for the purpose of evaluating the threats to the non-proliferation regime, the necessity to produce practical proposals aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the regime towards the 2020 Review Conference, the necessity of preserving the “spirit of the NPT”, increasing the transparency of technical aspects of military programs of nuclear states, decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines, and emphasizing the concept of human security in these doctrines, which should gradually replace the concept of national security. However, as far as the TPNW was concerned, it was only said that “it was not worth evaluating it as definitely good or definitely bad”. According to the experts of the Japanese NGO, what is most important is that it creates “an international environment for the discussion of the problem”.

A more positive evaluation of the TPNW is presented in the 2018 Hiroshima Report distributed during the sessions of the Preparatory Committee by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The report evaluates the TPNW as the first attempt to legally ban nuclear weapons and as an example of the role of civil society in international processes. At the same time, the report emphasizes that the treaty has been ratified only by a small number of countries and that the members of the “nuclear club” refused to conduct any negotiations about the document [Hiroshima Report 2018].

The author of this article also collected the comments about Japan’s position concerning the TPNW from other representatives of Japanese academic circles and civil society activists. For example, Hirose Satoshi,

Professor of the Nagasaki University, noted that the TPNW appeared “too early”, that it was “incomplete”, that it contained many gaps, and that, most importantly, there were no concrete parameters of verifying the fulfillment of obligations. The expert evaluated the role of the Treaty as merely symbolic, expressed mostly in its “stigmatizing” nuclear weapons. Compared to other multilateral documents in the field of WMD control (the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, which became effective, respectively, in 1975 and 1997), the TPNW is a “skeleton without bones and muscle”, and currently there seem to be no prospects of improving it. S. Hirose notes that Japan itself “hates nuclear weapons in principle”, but, because there remains a real danger posed, first of all, by the threats from the DPRK, Japan needs the U.S. “nuclear umbrella”. The researcher also acknowledges that Japan’s far-right circles harbor nuclear ambitions. Besides, according to S. Hirose, an important factor defining Japan’s position is the militarization of China, which is strengthening its military might, first of all, due to internal reasons: President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, aims to, on the one hand, secure the support of the people by means of economic development of the country and, on the other hand, to prevent excessive independence of its citizens, who must rely on the state and the Communist Party in all matters. The spread of radical nationalism in the PRC also poses a threat [The Author’s Interview with S. Hirose].

According to another researcher from the Nagasaki University, Professor Suzuki Tatsujirō, the reason for refusal to sign the TPNW consists in the fact that “the Japanese government considers the system of nuclear deterrence necessary due to the difficult international environment in North East Asia”. Japan is relying on the U.S. role in the ultimate settlement of the problem of the DPRK nuclear program and categorically distrusts the declarations of China about its rejection of possibility of a preemptive nuclear strike. The principle of Japan’s rejection of nuclear weapons is not a legal obligation. T. Suzuki notes

that, from the legal point of view, even the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan cannot be ruled out: “Americans may not introduce nuclear weapons into Japanese territory, but the Japanese government will refuse only if they ask for its permission, but, in reality, the U.S. does not thoroughly report the contents of every ship. Under these conditions, T. Suzuki believes, the TPNW is respected by the Japanese society as an initiative with great potential that has gained the support of many non-nuclear states, but, nevertheless, Japan will hardly be able to ever sign it [The Author’s Interview with T. Suzuki]. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that, in addition to the threat from China and the DPRK, Japan is also concerned about the presence of two more nuclear states in its relative proximity, in the same region of the Asia Pacific, namely, India and Pakistan. In particular, during the 2018 Preparatory Committee, the Japanese delegation urged to strive for making both of these nations eventually join the NPT as non-nuclear states, i.e. it essentially demanded their disarmament [Statement by Ambassador Mitsuru Kitano 2018].

Going back to the opinions of Japanese activists, it is also worth noting that the coordinator of the Peace Depot group, Yamaguchi Daisuke, believes that the reason for Japan’s refusal to sign the TPNW is that, as far as the issue of nuclear non-proliferation is concerned, there is a clear division in the country: there is the position of the civil society (in favor of universal disarmament, abandonment of nuclear weapons, and signing the TPNW), and there is the position of the state (in favor of the universal nuclear deterrence system). The state’s position is defined by the presence of outside threats, originating mainly from North Korea and China. However, the Japanese activist notes that one should not ascribe the views of Chinese party and military leadership in the field of arms buildup to the entire Chinese people, as “the people in China have no freedom of speech. Probably, the general public think differently” [The Author’s Interview with D. Yamaguchi].

A similar opinion concerning the position of the Japanese state on the TPNW is also expressed by the ICAN Japan coordinator, Kawasaki Akira, who is simultaneously a member of the Peace Boat: while the Treaty “corresponds to the aspirations of those who have been

unfortunate to suffer the effects of nuclear weapons in some way”, the Japanese politics has “two faces”, the activist says: the one belonging to Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and other regional centers together with their leaders, and the one belonging to Tokyo, the government representatives, the diplomats. The former support the ideals of universal nuclear disarmament, while the latter embody an absolutely clear policy – that of a nation that has an alliance with the U.S. It is them who declare that Japan will not sign or ratify the TPNW in the foreseeable future, despite the “normative role” of the TPNW, the “pressure of the public opinion”, and its role in “stigmatizing” nuclear weapons, which is still “a symbol of a nation’s greatness in mass consciousness”, but still bears the threat of “inhuman suffering”. Meanwhile, Japan needs the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” given the threats from China and North Korea, even though, according to A. Kawasaki, China will hardly go to war with Japan, because it depends on the latter and “will not be able to develop without cooperation with it” [The Author’s Interview with A. Kawasaki].

The NGO representatives claim to be trying to influence the Japanese government, but there have been no substantial changes in its position. They also work with the global public opinion: for example, during the 2018 Preparatory Committee, petitions in support of the TPNW were distributed among the delegates by such Japanese NGOs as Hibakusha Appeal, Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organisations, “Mayors for Peace”, as well as a well-known religious organization *Sōka Gakkai*.

The representatives of the Japanese media also believe the government’s position to be at odds with the public opinion. During the 2018 Preparatory Committee, in informal conversations with the author, they noted that Japan’s position looked “strange”, while highly evaluating the work of NGOs aimed at fostering anti-nuclear ideas in society. Outside the framework of the Preparatory Committee, one can also provide examples of media publications which condemn the Japanese government’s chosen position of refusing to sign the TPNW [Kakugunshuku dōkō hyōka Nihon 12 i ni kōtai 2018; Thakur 2017] and follow the campaigns of Japanese anti-nuclear NGOs [Nakayama 2018].

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Remaining an active participant of the international non-proliferation regime, Japan nevertheless does not join the initiative to ban nuclear weapons and refuses to sign the TPNW. This can be seen from the fact that, in their official statements, the Japanese government representatives evade the issue of the TPNW and do not state their refusal to sign it openly and categorically. The situation is paradoxical because Japan has suffered the consequences of nuclear bombings, some *hibakusha* are still alive, and their second generation suffer from health issues as well; finally, several anti-nuclear NGOs are active in the country. But none of these reasons is able to force the Japanese government to change its position.

The reason that is impervious to the influence of Japanese civil society is the fact that Japan has an alliance with the U.S., depends on it and keeps reaffirming that it is under the U.S. security guarantees. Japan is not ready to abandon these guarantees now and will hardly be able to do that in the foreseeable future due to the presence of threats to its security, or risks that it is interpreting as threats. Therefore, Japan continues to have a certain duality in its non-proliferation policy and leaves for itself a space for maneuver, using less important initiatives to maintain its image of a proponent of a non-nuclear world while simultaneously pursuing its own security interests.

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